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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation explores the philosophy of history that Heidegger 
presents in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. I argue that his philosophy 
of history differs importantly from several influential philosophical studies of 
history by his predecessors (particularly Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl), 
and that it makes a valuable contribution to subsequent philosophy of history. 
Heidegger’s existential analysis emphasizes the interpretive character of the 
individual’s relation to history and, as a consequence, the hermeneutical features 
of any philosophical approach to history. An essential part of his analysis is his 
insistence on the individual’s frequently shirked responsibility for her 
interpretations. I argue that this focus on personal responsibility for historical 
interpretation places a burden upon the individual but also opens a possibility for 
creative engagement with the world. The value of the future is opened through 
the individual’s responsible engagement with her history. 
 In the first the two chapters I introduce general sorts of problems that have 
beset the philosophy of history in the last two centuries, in particular, the 
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problems presented by the prospect of an objective interpretation of history.  
Since the objectivity of an interpretation implies that the interpretation has some 
authority over those who understand it, I contend that the prospect of objective 
historical interpretation raises specific and daunting questions about one’s 
responsibility with regard to such interpretations. 
I continue the theme of responsibility and authority in the latter two 
chapters. There, I am interested in dissuading the reader from the view that 
Heidegger adopts an irresponsible attitude toward historical interpretation in 
Being and Time.  By way of presenting a defense of Heidegger’s analysis of 
authenticity and inauthenticity, I argue that his philosophy amounts to a robust 
defense of historical responsibility. Through his analysis of conscience, guilt and 
resoluteness, Heidegger demonstrates Dasein’s capacity to recognize itself as a 
kind of entity that can and, indeed, must take responsibility for its interpretations 
and thereby for its historicity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Paradoxically, the rise of historical consciousness in the 19th Century led 
to a forgetfulness of history when it came to historical studies and the conditions 
that enabled them. We have the sense that we are historically contingent beings 
without inquiring into how we are historically contingent. Once we recognized that 
we were historically contingent, we thought that the main leap was done and now 
we just needed to do the work of uncovering our history in order understand 
ourselves. Recognition of our own historical contingency is just the first step, 
though. Next, we need to figure out in what way we are historical, and how 
history and our own historicity are accessible to us. Uncovering our history is not 
just a matter of discovering what happened before us; we also need to 
understand how it is available to us and the kinds of relationships that we have to 
it and that we can adopt towards it. In other words, historical consciousness 
forgot (or perhaps never knew) its own historical contingency. Heidegger 
suggests as much, contending that philosophers have missed the problem of 
history by focusing too much on the problems of historiography. What we need is 
an account of how we can genuinely take up our historical situation, both now 
and with a view to the future. 
 This dissertation is an exploration of the philosophy of history that 
Heidegger presents in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. I argue that his 
philosophy of history is importantly different from several influential philosophical 
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studies of history by his predecessors (particularly Heinrich Rickert and Edmund 
Husserl), and that it makes a valuable contribution to 20th Century philosophy of 
history as it developed by more “analytically”-minded philosophers including W.H. 
Walsh, William Dray and Maurice Mendelbaum. In particular, Heidegger 
advocates an existential exploration of the individual’s relation to history that 
emphasizes its interpretive character and the consequent interpretive features of 
any philosophical approach to history. An important part of his analysis is a 
discussion of the responsibility that the individual must take for her interpretations 
and that she nonetheless frequently denies. I suggest that this focus on personal 
responsibility with respect to historical interpretation not only puts a heavy weight 
upon the individual but also opens a possibility for her creative engagement with 
the world. The value of the future is opened up through the individual’s 
responsible engagement with her history. 
 In the first the two chapters I introduce several of the general issues that 
have guided the philosophy of history in the last two centuries. The first chapter 
gives an introduction to philosophical concerns about historical interpretation, 
including the prospects for objective interpretations of history. I examine several 
influential accounts, and one critique, of historical objectivity and argue that they 
raise troubling questions about the possibility the objective historical 
interpretation. This examination leads into the discussions of Heidegger in the 
third and fourth chapters. 
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In the first chapter, I also offer an argument that Heidegger is worthy of 
attention from philosophers of history. He is not often regarded as an explicit 
philosopher of history (at least not anymore). He is far more well-known as a 
hermeneutical phenomenologist and interpreter of ancient Greek philosophy and 
of modern day techno-science. I argue that his conception of Being and its 
relation to Dasein implies an important connection between historical phenomena 
and the phenomenon of Being. Put briefly, Heidegger takes the “question of 
Being” to be simultaneously central to philosophical inquiry and forgotten by 
philosophers throughout history. Every object of philosophical inquiry is Being in 
one way or another but, according to Heidegger’s contention, philosophers have 
repeatedly failed to clarify the meaning of “Being”. In order to undertake this 
neglected investigation, Heidegger places the individual human being, Dasein, at 
the center, arguing that Dasein has a privileged philosophical position because it 
is the only entity that both is (has Being) and cares about what Being is. In other 
words, human beings are the only entities who care about what they are and the 
only ones for whom the question of Being has any meaning whatsoever. 
Individual human beings always live within and understand themselves 
from particular historical contexts. Their conceptions of themselves, of the world 
and other objects (including other people) are influenced in part by their 
understandings of Being. The interpretation of a person’s historical context is 
thus important for understanding how they conceptualize Being. Heidegger 
makes this point stronger by arguing that Being is itself historical. It always 
4 
 
reveals itself to human beings through (and within) historical contexts. The only 
access that we have to the phenomenon (or phenomena) of Being is via the 
interpretation of historical phenomena. Thus, an understanding of historical 
phenomena, and the possibilities of historical interpretation, is crucial to 
approaching Being as it reveals itself throughout history. A philosophy of history 
is necessary for Heidegger’s project, and in fact Heidegger’s suggestions seem 
to imply that philosophies of history are centrally important in any philosophical 
inquiry that takes the question of Being seriously (that is, any serious 
philosophical inquiry for the Heidegger of Being and Time). 
In the second chapter, I address three important precursors to 
Heidegger’s philosophy of history: Heinrich Rickert, Edmund Husserl and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. These three philosophers offer distinct approaches to the 
philosophy of history. In my discussions of the first two, I am particularly 
concerned with their attempts to justify claims to authoritative objectivity with 
respect to historical interpretation. In short, Rickert argues that the objectivity of 
one’s historical interpretations is underwritten by an appeal to universal values 
that illuminate the interpreted content. In contrast, while Husserl does not regard 
himself as a philosopher of history, he articulates a vision of Western 
philosophy’s historical project centered on an attempt to secure scientific 
objectivity (both in the natural and the humanistic sciences). These two 
philosophers locate the authority of historical interpretation in an appeal to 
something that transcends the individual human being. 
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Nietzsche, on the other hand, forcefully attacks the pretensions to 
objectivity of his historically inclined contemporaries. He argues that the demand 
for objectivity from historical interpretation has unhealthy consequences for those 
living in the light of those interpretations (both those offering them and those 
making use of them). Namely, the obsession with history prompts a withdrawal 
from the world in which the world is regarded as a dead object for dissection (or, 
at best, lethal vivisection), instead of a vital world that elicits human engagement. 
His analysis suggests that the attempt to secure the objectivity of one’s historical 
interpretations may have problematic and unintended consequences: primarily, 
that one is not responsible to and for the world because one can only interpret 
the world by appealing to something that transcends oneself (and thus for which 
one is not ultimately responsible). 
 I continue the theme of responsibility and authority in the latter two 
chapters. There, I am interested in dissuading the reader from the view that 
Heidegger is irresponsible toward historical interpretation in Being and Time. In 
the course of research, I was struck by the criticisms that were levelled against 
Heidegger by his contemporaries and immediate successors, and in particular by 
the difference between their reactions to Heidegger’s philosophical work and the 
reactions that have come with temporal distance. In some ways, it seems that the 
intervention of the Second World War exposed (or at least highlighted) potential 
dangers in Heidegger’s thought. The intellectual (not to mention physical and 
spiritual) damage done by Heidegger and his fellow Nazis, fresh in European 
6 
 
memory, spoke to the urgency of assessing Heidegger’s influence and legacy. 
Let me give several examples. 
 In his Negative Dialectics, Theodor Adorno takes Heidegger and the 
existentialists to task for intellectually encouraging submission to what is taken to 
be the irresistible force of history. He argues that paradoxically this submission is 
incited by the valorization of individual and irreducible existence – that is, 
subjectivity – against the totalizing forces of philosophy and science.1 He 
observes that in Heidegger’s concern for the history of philosophy, and 
particularly for historical concepts of Being that determine their respective eras, 
he engages in an “ontologization of history” that “permits one without a glance to 
attribute the power of Being to historical powers, and thus justify submission to 
historical situations as though it were commanded by Being itself.”2 In other 
words, one could always argue that the accession to one’s historical 
circumstances, to going with the flow of history, is philosophically legitimated 
through the analysis of Being. He claims that Heidegger’s analysis of existence 
and Being results in nothing “but the naked affirmation of what is anyway – the 
affirmation of power.”3 Even worse, this affirmation takes place amidst “the 
combination of radical bearing and sacred tone with a personality-directed 
ideology of genuineness and grit – qualities which individuals in the spirit of 
                                                 
1
 I do not want to develop his argument here as it is long and difficult. Adorno makes this 
argument primarily in chapter 2 of part 1 of Negative Dialectics. 
2
 Adorno, 130. 
3
 Adorno, 131. 
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privilege have the doltish cunning to reserve to themselves.”4 Far from being 
revolutionary, Being and Time, the accusation goes, is Heidegger wrapping 
reactionary and regressive philosophical views in a cloak of authenticity and 
individualism. In other words, while Heidegger may gesture towards individual 
responsibility, he really affirms irresponsible submission to impersonal Being. 
Adorno’s analysis casts serious doubts on Heidegger’s philosophical project and 
its effect on the intellectual lives of his successors. 
 In Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s 
philosophy in terms of obedience, power and tyranny along similar lines to those 
developed by Adorno. He calls Heidegger’s fundamental ontology a “philosophy 
of power” and a “philosophy of injustice.” He continues: 
Even though it opposes the technological passion issued forth from the 
forgetting of Being hidden by beings, Heideggerian ontology, which 
subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in 
general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably 
to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny.5 
 
Similarly to Adorno’s critique, Heidegger is accused of inciting subordination to 
Being, to the way things are. This subordination results in the control of human 
lives by the anonymous, impersonal power of the way things are. Again, 
Heidegger’s existential analytic, far from rescuing personal Dasein from 
reactionary and regressive forces, instead betrays the individual (and the Other) 
to the tyranny of those very forces. Heidegger’s philosophy, including his 
philosophy of history, is believed to preach an irresponsibility and submission to 
                                                 
4
 Adorno, 127. 
5
 Levinas, 46-47. Translation modified. 
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Being (and whatever is). Levinas also casts serious doubts on the ethical 
implications of Heidegger’s project. 
 With the passage of time and recent works on Heidegger and Nazism 
notwithstanding,6 the question of Heidegger’s possible moral and intellectual 
bankruptcy perhaps has become less urgent. He and his contemporaries do not 
cast the shadow that they once did. Nevertheless, the question is still important 
to an honest evaluation of his existential analytic and the philosophical project 
that he begins in the 1920s and that culminates in Being and Time. A central 
premise of the existential analytic is that Dasein – personal, human experience – 
has a fundamental role to play in philosophical activity, from the most particular, 
limited investigations to the most general, unlimited surveys of Being. The 
analysis of Dasein’s existence thus serves as a first philosophy. As such, it is 
crucial that any attempted analysis be examined at the beginning for unpalatable 
and irresponsible tendencies. 
In the latter two chapters, I present, to some small degree, a defense of 
Heidegger’s analysis of authenticity and inauthenticity, and thus attempt to 
rehabilitate the thought that Heidegger as a philosopher defends historical 
responsibility and abhors irresponsibility. In the third chapter, I argue that 
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s inevitable inauthenticity casts suspicion upon 
Dasein’s claims to scientific objectivity. Dasein is structurally constituted in part 
by a tendency to understand and interpret everything, including itself, the world, 
                                                 
6
 I am thinking here of responses to Richard Wolin’s Politics of Being in the 1990s and the recent 
publication of the Schwarze Hefte, along with the ensuing fallout. 
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other objects and other people, in terms that are passed down to it from the 
public world. That is, general, publicly available interpretations tend to govern the 
particular understandings that guide Dasein’s activities. This is not always 
problematic, in that collective activities – and there is a big question of whether 
there are any non-collective activities – require the individual to be on the same 
page as others, to allow her interpretations to be guided by those of others or by 
those of the public at large. However, the possibility of submissive conformism 
implies significant potential problems as well. Primarily amongst these, for my 
purposes, is the potential abrogation of responsibility for one’s guiding 
interpretations and thus for one’s activities. In terms of objectivity, interpretations 
made under the mantel of scientific objectivity are as susceptible to 
irresponsibility as any other guiding interpretation. As such, they must be 
questioned in light of the possibility of submissive irresponsibility. 
In the fourth chapter, I turn from the problems implied by the potential 
inauthenticity of scientific interpretation to Heidegger’s positive conception of 
authenticity. Given that Dasein’s inauthenticity is unavoidable, it is easy to see 
why one might think that Heidegger is preaching a bland conformism to the social 
movements and historical environment of one’s time. Levinas’ and Adorno’s 
criticisms of Heidegger’s philosophy as an affirmation and philosophy of (public) 
power are certainly not baseless.7 Accordingly, I offer an interpretation of 
                                                 
7
 I do not want to suggest here that their criticisms are based merely upon Heidegger’s account of 
inauthenticity, either. Their criticisms are much more detailed and subtle than that. For the 
purposes of this introduction, however, I only want to highlight the main issues that Heidegger’s 
discussion of inauthenticity prompts in broad strokes. 
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Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity in Division II of Being and Time. I argue 
that through his analysis of conscience, guilt and resoluteness, Heidegger 
presents a possibility for Dasein to recognize itself as the only kind of entity that 
can take responsibility for its interpretations, even as it evades that responsibility. 
He does not suggest that Dasein ever rises to the occasion of authenticity, but he 
does highlight a possibility for Dasein’s existence. I would suggest that this 
possibility could form the basis of an ethics, though I do not develop that 
possibility in any detail there. 
Finally, at the end of the fourth chapter, I return to the philosophers of 
history discussed in the first two chapters. I argue there that those philosophers 
fail to secure their accounts of historical objectivity against the problematic 
possibilities of inauthenticity and do not account for the possibility of authentic 
historical interpretation as Heidegger discusses it. I conclude with a brief remark 
about the importance of speculative, existential philosophies of history against 
their more epistemologically-focused cousins. 
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CHAPTER 1: MARTIN HEIDEGGER AS PHILOSOPHER OF HISTORY 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Philosophy of History 
 
 The philosophy of history is a broad field with many particular (and 
frequently contradictory) projects, interests and issues. It can be (and usually is) 
divided into two general projects: critical philosophy of history and speculative 
philosophy of history.8 The former is an investigation into the epistemological 
structures and prospects of the discipline that we call “history.” A central question 
here is whether history is a scientific discipline; that is, critical philosophers of 
history concern themselves with whether history does or can provide the 
historian and the public with scientific knowledge of its subject matter along the 
lines of the more familiar sciences. A major theme in this branch has been the 
epistemological similarities and dissimilarities between history and the more 
established natural sciences. Questions of the explanatory character of historical 
claims and their truth and objectivity are thus crucial to the critical philosophy of 
history.  
 On the other hand, the speculative philosophy of history is concerned with 
metaphysical questions about the past itself. The speculative philosophers of 
history have been interested in uncovering the ultimate intelligibility of the past. 
                                                 
8
 Many commentators make this distinction. It can be traced at least to the epistemological and 
metaphysical revolutions of the late 18
th
 Century. See, for instance, W.H. Walsh’s Introduction to 
the Philosophy of History, which is probably still the best introduction to the subject. 
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W.H. Walsh has attributed this interest to “the feeling that there is something 
morally outrageous in the notion that history has no rhyme or reason in it.”9 
Though this claim is misleading in that the feeling surely is not universal, it gives 
some idea of the motivations behind speculative philosophy of history. If history 
is irrational (if it evinces no rhyme or reason), then we seem to be the irrational 
products of irrational forces; and if that is so, then what hope is there for us and 
our attempt to guide our own future? What justifies what we have done with the 
world as we found it and what we have left for future generations? No grand 
historical projects seem possible if history itself is irrational. (It is not mere 
happenstance that many philosophies of history are theodicies.10) 
The speculative project takes several interconnected forms. There is an 
attempt to discover the justification and point of the past, its meaning. This 
search has frequently involved narration of an intelligible plot evinced through 
history.11 As part of explicating the movements of history, the speculative branch 
also deals with the mechanisms of historical development and change. If we are 
to find a plot that explains historical events, we must understand the underlying 
processes that relate those historical events to each other (the connections that 
                                                 
9
 Walsh, Introduction, 119. 
10
 St. Augustine’s City of God and Hegel’s works on the philosophy of history are examples of 
historically oriented theodicies. 
11
 Hegel’s works on the philosophy of history are perfect examples of this kind of history. World 
history is the story of Spirit’s realization and reconciliation of its own freedom, and the stages of 
that history are intelligible as they fit into that greater story. 
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draw events into a coherent whole). It thus takes the form of an investigation into 
the a priori principles of historical development and of its interpretation.12 
 William Dray lays out three kinds of questions that the speculative 
philosopher of history aims to answer, which might help clarify my remarks in the 
previous paragraphs.13 The first question is whether history displays any pattern 
of events, be it a linear progression or regression, a cycle of the two or some 
other form. We might think of this inquiry as determining whether there is any 
discernable organization to the events of the past. The second question is, 
assuming that there is some sense to be made of the past, by what means are 
different parts of the past connected to one another? Mechanism is Dray’s word, 
but he admits that it is somewhat misleading, since it gives the impression that 
human beings and their products are only subject to mechanical forces. 
Philosophers of history and historians need not confine themselves to 
mechanical explanations. For instance, psychological and sociological 
explanations of behavior are much more prominent in historical explanations than 
physical mechanism ever is. The third question is, what is the purpose, value or 
justification of history? As Dray observes, while the first two questions are 
properly asked by historians as well, this final question is the province of 
philosophers.14 The first two questions are matters of fact and subject to 
                                                 
12
 Marx is a good example of this kind of speculative philosophy. He explicates the fundamental 
forces that motivate historical change, explain the necessity of the capitalist stage of production 
and exchange, and ultimately guarantee the success of the proletarian revolution. 
13
 See his excellent introduction entitled, Philosophy of History. He discusses the following three 
question at 64-65. 
14
 Dray, 65. 
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empirical research. In contrast, questions of justification cannot be answered 
through historical-empirical study. Without a prior commitment to principles which 
justify what ought to be rather than what is, no empirical evidence can compel a 
person to accept or reject a particular justification for an event or sequence of 
events.15 In other words, for the philosopher of history, is cannot imply ought. 
 As one might expect from the examples provided above, speculative 
philosophy of history has been largely neglected in recent disciplinary history.16 
Metaphysical and political interests have motivated speculative investigations, 
and neither interest has brought repute to those investigations. Metaphysics was 
under attack from all sides for much of the 20th Century, to the degree that 
philosophy of history did not benefit from its association.17 Political philosophy 
acquired more caché, perhaps in part due to ideological struggles that 
characterized much of the last 150 years, but it has not benefited from its 
association with partisan interests. Claims about the arc of history made in 
support of (or as a consequence of) a particular political view are regarded with a 
measure of suspicion, sometimes justly and sometimes not. In addition, 
                                                 
15
 What I have in mind here is that merely providing empirical evidence that an event took place 
and that it had such and such effects does not support any particular justification or response to 
that event. Contextualizing information about the social values of that event and its consequences 
have to be provided as well. If I landed on Mars and discovered that the Martians were about to 
punish a local for smiling at his neighbor, no amount of evidence that he really did smile at his 
neighbor or that his neighbor felt angry about that would convince me that his punishment is 
justified. Instead, the Martians would have to explain what is wrong about smiling at one’s 
neighbor, and this explanation would have to rely, at least in part, on explanations of the relevant 
social context. 
16
 For just one instance, the manifesto published at the recent founding of the Journal for the 
Philosophy of History contains no mention of speculative philosophy. 
17
 Walsh suggests that speculation fell into ill repute due to its “metaphysical extravagance.” See 
Walsh, Introduction, 14. 
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advances in the critical philosophy of history have perhaps undermined its 
speculative cousin. The increasing integration of history into the academy as an 
independent discipline – that is, one with its own subject matter, methods and 
standards – coincides with interest in the scientific status of history.18 The 
triumph of non-teleological conceptions of science is bound to influence the types 
of inquiries that historians (and philosophers of history) view as legitimate. If 
genuine sciences exclude questions of telos, then the meaning of history as a 
whole, and by extension of individual events, becomes at the least unscientific. 
History is unveiled as no more intelligible than nature to the scientific historian. 
She can search for causes and effects (and perhaps for Hempel’s covering 
laws19), but not for meanings. Philosophers of history (or other amateurs) might 
attempt to discern the plot of history, but they will be no more attaining scientific 
knowledge of their subject than a memoirist exhibits a scientific knowledge of 
hers. Moreover, critical philosophy of history can undermine the second branch 
of speculation, the a priori principles of historical mechanism and interpretation. 
The traditional view has been that questions of interpretation and methodological 
principles are always answered outside of the normal discourse of a science.20 
                                                 
18
 The development of Neokantian philosophy of history (particularly, the Southwest School) over 
the course of the 19
th
 Century is an example of this relation. In the 20
th
 Century, developments in 
the philosophy of science prompted responses from philosophers of history as well. For as long 
as there has been modern philosophy of history, it has been heavily influenced by 
contemporaneous philosophy of science. 
19
 See for instance Carl Hempel, “The Function of General Laws in History,” in Journal of 
Philosophy (39). 
20
 There is a massive literature built around this claim, much too extensive to reference here. 
Rudolf Carnap, Thomas Kuhn, Ian Hacking and Heidegger are four influential theorists that jump 
to mind. For example, see Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity for a discussion of the relations 
between object languages and metalanguages. See Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions for 
16 
 
Such canons and principles must be decided outside of scientific practice on pain 
of circularity and paradox. (In other words, our reason to accept the canons and 
principles of a science cannot be simply because the science asserts them as its 
canons and principles.) The basic concepts and logic of a science may be 
decided in the course of scientific practice, but they do not and cannot depend on 
that practice for their justification.21 
 Although speculative investigations are regarded now as seriously 
misguided (at best) by philosophers of history, I think it would be foolish to 
completely abandon speculative interest in the significance of the past. The past 
is undoubtedly meaningful. Our world and the lives that we live within it did not 
spring into existence ex nihilo. They have a history. Our present and future lives 
are circumscribed by the way we have conducted ourselves from birth to now 
and how others have conducted themselves before us and around us. Our 
collective institutions and organizations derive their legitimacy from their 
continuity with founding and affirming moments in the past. Our conflicts are 
frequently rooted in past events and draw their power to captivate us from our 
own orientation towards the past. In order to understand these elements of our 
lives, we have to understand their historical contexts. Of course, we can live out 
our lives without sensitivity to our historical contexts, but to do so would be to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
a discussion of paradigmatic interpretations and scientific practice. Hacking’s Social Construction 
of What? contains interesting analyses of the relations between social-historical background and 
scientific practices. Heidegger’s Being and Time contains a number of analyses of the relations 
between philosophical ontology and the sciences. See, for instance, §3 for an early discussion of 
the relation. 
21
 More on this below. 
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oblivious to the gravity (or levity) of our situations at best, and at worst to court 
disaster. Understanding our history is an essential element of understanding 
ourselves. The meaningfulness of the past in part arguably informs the 
meaningfulness of the present. 
The premise that the past is experienced as meaningful certainly does not 
support the conclusion that there is an overarching master narrative of the past. 
However, there is still room for speculation in this area, perhaps not in 
uncovering the central meaning of universal history, but instead in taking up the 
past as a meaningful part of the individual’s own existence. In that case, the past 
would still have meaning, even if it does not have a single, ultimate meaning. 
 
1.2 The Normative Authority of Historical Interpretation 
 
There is one area in which it is widely acknowledged that critical and 
speculative philosophers of history have overlapping interests: the philosophical 
investigation of historical interpretation.22 The past is significant, both as an 
object of knowledge for the critical philosopher and as a meaningful dimension of 
human experience for the speculative philosopher. It is inaccessible other than 
through interpretation, be it explicit or otherwise, both for those who intend to 
know it and those who intend to discern its meaning. There is thus interpretive 
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 Both critical and speculative philosophers of history acknowledge that this is true. I know of no 
theorist who would deny that interpretive work is required in historical practice. This of course 
does not mean that everyone agrees on precisely the types of interpretive work required, nor on 
the precise character of that interpretive work. 
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work that must be done by anyone who would concern herself with the past. 
Given that a person cannot dive into the past and immediately perceive it, she 
must work through the presently accessible traces of that past. Accordingly, she 
must interpret the present evidence to form conjectures about the past. The 
discipline of source criticism is an example of such interpretive work. In addition 
to limitations on the interpretation of evidence, she cannot provide a complete 
representation of the past. No human being could possibly comprehend and 
represent the colossal vista of billions of years, let alone the mere thousands of 
years of recorded human history. Hence, she needs to select relevant subjects 
from the potential material. So, too, she has to interpret the relevance and 
importance of past events and their present traces in light of her interests and 
objectives. Moreover, she has no access to the inner life of her human subjects 
either. Motives, incentives and stimuli are never entirely revealed. She thus must 
interpret what their actions mean within given contexts, much like how we all 
must interpret the actions of others. 
My primary interest in this dissertation is the investigation of historical 
interpretation. In particular, in what follows, I examine the notion of authority as it 
applies to interpretations of one’s historical place. As the philosophers of history 
that I have discussed above present it, the attempt to understand one’s historical 
place is an attempt to situate oneself within a larger context of historical forces 
and narratives that is thought to condition one’s own life. To understand my 
historical place is to understand how I fit into the larger pictures that historical 
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study affords us and to understand how my life moving forward is enabled and 
constrained by the elements of those larger pictures. A central concern for any 
interpretation thus produced is the authority that the interpretation can claim. I do 
not want to have any old understanding of my historical place; I want my 
understanding to have some measure of authority. I want it to be an authoritative 
understanding.23 Similarly, I do not want to communicate just any old 
understanding of our historical situation to others; I want to communicate an 
authoritative understanding. 
Considering that it is a major theme of the following discussions of 
historical interpretation, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by authority. The 
subject of authority has been explored in a number of contexts in a variety of 
different ways.24 For my purposes, I believe there are several clarifying theses 
about authority that are widely held and can be succinctly stated. Authority is 
normative; that is, authoritative claims have normative implications for those who 
are subject to them. Authority sets norms that govern activities (of various kinds). 
For instance, the official baseball rulebook, as authoritative, has normative 
implications that govern the playing the baseball. A napkin upon which I have 
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 I do not mean to suggest here that authority is the only evaluation relevant to an interpretation. 
I should be interested in having true interpretations. That is, I want my interpretations to be 
constrained in some sense by the interpreted phenomena. For my purposes in this dissertation, 
however, I am not going to focus on that evaluative constraint. I am primarily interested in the 
evaluation of interpretation that is proper to just one side of the relation between interpreter and 
interpreted. I focus on the authority of an interpretation for one’s self and others, regardless of 
whether the interpretation is true or not. 
24
 Perhaps most familiarly, authority is discussed philosophically in the context of political theory. 
Because I am interested primarily in interpretive authority in the following, I will not be discussing 
political connotations in any depth (though there are certainly some connections to be drawn 
there). 
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scribbled some baseball rules that I know does not have such normative 
implications, and hence is not authoritative. 
Not only does authority set norms; it also demands subordination from 
those and that over whom and which it has authority. Authority subjects 
subordinates to norms that govern their activities. The baseball rulebook does 
not make claims about baseball that can be obeyed or not while playing.25 It 
makes claims about baseball that must be obeyed if one is to play baseball at all. 
In other words, anyone who would play baseball must subordinate herself to the 
rules that govern that activity. Authoritative claims make normative demands on 
anyone who would involve herself with the activities relevant to them. If the 
baseball rulebook states that a player goes to first base on a walk, then that 
statement places normative demands on anyone seeking to navigate that 
situation. If she is to continue playing baseball, she must do as the rulebook 
states. 
My final thesis on authority is that, in addition to demanding subordination 
to norms, it claims exclusivity over the activities that it governs. That is, the 
authority in any activity excludes any rival authority over that activity. This is a 
consequence of the fact that authority has normative implications. The 
authoritative norms are supposed to provide guidance to subordinates engaged 
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 Of course, this is not to say that it is impossible for a player to break rules while playing (that is 
a widespread and uncontroversial experience). Rather, it is to say that the player does not get a 
choice in which rules are the rules of baseball. That is the purview of the baseball rulebook (or, 
more properly, of those who have authority over the content of the baseball rulebook). The 
subjects of authority can violate the norms governing their activities, but they do not choose the 
norms. 
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in the governed activity. If there are conflicting norms (or conflicting authorities 
determining the norms), then there may be conflicting demands made upon the 
participants. The activity may lose its coherence, and thus cease to be an activity 
at all, becoming instead an unordered chaos. In order to govern its associated 
activities, the baseball rulebook must have at least the pretense to being all and 
the only rules of baseball. Contenders would lead to serious problems in the 
coherence of the game itself.26 
There are many ways that historians, and average individuals, imbue their 
interpretations with authority. One might harness the authoritative sources when 
constructing an historical work. Using interviews with the immediate participants 
in an historical event may attach authority to the work. (Of course, if the 
participants are known to be unauthoritative, perhaps because they conspired to 
hide the truth, their word would not provide authority in the way a historian might 
want.) One might use other sources of evidence to establish authority 
(archeological or philological work, for instance). One might use one’s own titles, 
an academic affiliation for instance, to give one’s own historical interpretations 
authority. The person who does not have recourse to such specialized claims to 
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 For clarification, I am not claiming here that authorities always are exclusive. That is a different 
issue from whether authorities make a claim to exclusivity. Many activities may be in fact 
incoherent because they contain contradictory norms and authorities (antinomies are not unheard 
of). The picture is also complicated by the fact that virtually all activities are mixed in some sense, 
in that multiple authorities govern different aspects of what looks like one activity. So, for 
instance, while players are engaged in a baseball game, they cannot kill their opponents, even 
though there is nothing in the baseball rulebook that states that you cannot kill your opponent. 
This is because while they are playing baseball, they are also engaged in a second activity: living 
in civil society. They must obey both the authoritative norms of the one activity (baseball) and the 
authoritative norms of the other activity as well (civil society). 
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authority might appeal to common sense to underpin the authority of her 
interpretations. 
The attempt to understand the past, either in its grand sweep or in limited 
parcels, poses a number of difficulties for the authority of any such attempt. I will 
focus on three in what follows. 
One of the basic observations made by philosophers of history (and 
anyone who has paid attention to history instruction at any level) is that every 
generation writes new history books, frequently overturning and contradicting the 
received interpretations of their parents and mentors.27 That is, our 
interpretations of history change over time and draw significantly from the cultural 
milieu in which they are written and received. Interpretations of history thus are 
themselves historical artifacts. Moreover, they are examples of historical artifacts 
which play a significant role in determining what kinds of interpretations are 
available to the interpreter. Interpretations are an historical phenomenon which 
sets the terms within which further interpretations are created. This suggests two 
issues that confront the historical interpreter. 
The first issue is that interpretation is always done from perspectives that 
are constituted in part by sets of preconceptions. These preconceptions guide 
the interpreter in ways that are sometimes obvious and sometimes concealed. 
For instance, preconceptions about the importance of political journalism for the 
development of democracy in modern France perhaps entail that one should 
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 This observation is made in virtually every theoretical introduction to the philosophy of history. 
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have at least a passing familiarity with the works (or at least the assassination) of 
Jean-Paul Marat. Less obviously, preconceptions about the crucial importance of 
formalized, state institutions for the development of democracy may guide the 
interpreter’s assessments of the interactions between the French National Guard 
and the National Convention. Additionally, those latter preconceptions might lead 
an interpreter to attend less to the informal political activities of Parisians in the 
city’s marketplaces. Interpretive preconceptions guide both positively and 
negatively. 
Given that interpretation is always guided by preconceptions, the authority 
of an interpretation relies upon its preconceptions. One’s preconceptions carry 
normative weight, such that they determine norms that should govern my actions 
if I accept those preconceptions. In other words, if I am going to accept the 
interpretation (as something that guides my activities), I should accept its 
preconceptions. Contrapositively, if I do not accept the preconceptions, then I 
should not accept the interpretation as providing guidance to my relevant 
activities. Hence, since our preconceptions are liable to criticism, the authority of 
our interpretations is also liable to criticism. For instance, I could interpret the 
French Revolution as a complex outcome of Martian domestic politics because 
my neighbor the botanist says the Martians and the French were in close contact 
in the late 18th Century. One need not take such an interpretation seriously, 
though, because my neighbor’s expertise does not imbue that particular 
interpretation with authority. Additionally, even if my neighbor was an authority on 
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the French Revolution, the problematic preconception that Martians were in 
contact with the French, despite all the evidence that there have never been any 
Martians, presents a serious deficiency in the authority of the interpretation. (In 
contrast, if my neighbor the botanist claimed that his trees were dying due to 
Dutch Elm disease, one could take that as an authoritative interpretation.) 
Moreover, if I then interpret anti-democratic activities as anti-Martian activities 
(since our democracies are the unnatural result of Martian conspiracies) on the 
basis of Martian-French contacts, one need not accept that interpretation either.  
The second issue that confronts the historical interpreter is the obvious 
finitude of her own interpretations. Just as one generation rewrites the histories 
handed down by the previous generation, it must also recognize that its children 
will rewrite the histories that are handed down to them. Additionally, the 
interpreter must realize that she can only ever achieve a partial view of her 
subject. As R.J. Collingwood has pointed out, the object of historical 
interpretation is always in the process of being given. History is at no point 
complete.28 Moreover, at no point is the possibility of further investigation and 
evidentiary interpretation exhausted. There is always the possibility that new 
evidence will be discovered about the objects of historical interpretation, or that a 
new interpretation will shed light upon old subject matter. Historical 
interpretations are always finitely situated, and obviously so. 
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The essential finitude of all interpretations presents a problem for their 
authority: We need never accept any interpretation as final. There is always the 
possibility that some new interpretation will unsettle established interpretations. 
Interpretations can gain and lose authority through time. This lack of stability in 
interpretive authority may suggest that we reject the authority of any given 
interpretation. The potential for a revaluation of any given interpretation 
undermines the reliability, even if only to a minor degree, of every interpretation. 
(It is as if the official baseball rulebook could be overturned at any moment – 
even mid-game – and a new set of rules substituted in its place. If that were 
possible, the rulebook would not be the authoritative source that we take it to be.) 
Such a view may encourage an extreme relativism about interpretation. Perhaps 
if no interpretations are ultimately authoritative (though they might seem so at the 
moment), then we ought not to prefer any interpretation to any other. At the very 
least, the suspicion of an interpretation radically challenges our ability to engage 
in its governed activities. 
The third issue that I want to introduce here is that of historical objectivity. 
Once we have acknowledged that historical interpretation is always finitely 
situated, we are confronted with a serious question about the potential for 
objectivity in historical interpretation and representation. A discussion of 
objectivity is important, because the claim to objectivity is one of the main ways 
in which an interpretation makes a claim to be authoritative. It hardly needs be 
mentioned that the connection between objectivity and normative commitment 
26 
 
and implication has been extensively explored in a great number of excellent 
studies.29 For my purposes, I do not think the precise nature of the connection 
must be explicated here (such a task is far beyond the limited scope of this 
chapter). It suffices for my purposes to say that the claim to objectivity carries 
normative implications for those who accept it. Objective statements play an 
important role in governing human activity. They may not always individually 
determine norms, but they always fit into normative frameworks that guide 
activity. To claim that one’s interpretation of a given activity is objective is to 
claim that others should subordinate themselves to that interpretation in order to 
participate in its associated activities. For instance, to claim objectively that my 
pen is made of nonconductive plastic is to assert norms of activity associated 
with my pen (for one, it cannot be used to close a circuit). To give a more 
historical (and controversial) example, the assertion that there are objective facts 
that Palestinians have a legal claim to land illegally claimed by the Israeli 
government and that legal claims are always to be preferred to illegal claims, 
implies particular norms that should govern activity related to that particular 
issue.30 More generally, arguments about competing interpretations of historical 
events frequently revolve around claims to objectivity (each side accusing the 
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 A prominent, and recent, profusion of interest in this topic has been motivated by a debate in 
the literature between Robert Brandom and Jurgen Habermas. Both argue that claims to 
objectivity (or objective statements) carry normative implications. They disagree about whether 
those claims can be sustained given the normative limitations that govern intersubjective, 
community-based activities. For an interesting summary of (and contribution to) this debate, see 
James Swindal’s “Can a Discursive Pragmatism Guarantee Objectivity?” 
30
 They do not imply all the norms that are associated with that issue, but they do imply some, 
and they fit into and modify a larger context of norms. 
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other of doing bad – that is, non-objective – historical research, or of distorting – 
that is, presenting non-objectively – the historical “facts”, or some other claim that 
the other is failing to be objective in their interpretations). By claiming to be 
objective, one makes a powerful claim to authority. 
The question of what constitutes objectivity is a difficult one, and not one 
that I can answer in the limited space available. J.A. Passmore and Maurice 
Mandelbaum have each reflected extensively on the question of whether and to 
what extent historical interpretations can claim objectivity.31 Both recognize that, 
because historical interpretations are about events and objects that no longer 
are, it is impossible in most (if not all) cases to verify the objective truth with 
respect to what is interpreted. (This problem is, of course, endemic to claims to 
objectivity, particularly to realist claims, but it seems particularly acute in 
connection to historical knowledge.) Consequently, objectivity in historical 
interpretation must be built upon claims relating to the way one arrives at a 
judgment. Mandelbaum observes that objectivity frequently refers more to the 
conditions under which a judgment (or interpretation) was made, rather than the 
truth or falsity of the judgment.32 Similarly, Passmore’s discussion of objectivity 
centers on the way in which historical judgments are justified, rather than their 
comparison to the historical past. (In fact, Passmore plausibly argues that 
historical study does not involve any direct perception of the past.33) 
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 See Passmore’s “The Objectivity of History,” in Philosophy (33) and Mandelbaum’s Anatomy of 
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Passmore briefly discusses (and dismisses) eight plausible candidates for 
a criterion of historical objectivity. I will not enumerate them here; it will suffice to 
present the eighth and perhaps weakest. Criterion eight is as follows: “In 
objective inquiries, conclusions are reached which are universally acceptable.”34 
That is, anyone with the relevant skills and knowledge will accept the conclusion 
of an objective inquiry. (In other words, if you understand the physics of 
electromagnetism, then you will accept the results of an inquiry into the sun’s 
magnetic field – and importantly, if you do not understand that physics, then your 
acceptance or rejection of the inquiry is irrelevant to its objectivity.) An objective 
conclusion will be recognized as justified by the procedures and subject matter of 
the inquiry, rather than by the particularities of the inquirer. Universal acceptance 
requires that everyone, regardless of background and idiosyncrasy, find the 
conclusion compelling on the grounds of what is universally accessible in the 
inquiry and conclusion. In other words, as Passmore quotes Walsh, the objective 
historian must create her interpretations in “abstraction” from her “personal 
idiosyncrasies or private feelings.”35 
Passmore points out several difficulties with this notion of objectivity. 
Despite them, in what follows I adopt his universality criterion, because it makes 
explicit why claims to objectivity are considered authoritative. Objectivity is 
authoritative because it commands universal assent. Not only is universal assent 
evidence for the objectivity of a statement (defeasible evidence, that is); but an 
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allegedly objective statement is one to which allegedly everyone must assent. 
Passmore’s eighth criterion highlights this normative character of objectivity. 
When made appropriately, the claim to objectivity is an important claim to 
authority. I do not dispute that genuinely objective inquiries and objective 
conclusions should command our assent. However, in the chapters that follow, I 
show that Heidegger problematizes these normative claims. I do so through a 
detailed consideration of Heidegger’s investigations in Being and Time into the 
nature and limitations of interpretative activities. The claim to authority that such 
activities make is a crucial element of his investigations. 
 
1.3 Martin Heidegger as a Philosopher of History 
 
 Heidegger’s major early work, Being and Time, is particularly relevant to 
the issues in the speculative philosophy of history that I introduced above. In the 
present section I discuss three primary reasons for this relevance. The first is that 
Heidegger offers us a large-scale, philosophical interpretation of Western history. 
Whether the interpretation provides an adequate account of the underlying 
significance that it attempts to uncover is a question that warrants serious 
investigation. His interpretation has been detailed in a number of excellent 
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studies, so I will not go into too much detail about it here.36 I merely want to point 
out the general features of Heidegger’s interpretation. 
Heidegger characterizes his task in Being and Time as that of “destroying 
the history of ontology” and views this task as necessary if anyone is going to 
appropriately raise the “question of Being”.37 Heidegger’s overall purpose in 
Being and Time is to inquire into the status and characteristics of Being, as 
opposed to the status and characteristics of any particular entities (which much 
of philosophy has been concerned with for most of its history). So, rather than 
investigating particular entities, like ethical values, say, or natural objects, 
Heidegger wants to provoke an investigation into that character of Being that all 
things share (everything from ethical values to natural objects to human beings to 
logical propositions, and so on) – that makes them something that is rather than 
is not. The question has been raised many times in history (with varying degrees 
of clarity and force) and many supposed answers have been given. This history 
of answers makes up the “history of ontology” that Heidegger is intent on 
destroying. Heidegger’s interpretation of his contemporary philosophical-
historical situation leads him to the conclusion of the necessity of such a 
destruction. 
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 There are many presentations of Heidegger’ historical interpretations. See, for example, 
Thomas Wren, “Heidegger’s Philosophy of History” (1972); E.M. Henning, “Destruction and 
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Heidegger claims that the history of philosophy has been determined by 
early answers to the question of Being, and that that question has been forgotten 
subsequently in favor of its traditionally available answers. The ancient Greeks, 
he says, provided answers to the question of Being that have determined all 
subsequent answers up to those of the present day: 
Greek ontology and its history – which, in their numerous filiations and 
distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today – 
…and the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated to a tradition in 
which it gets reduced to something self-evident – merely material for 
reworking.38 
 
He goes on to gloss how basic Greek ontological concepts were carried over into 
medieval scholasticism culminating in Suarez, from there to Descartes’ focus 
upon the subject in terms of scholastic ontological categories, and finally from 
Descartes to Kant’s determination of subjectivity through categories that 
ultimately have their origin in Greek ontology. He ends his brief history with Kant, 
and it is probable that the critique of Kant is supposed to apply to Heidegger’s 
neo-Kantian contemporaries, thus bringing his critical history up into the present. 
With this history, Heidegger provides an interpretation of his own historical 
moment and its relation to philosophical history as a whole. The important ages 
of philosophical history begin with the Greeks and that beginning prompts and 
guides a sequence of eras. The sequence is neither progressive nor regressive, 
we might think, since Heidegger’s presentation claims that there has been no 
progress in the attempt to answer the question of Being, nor has there been any 
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regress in that attempt; the philosophical material has only been reworked and 
the attempt has simply not happened at all (hence, the forgottenness of the 
question). Nonetheless, the content of the sequential ages has been for the most 
part determined by the original ontological inquiries of the Greeks. We might 
think of the history that Heidegger describes as a history of stagnation. 
 Not only has his age been determined by the ontological inquiries of the 
Greeks and our era’s relations to other ages been determined by our common 
heritage of inquiry; Heidegger also believes that his era carries the possibility 
overturning this history and rediscovering the question of Being, thus enabling us 
to re-ask the question and perhaps begin a newer, more fruitful era of answers. It 
is unclear whether Heidegger believes his era to be particularly privileged in that 
respect, but he at least seems to think that a rediscovery of the question is 
possible for his era.39 He claims that it is possible for individuals to recognize the 
necessity of inquiring into the history of ontology, both to loosen its hold over us 
and to see its possibilities for further development, since we cannot get rid of it 
altogether (we cannot destroy the past, only its hold on us). We have become 
unable to ask the question of Being precisely because answers to it have been 
made so readily available to us by the philosophical tradition. Heidegger argues 
that the individual can dismantle this tradition in order to inquire freely (and, we 
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 Heidegger seems to hold this view in Being and Time. He may abandon that view soon after, 
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might say, honestly) into Being.40 Moreover, having loosened the tradition’s hold 
by dismantling it, the philosophical individual can make herself aware of the 
possibilities of those traditional positions. We might say that she can become 
aware of historical possibility, rather than just historical actuality. As Heidegger 
puts it,  
if Dasein has seized upon its latent possibility not only of making its own 
existence transparent to itself but also of inquiring into the meaning of 
existentiality itself (that is to say, of previously inquiring into the meaning 
of Being in general), and if by such inquiry its eyes have been opened to 
its own essential historicality, then one cannot fail to see that the inquiry 
into Being…is itself characterized by historicality. The ownmost meaning 
of Being which belongs to the inquiry into Being as an historical inquiry, 
gives us the assignment of inquiring into the history of that inquiry itself, 
that is, of becoming historiological. In working out the question of Being, 
we must heed this assignment, so that by positively making the past our 
own, we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost 
possibilities of such inquiry.41 
 
In Heidegger’s historical moment (perhaps characterized primarily by 
fundamental ontological inquiries), the individual who has escaped the pull of 
tradition can work to retrieve and appropriate history for the purpose of 
developing the present and future. The individual is not doomed to be crushed 
under the weight of history. Thus, Heidegger provides both an interpretation of 
his own era’s place within the panorama of history and of the resources available 
to individuals within his own era for confronting its historical forces. 
 It is worth mentioning that Heidegger presents two kinds of history in his 
discussions of the history of philosophy. His discussions take the form of a 
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historiography of philosophy, drawing developmental connections between 
particular philosophers and their texts. Descartes takes up the language of the 
medieval philosophers, particularly Suarez, and leads to the later moderns like 
Leibniz and particularly Kant (not to mention Husserl along with other 
contemporaries of Heidegger). In addition, he presents a history of a 
philosophical question. This history is primarily in the form of a sequence of 
failures to notice the question. Heidegger goes on in Being and Time to analyze 
the difficulty in noticing and addressing the question of Being. This second 
history is what I want to claim is a philosophy of history. The first, the 
historiography of philosophical authors is certainly important to Heidegger’s 
presentation (in terms of providing material for consideration and evidence for his 
claims), but the essential work is done by his consideration of the animating 
question of that history. Without the second history – that is, the discussion of the 
central question of his history of philosophy – it would be more akin to a chronicle 
of the philosophical past. The forgottenness of the question of Being animates 
Heidegger’s presentation of the history of metaphysics. His attempt to clarify the 
history of this question constitutes a philosophy of history.42 
The second reason is that Heidegger admits the finite character of 
interpretation and, as a hermeneutical phenomenologist, devotes attention to the 
possibilities and limitations of interpretive activities. Being and Time is the 
                                                 
42
 For more on the relationship between the historiography of philosophical authors and texts and 
the history of the question of Being, see Robert Bernasconi, “Descartes in the History of Being,” 
Research in Phenomenology 17 (1987). 
35 
 
product of an important attempt to understand how the historical past becomes 
accessible to human beings and thus of how they can meaningfully relate to that 
history (if they can at all). Heidegger argues that human understanding is guided 
and conditioned by what he calls a “fore-structure,” an important element of 
which is what Gadamer has called the prejudices of understanding.43 
Understanding is always an activity that takes place in media res. As such, when 
analyzing any particular understanding and interpretation of something (be it a 
thing, a person, an idea, a system, etc.), it is important to take note of the 
prejudgments and preconceptions that condition that understanding and 
interpretation. In Being and Time, Heidegger is not interested in many particular 
preconceptions (other than the big, metaphysical ones) nor in criticizing them. 
Instead, he attempts to delineate several existential structures through which 
prejudices and preconceptions condition interpretive activities. 
Heidegger argues that human beings can exist in two (or perhaps three) 
different modes: authentically, inauthentically, or undifferentiated.44 One of the 
major tasks of Being and Time is to separate the first two modes and describe 
their existential foundations. Authenticity and inauthenticity are differentiated from 
each other in a number of ways. Importantly for the discussion of the finitude of 
interpretation, they are differentiated by the human being’s relationship to the 
preconceptions that guide his or her understanding of self, the world and 
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everything in it. Inauthenticity is not simply the negative of authenticity; 
Heidegger calls it a positive possibility of Dasein’s existence.45 A person is 
inauthentic when she submits her understanding to generally held (Heidegger 
says, “public”) interpretations of what is understood without taking responsibility 
for those interpretations and that submission.46 This submission places important 
limitations on interpretive activity, particularly considering that Heidegger argues 
that everyone exists inauthentically most of the time. It means that much 
interpretive activity is governed by popular prejudice. This limitation is made 
particularly problematic in light of the importance of understanding and 
interpretation for our access to the central question of Being and Time (and, 
Heidegger argues, of philosophy itself), the question of Being.47 In contrast to the 
inauthentic, the authentic individual takes responsibility for her relationships to 
the prevailing prejudices and preconceptions that guide her understanding. She 
cannot entirely escape those prejudices, though. They form a background to all 
her interpretive activities. Understanding them is crucial for the authentic 
individual. (Perhaps paradoxically, explicit understanding of the prevailing 
preconceptions is more important for the authentic individual, even if she rejects 
them, than it is for the inauthentic individual, who must understand them 
somewhat in order to submit.) 
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Being and Time is a vital work in the philosophy of history because it 
provides both a robust analysis of the limitations of interpretation in general (and 
so of historical interpretation by extension) and it highlights the crucial 
importance of historical interpretation within philosophy at large. Public 
interpretations dominate the interpretive activities of individuals. Public 
interpretations are in time and change over time. (Hence, each new generation 
rewrites the history books.) Heidegger supports the view that I expressed above 
in connection with Collingwood that interpretations are themselves historical 
artifacts that are influenced by the cultural and philosophical milieu in which they 
arise and gain sway. Interpretations of history (or of anything else for that matter) 
are not isolated, nor are they wholly abstract. Instead, they draw upon and guide 
interpretive activities aimed at other elements of experience. Historical 
interpretation influences and is influenced by interpretations of science, of 
politics, of home life, and of the world at large. Importantly again, historical 
interpretation influences and is influenced by our understanding of Being. As I will 
highlight below, our understandings of Being influence our understandings of 
everything else (all beings, that is). Given that these understandings of Being are 
historically contingent, robust historical interpretation is necessary for clarifying 
our understanding and interpretations of anything at all. 
The third reason that Heidegger should be attended to by philosophers of 
history is that Being and Time is a sustained attempt to take history seriously. He 
does not view the history of philosophy as a dry chronicle of inessential and 
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failed attempts to solve philosophical problems, nor as developmental precursors 
to modern attempts to solve those problems; in other words, he does not view 
the history of philosophy as something that can be tossed aside in favor of the 
here and now. Instead, he argues that the historical dimension of human 
existence is crucial to understanding the possibilities and problems of that 
existence. The philosophy of history is in fact vitally important for Heidegger. To 
see how this is the case, I turn now to his exploration of the relationship between 
the concepts of Being and history. Examination of his exploration of this 
relationship clarifies several of his basic intentions with respect to human beings 
and history in Being and Time. 
 
1.4 Being and History 
 
 Being and the phenomenon of history are inextricably tied together in 
Being and Time. In this section, I provide a brief preliminary discussion of what 
Heidegger means by “Being” before turning to a description of what Heidegger 
means by the phenomenon of the historical. I then lay out several arguments that 
the phenomenon of the historical presupposes Being, drawn first from 
Heidegger’s description of the ontological priority of Being over any particular 
region of beings (the “historical” being one such region), and second from his 
discussion of Count Paul von Yorck’s criticisms of Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
psychological and historical research. Finally, I turn to an extended argument that 
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Being actually presupposes historical phenomena, by way of the phenomenon of 
Being’s dependence upon Dasein and Dasein’s own historically situated 
character. 
 Heidegger gives a lengthy and idiosyncratic discussion of the notion of a 
phenomenon and phenomenology in the second introduction to Being and Time. 
His discussion helps elucidate the notion of a basic phenomenon and indicates 
our point of access into its clarification. 
 Being is the basic phenomenon, according to Heidegger. To get to that 
conclusion, it is helpful to start with what Heidegger calls the “formal conception” 
of a phenomenon: a phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself.48 Heidegger 
argues that this conception is formal in that it covers the more typical, 
philosophical notions of a phenomenon that have been handed down in the 
Kantian tradition and only emphasizes the essential structural elements. It does 
not make any claim about what are phenomena. Depending upon one’s 
philosophical system and what one thinks shows itself in the system, different 
things will count as phenomena.49 He highlights the idea of an appearance and 
attempts to show that, while it has been taken as a synonym for phenomenon, it 
actually depends upon the formal conception of a phenomenon.50 An 
appearance, he argues, is always an appearance of something. This does not 
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mean that the something which appears shows itself. Rather, there is the 
interpolation of an appearance between that which is being appeared to (the 
knowing subject, say) and that which is appearing. The appearance shows itself 
(otherwise, it would not show up at all) and the underlying something that is 
responsible for the appearance only announces itself through the appearance, in 
Heidegger’s words. We might think of the relationship between a Kantian 
phenomenon and the thing in itself of which it is an appearance for an example of 
this notion of appearance. This system of an appearance does include something 
that fits the formal conception of a phenomenon, however. The interpolated 
appearance shows itself in itself. If it did not, it would not show up at all, and 
thereby neither would that of which it is an appearance. Therefore, the notion of 
appearance presupposes and depends upon Heidegger’s conception of a 
phenomenon.51 
 One might object to Heidegger’s notion of a phenomenon by arguing that 
sometimes something shows itself as something that it is not (for instance, a 
piece of wax fruit could seem to be real before eaten) and that by focusing on his 
own notion of phenomenon, Heidegger is excluding a range of phenomena that 
do not share the same formal characteristics but may have equal claim to being 
phenomena. There is a ready answer to this objection in Heidegger’s argument 
that this notion of a “semblance”, as he calls it, presupposes his notion of a 
phenomenon. He argues that something can only hide itself and look like 
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something that it is not when it “makes a pretension of showing itself”.52 The 
semblance makes use of the formal conception of a phenomenon in order to hide 
itself. It shows itself as something that shows itself in itself, in other words as a 
phenomenon, while not being so. It can only be a semblance because it presents 
itself as a phenomenon. The wax fruit must seem to be real in order to trick us. 
Hence, a semblance must be considered a modification of Heidegger’s notion of 
a phenomenon, and therefore based upon it. 
 Heidegger gives a discussion of the “-ology” portion of phenomenology, 
only a small portion of which is relevant for my purposes. The important part is 
that Heidegger claims that “the function of the logos lies in merely letting 
something be seen.”53 He locates the origin of “-ology” in the idea of a discourse. 
Discussion is a way of making something seen by the discussants. Their 
discourse is a way of letting something be seen (something that perhaps is not 
present anymore, or contains elements that are difficult to discern, for instance). 
Similarly, if we think of a lecturer discoursing on a subject, we can see that it is a 
way of enabling the audience to see the subject of the lecture. The activity of 
enabling something to be seen is importantly required when the something does 
not show itself but one wants to have it in view. A discussion or a lecture is 
important when it lets the conversers or the audience see something that is not 
readily apparent. Any “-ology” is a way of letting the subject of that area of study 
be seen, in one way or another, and usually in a way in which it is not readily 
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apparent. Theology is, for instance, a way of letting god be seen, usually in a way 
in which god is not readily apparent. Of course, it is not the only way that god can 
be seen (inspired religious experiences might be another example), but it is one 
way of doing so. Similarly, biology is a way of letting life be seen, and of course 
not exclusively so. Phenomenology is, accordingly, a way of letting phenomena 
be seen. 
 That Being is a basic phenomenon and the subject matter of 
phenomenology follows from Heidegger’s discussion of the phenomenon and 
phenomenology. A phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself. A 
phenomenon in this sense is readily apparent. We might say that no work is 
required to make it show itself in itself; it already does so and that is what makes 
it a phenomenon. There is a puzzle here though. Phenomenology is supposed to 
be a way of enabling phenomena to show themselves. However, phenomena are 
readily apparent. We do not need to work to let them be seen, as they already 
show themselves in themselves. Hence, phenomenology would seem to be an 
empty and redundant science. It would seem to be an attempt to enable what is 
already perfectly see-able to show itself. Phenomenology is rescued from 
redundancy by what Heidegger calls “the phenomenological conception of the 
phenomenon,” in contrast to the formal conception at work in the puzzle.54 
 The formal conception of a phenomenon raises a question: what enables 
a phenomenon to show itself? Perhaps the obvious answer, given Heidegger’s 
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characterization of a phenomenon, is that it is the phenomenon itself. If so, what 
is it about a phenomenon that allows its showing of itself in itself? In other words, 
on what is the phenomenal character of a phenomenon grounded? Heidegger 
argues that we can enable this element of the phenomenon to be seen. 
Moreover, he argues that clarifying and enabling this seeing is the proper aim of 
phenomenology. 
[T]hat which already shows itself in the [Kantian] appearance as prior to 
the ‘phenomenon’ as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in 
every case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be 
brought thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself will 
be the ‘phenomena’ of phenomenology.55 
 
According to Heidegger, Being is this element of the phenomenon, whereby it 
shows itself in itself, and which is not readily apparent but can be brought to 
show itself in itself. Being is therefore the basic phenomenon, that phenomenon 
of self-showing upon which all other phenomena as such are based. It is 
presupposed by all phenomena. As Heidegger puts it, “in the phenomenological 
conception of ‘phenomenon’ what one has in mind as that which shows itself is 
the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and derivatives.”56 That is, the 
Being of an entity is the particular ontological structure of that entity. 
Heidegger is primarily interested in the large categories of Being, like the 
historical or the natural. To take the latter as an example, when one sees the 
Being of the natural, one sees the structure that makes an entity natural. This will 
involve a diversity of characteristics. Though natural entities come in a vast 
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variety of forms, there are certain essential features that unite them all as natural. 
For instance, they are all in particular spatio-temporal locations. They all occupy 
space (either exclusively or non-exclusively). They are capable of various kinds 
of interactions with other entities (and not capable of other kinds of interactions). 
Descartes’ attempt to determine the essence of the material world and to 
distinguish it from the mental is an excellent example of what Heidegger has in 
mind here. Moreover, not only do natural entities have certain kinds of properties; 
their naturalness also implies that they have certain kinds of properties. If 
something is a natural entity, then it must be spatio-temporally located. If it is not 
spatio-temporally located, then it is not a natural entity. We can derive properties 
(both intrinsic and extrinsic) when we see the Being of an entity. In addition, the 
Being of an entity imbues it with a particular meaning in relation to the human 
being. Natural entities have a particular meaning within human understanding, 
perhaps inhuman forces to be feared or resources to be used to further one’s 
interests. 
 The phenomenon of the historical is, like Being, seemingly obvious but 
difficult to define. Historical objects are, broadly construed, the entities that 
belong to the past of human beings. Human products like tools, ideas, paintings, 
musical recordings, and stories are all capable of being historical entities if they 
belong to the past.57 What makes them historical is that we recognize them as 
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having meant something to human beings in the past, either as a tool or as an 
artistic production, or as a facet of a way of life, or some other meaning. The 
phenomenon of the historical is what allows these objects to show up as 
meaningful for people in the past. 
 Human beings exist in time. But they do not just exist in time like a rock 
exists in time. We might say that a rock is indifferent to the passage of time, and 
it takes no account of its own past or its own future. A rock certainly changes 
over time, but this change is not internal to the rock and the rock’s actions; 
instead, the rock changes because it is weathered by external elements. In 
contrast, human beings actively take account of their temporal character, their 
past and their future. The past can hold great importance of a person, not just as 
something that happened and is now not happening but may have left some 
traces in the present, but as something that determines the possibilities for her 
future. A woman who spends her youth lying on the beach rather than learning to 
play the guitar will have physical traces (the weathering of the skin) of her activity 
and will also have delimited her current possibilities (entertaining her friends at a 
party with her excellent guitar skills). The past is not only something that 
happened to her but something that has meaning for her in the present and for 
the future. Heidegger puts it thus: “Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch ‘of 
life’…with the phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself along…it is 
by no means the case that Dasein ‘is’ actual in a point of time, and that, apart 
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from this, it is ‘surrounded’ by the non-actuality of its birth and death.”58 This 
stretching along of itself is a fundamental phenomenon of history, which enables 
other phenomena of history such as the idea of “world-history,” of the history of a 
community, of the biography of an individual, and so on. As Heidegger has it, 
“the specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself 
along, we call its historizing”59 and “only on the basis of such ‘historizing’ is 
anything like ‘world-history’ possible or can anything belong historically to world-
history.”60 
 Being and the historical are inextricably tied together in SZ, perhaps 
problematically so. Here, I aim to spell out the relationship between the two as it 
appears in that work and attempt to demonstrate the potential difficulty that it 
presents. This difficulty takes the form of a question of priority. Heidegger is clear 
that history seems to be grounded in some sense in Being, and thus Being 
enjoys a certain priority over history. However, Heidegger is also clear that Being 
only is in historical manifestations, and thus history enjoys a certain priority over 
Being. Another way of putting this question is the following: Is the concept of the 
historical determined by the concept of Being? Or is the concept of Being 
determined by the concept of history (or the historical)? Heidegger seems to 
answer both questions in the affirmative in SZ. I will present Heidegger’s 
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arguments that Being enjoys priority over history before presenting his 
arguments that history enjoys priority over Being. 
 Heidegger provides several arguments that history is determined by 
Being. These fall into two kinds. He argues on the one hand that as the basic 
phenomenon, Being is the self-showing that defines phenomena as such 
(including the phenomenon of the historical). On the other hand he argues that 
history presupposes a conception of Being.  I will present these arguments in 
turn. 
 The first of the above arguments follows from Heidegger’s discussion of 
the concept of a phenomenon and Being. As Heidegger presented it, Being is the 
basic phenomenality of phenomena, their character of showing themselves. 
Hence, it is presupposed by all phenomena and enjoys a certain priority over all 
other phenomena. History is a phenomenon. There are historical entities, such 
as tools, paintings, audio recordings, ambassadorial documents, and so on. 
These entities show themselves, i.e., they are, as specifically historical entities, 
as things that were meaningful to people in the past, rather than only as lumps of 
iron, pigments smeared across canvas, grooves on a wax disk, or ink scratched 
into patterns on parchment. The phenomenon of history is what enables all these 
historical entities to show themselves as such. The phenomenon of history, along 
with all individual historical entities, presupposes the basic phenomenon of 
Being. The phenomenon of history could not show itself as what it is (or as 
anything at all) without that basic phenomenon. Similarly, for historical entities to 
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show themselves as historical (or as anything at all) is for them to be, i.e., to 
belong to the phenomenon of Being. Therefore, the phenomenon of history, and 
thereby all historical entities, are determined in some degree by and presuppose 
Being. Being has some priority over history. 
 There are two points in SZ at which Heidegger argues that history 
presupposes a conception of Being.  The first is in his first introduction when he 
discusses the ontological priority of the question of Being.61 In this section, he 
argues that the research activities of the positive sciences, their inquiries into 
their various specific kinds of entities (matter and energy, chemical bonds and 
reactions, living things, and so on), are enabled and directed by particular 
understandings of the entities in their respective areas. An area of reality62 
cannot be opened up for positive research until an understanding of what it 
means to be an object that fits into that area. If we did not have any prior 
understanding of what it meant be an entity of some type, then entities of that 
type would never arise as an area for investigation, nor would we have any 
sense of how to deal with those entities even if they did show up as a viable 
area. For instance, if we had absolutely no understanding of what a material 
object is (that is, solidity or at least non-interpenetrability, capability of movement 
through space, capability of taking on spatial forms, persisting through time to at 
least a limited degree, and so on), we could never investigate the material world 
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in the manner of the physical sciences. Collision experiments, to take one 
example, would not make sense to the researcher as a way to investigate natural 
bodies, relying as they do on the non-interpenetrability of material objects along 
with the other three elements of matter that I mentioned. Unless we have some 
notion of what it means to be an entity of that particular kind and not of some 
other kind, we cannot do research into that particular kind of entities.  
The understanding of what it means to be an entity of a particular kind is 
provided by a philosophical inquiry into ontology, which is what Heidegger calls a 
“productive logic.”63 In this inquiry, the basic concepts (the categories) and 
structures (material logic) of a particular region of reality are disclosed to the 
ontological researcher and made available to positive scientists for their further 
research into the entities of that area. So an ontology of the material world 
involves a philosophical elucidation of the basic concepts of distance, time, 
shape, motion (if this is distinct from distance and time), non-interpenetrability, 
quantity of matter (mass), and so on, and a discussion of their relationships to 
one another (the material logic), such as relationships of motion to distance and 
time, non-interpenetrability to shape and quantity of matter, and so forth. 
According to Heidegger, the ontological research that makes an understanding of 
a region of reality available to the sciences is an inquiry into the Being of that 
area and of the entities within it. The ontological research into matter is an inquiry 
into the Being of the material world and everything that fits within that area of 
                                                 
63
 SZ, 10. 
50 
 
reality.64 This is not to suggest that it means the same thing to be an entity in 
distinct regions of reality. Heidegger will argue later in Being and Time that there 
are dominant interpretations of Being that cover multiple regions, but the 
productive logic of ontology does not require that this be the case, nor does it 
provide evidence that it is the case. Heidegger’s interpretation is compatible with 
multiple concepts of Being. 
 The idea of a crisis in a science confirms for Heidegger his view that the 
positive sciences work within inherited understandings of their respective areas.65 
Researchers working on a particular region of reality are frequently not 
thematically aware of their incorporation of a prior understanding of their area. 
They work towards gathering results within specific research programmes that 
largely delineate their methods and objects of research. When the research 
programme is progressing without running into difficulties, the researchers 
frequently do not question their fundamental assumptions seriously. Heidegger 
argues that this is not actually progress in the science and that a true sign of 
progress shows up when the researchers’ prior and unexamined understanding 
of their area is made more and more obvious to them through the difficulties 
presented to them in their research itself. A crisis appears in the foundations of 
the science as the accumulation of results presents more and more exceptions to 
the standard explanations of the science, and the basic assumptions of that 
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science come more and more into question. At this point, it becomes obvious to 
at least some of the researchers that they were working with a prior 
understanding that was not sufficiently clear and is in need of reformation. 
 Heidegger argues that the prior understandings of the Being of specific 
areas remain “naïve and opaque” if they do not inquire into the meaning of Being 
in general.66 Along with the particular concepts and material logic of a science, 
we also regard the subject area and the entities within it as existing, as having 
Being. Physics, for instance, is not a discussion of some interesting fictions that 
are made up on the fly by its storytellers; instead, it is an attempt to discover and 
describe how nature really is. We may be able to work with a prior understanding 
of an area and to provide some basic concepts and material logic, however hazy 
those may be, but we will not have a complete and unambiguous understanding 
of any area if we do not provide an account of what we mean when we say that 
an area and its entities really are. 
 Heidegger mentions history explicitly in connection with the kind of prior 
ontological investigation that is required to lay the groundwork for positive 
scientific investigations. He uses it as an example of the kind of investigation he 
has in mind: 
To give an example, what is philosophically primary is neither a theory of 
the concept-formation of historiology nor the theory of historical 
knowledge, nor yet the theory of history as the Object of historiology; what 
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is primary is rather the Interpretation of authentically historical entities as 
regards their historicality.67 
 
History is a phenomenon. Entities sometimes show themselves as historical 
entities.68 Museums are full of artifacts that are objects of historical study. We 
learn about past worlds, the ways in which people lived in the past, by subjecting 
these objects to the methods of study of the historical and allied disciplines 
(archaeology, ethnology, anthropology, and so on). However, these artifacts do 
not first become of historical interest to us because they are subjected to the 
methods of those history-oriented disciplines. Instead, they are subjected to the 
methods of the history-oriented disciplines because they show themselves as 
historical entities. Heidegger puts it thus: “such equipment can be a 
historiological object only because it is in itself somehow historical.”69 History is a 
phenomenon which underpins the history-oriented disciplines. It is not a 
construction of those disciplines; rather, it is the phenomenon that characterizes 
the general ontological region of those disciplines.70 We must investigate 
historicality itself, the Being of historical phenomena, in order to secure our 
positive investigations of historical entities. 
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 Heidegger is clear that any investigation into the Being of historical 
phenomena requires an investigation into Being in general: “Ontological inquiry is 
indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the positive 
sciences. But it remains itself naïve and opaque if in its researches into the Being 
of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general.”71 In order to 
generate the productive logic that lays the groundwork for the history-oriented 
sciences, we must investigate the Being of the entities that reside within that 
ontological region, in other words, we must investigate historicality itself. And in 
order to investigate historicality itself, we must investigate Being in general, 
before it is differentiated into the particular Being of historical phenomena. 
 We must investigate Being in order to secure our understanding of the 
particular ontology that guides the positive investigation of history (the ontology 
of historicality). The concept of Being enjoys some priority over the concept of 
the historical in that the former is necessary for an investigation into the area 
delineated by the latter, while the latter does not seem required for investigations 
into all areas delineated by the former. The concept of Being guides all positive 
scientific and philosophical investigations; the concept of the historical – not to be 
confused with historicality – guides some but not all of them. The concept of 
Being does not fall under the concept of the historical but the concept of the 
historical does fall under the concept of Being. 
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 Heidegger makes a much more explicit argument for the above conclusion 
regarding history at the end of a discussion of the Being of the historical, in 
connection with Dilthey and Yorck’s correspondence. After discussing Dilthey’s 
preliminary investigations into history and the methodology of the positive 
science of history, Heidegger turns to Yorck’s criticism of Dilthey’s failure to 
investigate the Being of the entities studied by the historian in contrast to the 
Being of the entities studied by the natural scientist. He emphasizes Count 
Yorck’s criticism of Dilthey for failing to provide “a ‘generic’ differentiation 
between the ontical and the Historical’.”72 The “ontical” here is the region of the 
present-at-hand – of nature or something akin to nature, in other words – so 
Yorck is calling for an investigation into the distinctive features of two genera: the 
genus of entities belonging within the subject area of nature and the genus of 
entities belonging within the subject area of the historical. 
 In order to compare and contrast the two genera, we have to bring them 
into “a more primordial unity,” as Heidegger puts it.73 However, this more 
primordial unity cannot itself be a genus, since Heidegger, following Aristotle, 
asserts that “Being…is no class or genus of entities.”74 If it is not a genus, then it 
is certainly not a superordinate genus under which the ontical and the historical 
fall.  So if there is to be a primordial unity, it must be non-generic, corresponding 
to what Aristotle recognized as “the unity of analogy,” and Scotus and other 
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medieval thinkers treated as a “transcendental.”75 This means that we need to 
give an account of what it means to be that is presupposed by natural and 
historical entities alike, so that we can compare how they differ from one another. 
Each of these regions of reality has its own particular basic concepts and 
material-logical structure, none of which applies to the entities in the other 
regions. There is one clear similarity, however: the concept of Being applies 
equally to all the entities within both genera. When we compare the natural and 
the historical, on Heidegger’s account we have the following three insights: that 
our concern with the historical is really concern with the Being of the historical, 
rather than with any particular historical entity; that our concern with the natural is 
really a concern with the Being of the natural; and that the natural area of reality 
is just one area of entities amongst others.76  
 In contrast to the above conclusion that the phenomenon of history is 
dependent upon a concept of Being, Heidegger also indicates in several sections 
of Being and Time that the concept of Being is dependent upon the phenomenon 
of history. He does so through two arguments that he presents at different stages 
of his analysis. The first is an argument that Dasein (human being) is dependent 
upon history in the sense that Dasein’s existence always presupposes history. 
The second is an argument that Being is dependent upon Dasein, that is, that 
Being presupposes Dasein. Combining the two arguments, Heidegger can 
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conclude that Being is ultimately dependent upon history by way of Dasein. I will 
present each of these arguments below in turn. 
 Dasein always presupposes history in that Dasein is always an historical 
entity. Dasein is “Being-in-the-world” for Heidegger. That is, it is a unitary 
phenomenon that always incorporates a world into itself. Dasein is not to be 
understood as an isolated subject that comes to know or understand or come 
into some other relation with a world external to it, but is instead the complex 
phenomenon consisting of an entity that is always in a world that it did not 
choose nor first encounter at some definite point in time. To use one of 
Heidegger’s turns of phrase, Dasein is always already in a world. There is no 
Dasein without a world, nor a world without Dasein.77 
 The world exerts a powerful influence upon Dasein, one that is 
unavoidable since it is a constitutive part of Dasein. Heidegger argues this in his 
analysis of the “Being-in” part of Being-in-the-world. There are two constitutive 
aspects of Being-in for Heidegger: state-of-mind and understanding.78 One’s 
state-of-mind is, for Heidegger, how one finds oneself at any given moment. 
Finding oneself existing in a particular way at any given moment permeates 
Dasein’s experiences. This element of Dasein appears in the phenomenon of a 
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mood. In a mood, Dasein finds itself as already existing and as existing in a 
specific way that it may not have chosen. In its moodiness, Dasein finds that it is 
not the creator of itself and of its world: “In having a mood, Dasein is always 
disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its 
Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it 
has to be.”79 Dasein has always already been delivered over to being a particular 
entity; it has not chosen to be the entity that it is. Heidegger calls this “delivered 
over” characteristic of Dasein’s existence its “thrownness” and claims that this 
term “is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.”80 That is, “as 
an entity which has been delivered over to its Being, it remains also delivered 
over to the fact that it must always have found itself.”81 Dasein does not first see 
that it is surrounded by a world and then decide what relationships to take up to 
itself and to the objects and people around it. Instead, Dasein always finds itself 
as having already taken up particular relationships to itself, its world and the 
objects and people within it. In a certain sense, Dasein is not responsible for its 
world but is instead at its mercy. Dasein does not first encounter the world as raw 
material, empty of significance, and then subsequently give entities meanings 
that generate a more robust world. Instead, Dasein is always caught up in a 
world that it did not create, with meanings already there. It uncovers this feature 
of itself as Being-in-the-world in its moods. 
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 Heidegger calls the second constitutive feature of Dasein’s Being-in 
“understanding.” Dasein understands in terms of possibilities. For instance, 
understanding a machine means understanding what can be done with it; it 
means understanding the machine’s possibilities. Understanding a language 
means understanding how to say things in the language and how they are said 
by speakers of the language; it means understanding the expressive possibilities 
of the language. Understanding a situation means understanding what can be 
done in that situation and what is to be avoided; it means understanding the 
possibilities that the situation affords its participants. As Heidegger puts it, 
“understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and 
it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable 
of.”82 Dasein always understands everything, including itself, in terms of 
possibilities. 
It is possibility, in terms of which Dasein understands itself, that exerts a 
powerful influence upon Dasein and shows its dependence upon history. 
Heidegger is clear that possibility here “does not signify a free-floating 
potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the ‘liberty of indifference’…In every case 
Dasein, as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite 
possibilities.”83 In his analysis of state-of-mind and mood, Heidegger argued that 
Dasein always finds itself already involved with itself and a world. It therefore 
always finds itself with particular possibilities both for itself and for its world and 
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objects: “As factical Dasein, any Dasein has already diverted its potentiality-for-
Being into a possibility of understanding.”84 
Heidegger makes the historical character and dependence of Dasein 
explicit in the second introduction to Being and Time. There, he claims that “in its 
factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it already was.”85 
Dasein always finds itself in a particular situation, in a particular world, over 
which it cannot claim complete authority. Its past is therefore important to 
determining the conditions of its present. Its past sets the terms of its present and 
delimits its possibilities for further development. Dasein is dependent upon its 
past. 
Whatever the way of being it may have at the time, and thus with whatever 
understanding of Being it may possess, Dasein has grown up both into 
and in a traditional way of interpreting itself: in terms of this it understands 
itself proximally and, within a certain range, constantly. By this 
understanding, the possibilities of its Being are disclosed and regulated. 
Its own past – and this always means the past of its ‘generation’ – is not 
something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already 
goes ahead of it.86 
 
Dasein’s understanding of its own existence, of the possibilities that are open to it 
and those that are closed off to it, presupposes a history that has conditioned its 
present and therefore its future. Dasein always already finds itself involved in a 
world; it cannot decide to divorce itself completely from its own past. Heidegger 
claims that the historically contingent situations and conditions in which Dasein 
finds itself set the terms of its current and future existence: “Existentiality is 
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essentially determined by facticity.”87 Human existence presupposes and is 
therefore dependent upon the phenomenon of history for Heidegger. 
The second part of Heidegger’s argument that Being is dependent upon 
history is the argument that Being presupposes Dasein. He outright states that 
Being is dependent upon Dasein in two different sections of Being and Time: 
“Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something 
like an understanding of Being belongs,”88 that is, only in Dasein’s understanding, 
and “of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an 
understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being.”89 Here, I will 
attempt to elucidate his argument for these claims. 
Dasein is open to phenomena, to its world and to the entities within its 
world. It is not initially isolated within itself and subsequently turns towards the 
world. Instead, it is always already caught up in a world of its concerns and 
projects alongside other people caught up in worlds of their own concerns and 
projects. This openness to phenomena is necessary for Dasein’s discovery of its 
world and other entities. Just as there would be no way to discover the celestial 
bodies (with the possible exception of the moon) without the power of vision, 
there would be no way for Dasein to discover any phenomena without its own 
openness to them. If we were truly isolated (or truly blind), phenomena could 
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never show themselves to us. Heidegger calls this openness Dasein’s 
“disclosedness” and claims, “Dasein is its disclosedness.”90 Dasein is its 
openness to phenomena. 
In his discussion of the primordial phenomenon of truth, Heidegger lays 
out a picture of Dasein and its essential relation to phenomena (and hence, to 
Being) that should help clarify his view of the presupposition of Dasein for Being. 
The primordial phenomenon of truth, as Heidegger has it, is uncovering: “‘Being-
true’ (‘truth’) means Being-uncovering.”91 In order to make true assertions or 
judgments about an entity, that entity must first be uncovered in the appropriate 
way, in a way that makes it amenable to assertions or judgments; in other words, 
the entity must be uncovered as something that has properties (or as the 
reference of a grammatical subject or quantifier to which the relevant predicates 
can be applied). We make a true judgment when we point out a way (for 
instance, the having of a property) that an entity really is. As Heidegger puts it, 
“to say that an assertion ‘is true’ signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in 
itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, ‘lets’ the entity ‘be seen’ in its 
uncoveredness.”92 Entities do not uncover themselves, however. Sometimes they 
are not uncovered; sometimes they show themselves as not what they are. 
Entities must be uncovered by a special entity, Dasein: “Being-true as 
Being-uncovering, is a way of Being for Dasein.”93 Dasein is essentially involved 
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in the uncovering of entities through the constitutive feature of Being-in called 
“understanding,” which I have outlined briefly above. In understanding an entity 
as being something in particular (a tool, to take the classic instance), Dasein 
uncovers that entity in some ways and leaves it hidden in others.94 Dasein’s 
understanding of an entity makes that entity accessible to Dasein in particular 
ways and leaves it inaccessible in others. For instance, understanding something 
as a television, and therefore as something that can be used to watch television 
programs or movies, gives us access to that entity in its usefulness for certain 
activity and projects. Understanding it so also precludes us from accessing it in 
other ways, though. While taking it as a television, we do not understand it as 
something with particular atomic and molecular structures that will react when 
electricity is passed through it or when acids are poured upon it, as someone 
interested in its chemical composition might. In Dasein’s understanding, entities 
are covered and uncovered. Heidegger calls it “the basic kind of disclosure which 
is characteristic of Dasein – namely, understanding, in the sense of the genuine 
appropriation of those entities towards which Dasein can comport itself.”95 Dasein 
is essentially involved in the uncovering of entities in that for an entity to show 
itself, Dasein must be open to that entity showing itself. It must have access to 
that entity, and it has access through an understanding of what that entity is. 
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Heidegger indicates the importance of Dasein’s understanding for Being 
when he claims that without understanding, entities “can be neither understood 
nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be 
discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor 
can it be said that they are not.”96 Dasein’s understanding uncovers entities. It is 
necessary for them to show themselves at all (both as what they are and as what 
they are not). Being is the basic phenomenon that enables entities to show 
themselves, according to Heidegger’s introductory remarks. Without Dasein’s 
understanding, entities could not show themselves as anything at all. There 
would be no phenomena. Without the possibility of phenomena, Being could not 
show itself at all. 
Dasein is, in part, what makes it possible for entities to show themselves 
as what they are: “What is primarily ‘true’ – that is, uncovering – is Dasein.”97 
Dasein’s disclosedness is what makes its uncovering of entities as what they are 
possible. It must be open to the entities’ showing of themselves (the phenomena, 
their Being) in order for entities to show themselves as anything at all. Heidegger 
puts it thus: “With and through [the Being of Dasein] is uncoveredness; hence 
only with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon of truth 
attained.”98 Without Dasein, there is no truth, and hence no uncoveredness and 
no phenomena: “Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there 
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be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, 
uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be.”99 Without uncoveredness, without 
phenomena, there could be no Being. Being is the basic phenomenon, the self-
showing that constitutes the phenomenality of any other phenomenon. In order 
for Being to be this basic phenomenon, it must be able to show itself to 
something. Without Dasein’s understanding, without the disclosedness that 
Dasein provides, Being could not be. Hence, Heidegger claims that “Being…is 
dependent upon the understanding of Being”100 and that “Understanding of Being 
is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being.”101 Being is dependent upon 
Dasein. 
 The above two arguments together allow us to conclude that any concept 
of Being presupposes the historical by way of Dasein. Dasein is dependent upon 
history because it is situated within a historically-determined world not of its own 
making, from which it draws the possibilities of its own existence. Being is 
dependent upon Dasein because only through the uncovering of entities by 
Dasein’s understanding, only through Dasein’s openness to phenomena, is the 
basic phenomenon of Being possible. These two claims combine to make sense 
of Heidegger’s brief discussion of the historical character of the investigation of 
Being in the second introduction to Being and Time.102 
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 Heidegger argues that an essential part of his investigation of Being 
(ontological research, in other words) is an investigation into the history of Being. 
Heidegger claims that under particular conditions “one cannot fail to see that the 
inquiry into Being…is itself characterized by historicality [the Being of the 
historical].”103 This would be a strange claim if Being is ahistorical. If it were 
ahistorical, then we would plausibly regard the particular historical manifestations 
of Being as inessential instances of ahistorical Being, much as we regard a 
particular instance of the number thirteen (for instance, the rebellious English 
colonies of 1776) as an inessential, historical manifestation of an ahistorical 
entity. We need not study the American Revolution to understand the number 
thirteen. Instead, the historical manifestations of Being are essential, according to 
Heidegger, to Being itself. In order to understand Being, we have to examine its 
history. The dependence of Being upon Dasein’s understanding explains Being’s 
historical character. 
 I noted earlier that for Heidegger, “Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of 
those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being 
belongs.”104 Moreover, Dasein’s understanding is historically situated and 
determined. It always finds itself in a world that it did not entirely create or choose 
and which affords it certain possibilities while closing off others. Dasein always 
understands itself, its world and others in terms of traditional interpretations of 
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them. In other words, these entities and the world are uncovered by Dasein’s 
understanding in traditional terms. Dasein’s traditional interpretations allow 
entities to show themselves in particular ways and preclude them from showing 
themselves in other ways. An investigation of the allowances and limitations of 
these traditional interpretations is an essential part of the investigation of Being. 
Heidegger calls this investigation “the destruction of the history of ontology” and 
its elucidation of the allowances and limitations of the interpretations its “positive” 
and “negative” aspects, respectively.105 In order to understand how entities show 
themselves at all, we must understand the kinds of uncovering that are available 
to us. These kinds of uncovering are provided to us in the history of our 
understanding and interpretation of Being. In any given era, an examination of 
the traditional interpretations of Being available to Dasein at that time is essential 
to an examination of Being in general, including in our own. 
 Before moving on to some historical and philosophical background to 
Heidegger’s philosophy of history, I want to address a potential difficulty in his 
interpretation of the history of philosophy (of metaphysics in particular). Several 
commentators have suggested that Heidegger has incompatible aspirations in 
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Being and Time.106 On the one hand, his focus is limited to the history of Being 
and of the questioning of Being. On the other hand, because this question is 
implicated in all philosophical questions (and because the phenomenon of Being 
is implicated in all phenomena), he is providing a fundamental analysis that is 
about everything in general. The complaint is that his analysis is broad in scope 
but draws on very limited source material to establish his interpretive claims. He 
seems to think that even though the history of Being encompasses every human 
activity, product and project, he can uncover its significance through the analysis 
of philosophical texts alone. 
 There are, I think, two responses to this potential difficulty. First, like any 
writer of a history, Heidegger cannot possibly represent every source and every 
particular of the history that he is writing. He must select what is most important 
for the story that he is telling. That story is about the neglect of the question of 
Being amongst those who have been most explicitly concerned with Being since 
the early attempts to interpret the experience of Being in ancient Greece. Hence, 
philosophical texts are a sensible source material to emphasize in his history. Of 
course, this is not to say that philosophical texts are the only artifacts relevant to 
the history of Being, nor that philosophers are the only ones with anything to say 
about Being. Heidegger does not make either of those claims. This prompts the 
second response to the complaint raised above: Heidegger recognizes the limits 
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of interpretation and his historical presentation is accordingly open to the 
contributions of alternative presentations. It is not plausible to think that Being 
and Time is intended to present the definitive history of Being, particularly given 
its incomplete status and the purported content of the unpublished third division 
(a detailed destruction of the history of ontology). Instead, Being and Time is an 
approach to fundamental ontology through the existential analysis of a particular 
being who plays a special role the history of Being. Heidegger’s analysis is not 
hermetic; hence we need not complain simply because he leaves things out.107 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
 As shown above, the existence of Dasein is crucial to Heidegger’s 
discussion of Being’s and history’s mutual presupposition. Without the historically 
situated entity Dasein, Being cannot show itself; and without the self-showing of 
Being, nothing can show itself (including Dasein and the phenomenon of history). 
I highlight this importance now, because it will be a critical insight in Heidegger’s 
critiques of his philosophical predecessors and contemporaries. Heidegger, as a 
philosopher of history in Being and Time, will turn the philosophical focus on 
history towards an existential analysis of the human being’s access to historical 
understanding. In this focus, his philosophy of history differs from the gloss on 
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the general philosophy of history that I discussed above. This is perhaps 
appropriate, however, given that Heidegger’s concerns are far broader than an 
understanding of the academic discipline of history. He is not simply concerned 
with the canons of interpretation and methods of research. Instead, he is 
concerned with the fundamental modes of access that Dasein, regardless of the 
particular social roles that she plays, has to historical phenomena. 
 It is difficult to categorize neatly Heidegger’s philosophy of history 
according to the scheme that I laid out above, drawing from Walsh and Dray. 
Heidegger is certainly a speculative philosopher of history, given that his 
fundamental ontology is prior to any empirical study. He answers questions about 
the pattern of history (at least of the part of history in which he is interested). The 
pattern is one of neglect of a centrally important question, and of the 
philosophical confusions that have derived from that neglect. As I will show in 
subsequent chapters, Heidegger also answers the question of historical 
mechanism. Here, his focus on the human being in her relation to her history will 
be important. The interpretive activities of human beings will serve to connect 
and give sense to a coherent picture of the historical past. It is difficult to say 
whether he answers the third kind of question, that of justification or meaning. As 
I will try to show, he tends to ignore the question of justification, but in his focus 
on Dasein, he claims that history is meaningful, even if it has no overarching, 
trans-historical justification. 
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 To contextualize Heidegger’s direction in the philosophy of history, I turn 
to a discussion of several of Heidegger’s important forebears in the next chapter. 
I then return in chapters three and four to a detailed discussion of Heidegger’s 
concerns in the philosophy of history, his critiques of his forebears and several 
critiques that have been leveled against him. 
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CHAPTER 2: THREE FIGURES FROM HEIDEGGER’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, I introduce three theorists who form an important context 
for Heidegger’s own reflections on history in Being and Time. They are 
Heidegger’s mentors, Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl, and a prevailing 
philosophical influence of the time, Friedrich Nietzsche. The first two of these 
theorists were enormously influential on Heidegger’s early development. Many 
excellent studies have been devoted to exploring these influences.108 Below, I 
focus on Rickert and Husserl’s investigations of interpretive objectivity with 
respect to history. Both articulate what they take to be authoritative, objective 
interpretations of their particular historical situation and its relationships to the 
past (and future).109 In doing so, they also articulate distinct theories of 
interpretive objectivity. In the first several sections of this chapter, I explore those 
theories as important precursors to Heidegger’s investigations in Being and 
Time. In the third section below, I turn to Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of what he 
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takes to be a dominant trend in European historical studies: a sort of mania for 
history that works against Europe’s own vital cultural impulses. His critique of this 
historical mania calls into question claims to interpretive objectivity in ways that 
prefigure Heidegger’s own critique, which I will take up in the next chapter. 
 Alongside my presentations of the three theorists, I argue in this chapter 
that each of their theories represent significant visions of the foundations of 
historical understanding and interpretation and of the sources of objectivity of 
interpretation. Both Rickert and Husserl locate the authority of objectivity outside 
of the individual interpreter. Rickert locates it in a realm of absolute values. 
Husserl locates it in a project that claims absolute, objective validity. Nietzsche, 
in contrast, claims that objectivity has a dry and baseless authority, one that 
works contrary to the vital interests of the interpreter. While Heidegger does not 
address these three writers in Being and Time in precisely the terms that I 
discuss them in this chapter, I believe that taking them seriously as historical 
interpreters will be beneficial for understanding Heidegger’s own approaches to 
history and interpretation. 
 
2.2 Heinrich Rickert and Value Philosophy 
 
 Rickert mentored Heidegger when the latter turned to philosophy from 
theology and eventually advised him on his Habilitationsschrift of 1916. As a 
leading member of the Southwest school of Neo-kantianism, he was primarily 
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concerned with differentiating what he called the “cultural sciences” 
(Kulturwissenschaften) from the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). He 
recognized the rise of a historical sensibility and interest in history over the 
course of the 19th Century, while acknowledging the lack of significant progress 
in the philosophical grounding of the historical sciences. The lack of progress in 
the logical analysis and evaluation of the cultural sciences is in contrast to the 
enormous progress made with respect to the natural sciences over the 18th and 
19th Centuries, which found its philosophical and conceptual peak (according to 
Rickert) in the theoretical works of Immanuel Kant. Rickert located the success 
and failures of the natural and cultural sciences in their respective methods of 
concept formation.110 
 Both the natural and the cultural sciences attempt to provide 
representations of empirical reality, according to Rickert. The natural sciences 
aim at representations of the natural world in terms of mathematical formulae 
describing universal natural laws and organized typologies that describe generic 
and differential features of real objects. Their work is made difficult by the 
particular character of empirical reality, however. He characterizes empirical 
reality as a “heterogeneous continuum,” that is, a chaos of qualitative differences 
that fade into one another at any given spatial point and temporal moment.111 
This continuum has to be divided up by the sciences in order to provide their 
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laws and typologies. Scientists accomplish this division of empirical reality by the 
introduction of natural-scientific concepts peculiar to each of the sciences. The 
physicist creates concepts such as mass, velocity, potential energy, negative 
charge, and so on, in order to divide up the continuum along those lines. The 
chemist, in contrast, introduces concepts such as chemical, chemical reaction, 
molecular weight, and so on, in order to divide up the continuum along lines that 
are useful to her. The geologist (to give an example of a typological science) 
introduces concepts such as igneous rock, volcanism, shale, porosity, and so on, 
in order to divide the continuum along those lines instead. In order to divide up 
reality, the individual sciences have to decide upon the features of reality that are 
essential to their science, and thereby form the concepts of the science by 
abstracting away from the scientifically inessential features of their objects. 
According to Rickert, what is peculiar to the natural sciences is that the essential 
features according to which they divide up reality are general, repeatable 
features. Hence, he calls the natural sciences “generalizing” sciences.112 
Concepts like mass, chemical reaction, and shale do not pick out any particular 
object individually. Instead, they are essential features that pick out any number 
of objects that have them in common. Even if a natural-scientific concept were to 
pick out a single object, according to Rickert it would have to do so according to 
general features of the object which are at least in principle repeatable in another 
object, even if they are not ever actually repeated. 
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 In contrast to the natural sciences, the cultural sciences form their 
concepts according to individualizing qualities. When confronted with the 
heterogeneous continuum of empirical reality, the cultural scientist develops 
concepts aimed at picking out and describing individual items of reality in terms 
of their meaning and importance as individuals. The cultural sciences, though 
they confront the same continuum as the natural sciences, conceive of it as a 
realm of meaning and culture, that is, not as something that grows, develops and 
changes according to its own inner principles (which would be nature) but 
something that is created and cultivated by human beings for particular reasons. 
Rickert gives the following as a definition of the cultural world in contrast to the 
natural world: “nature is the embodiment of whatever comes to pass of itself, of 
what is ‘born’ and left to its own ‘growth.’ Culture, on the other hand, comprises 
whatever is either produced directly by man acting according to valued ends or, if 
it is already in existence, whatever is at least fostered intentionally for the sake of 
the values attaching to it.”113 What makes a cultural object important and 
significant, and hence worthy of cultural-scientific study, is not its general, 
repeatable characteristics, but instead its unique, individual characteristics that 
mark it off as separate from everything else. Its importance depends upon its 
distinction from everything else, rather than on its commonalities with other 
objects.114 Hence, the cultural scientist has to devise concepts that pick out the 
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individuality of the object. Rickert calls the cultural sciences “individualizing” 
sciences in contrast to their “generalizing” natural cousins. 
 Similarly to the natural sciences, the cultural sciences generate their 
concepts according to the essential features of the objects under study. In the 
case of cultural objects, however, the essential features are determined by what 
is culturally significant and meaningful about the object in its individuality. The 
significance and meaningfulness of an object is in turn determined by that 
object’s relationship to some value or set of values. As quoted above, Rickert 
believed that we can understand the meaning and importance of something by 
understanding how it was cultivated by human beings according to some value. 
Values for Rickert are not real entities. Instead, they consist “entirely in their 
acceptance as valid.”115 Though they are not real, values can be connected to 
real objects and to the actions of human beings. When they are connected to 
objects, Rickert refers to the objects as “goods.” When they are connected to 
human actions, Rickert refers to them as “valuations.”116 Only goods and 
valuations are significant. Absent a connection to value, they could not have 
been cultivated by human beings according to some value (such cultivation 
serving to connect them to value), and so their manifestations and development 
over time must be attributed to meaningless nature rather than meaningful 
culture. The orientation towards values allows one to separate out the meaningful 
from the meaningless. Once one has formed cultural-scientific concepts along 
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the lines delineated by a value or values, one can divide up the heterogeneous 
continuum according to those concepts, illuminating the significant individuality of 
certain portions of that continuum. For instance, in order to determine and select 
the essential features of a historical event, and so something that has meaning 
and significance, the historian must begin from an orientation towards some 
value or values. The orientation towards certain political and cultural values (say, 
political equality) involved in writing a history of ancient Rome allows one to pick 
out the importance of the assassination of Caesar while ignoring the breakfast 
items eaten by Brutus that morning.117 The historian begins from a value, political 
equality, which then illuminates certain portions of the continuum as significant 
and important in the light of that value. Perhaps it casts light on the development 
of the Athenian democracy, the fall of the Roman republic, the American and 
French revolutions, the American civil rights movement, and so on. The historian 
can then select, according to more value-derived concepts (e.g., the 
degeneration of a more egalitarian to a less egalitarian regime), a particular 
political movement in the form of the fall of the Roman republic. The 
assassination of Caesar casts light on a particularly important moment in that 
degeneration for its singular and essential influence upon the ongoing civil wars, 
culminating in the institution of the empire under Augustus. Without the 
references to values, the assassination of Caesar cannot be an interesting or 
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significant event, except perhaps insofar as it involves certain physical events.118 
There is no reason for the historian to isolate that event within the continuum of 
empirical reality unless the historian allows values to illuminate that continuum. 
 Accordingly, on Rickert’s account of cultural concept formation, the 
historian has to be oriented towards values before she can develop the concepts 
that will pick out the significant and meaningful from the continuum.  Given 
Rickert’s account, the question naturally arises of how the historian decides 
which values orient her studies. The validity of a value is the key idea for Rickert 
here. The historian chooses his guiding values according to what she judges to 
be accepted as valid in her milieu (her readership, her own cultural context). As 
Rickert puts it, the historian “takes it for granted that those to whom his work is 
addressed, like himself, on the whole acknowledge or at least understand the 
worth, if not of these or those particular goods, then of the general values 
embodied in religion, the state, law, customs, art, science, etc., with respect to 
which what is historically represented is essential.”119 In this vein, he goes on to 
say that he must “call special attention to the fact that the acceptance of cultural 
values as valid is either actually universal (i.e., common to all) or is at least 
expected of all members of the cultural community.”120 He claims, moreover, that 
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this expectation about the acceptance of values is “the primary basis of [history’s] 
objectivity.”121 In order to divide up the heterogeneous continuum according to 
the importance of cultural entities, the cultural scientist must illuminate the 
continuum with values that are generally accepted within the historian’s own 
cultural community. Such acceptance underpins the historian’s claim to 
objectivity when she represents particular portions of the continuum according to 
their individual importance and significance. 
 Rickert raises a noteworthy concern about using the values of one’s own 
cultural community to underpin the objectivity of one’s historical representations. 
If one only uses one’s own values, then the claimed objectivity will be limited to 
other individuals who share those values (which may be a very limited group). He 
notes that the claimed objectivity will thus be “historically limited objectivity.”122 
Rickert does not undertake to solve this difficulty. He claims to point it out merely 
to make explicit that, if one wants to do a universal history of all human beings, 
one must presuppose that there are universally valid values that one can deploy 
to illuminate the heterogeneous continuum and according to which one can 
construct cultural concepts.123 Without such universal values, the historian’s 
representation of history will always be limited to a particular, limited perspective.  
Rickert points to a potential area of philosophical interest that may give us 
hope that such universal values may be discoverable. We might suppose that the 
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values that could guide a universal history are analogous to the universal laws 
that we assume are governing the natural world. We do not know the universal 
natural laws with certainty, nor can we reasonably believe that we have 
discovered anything more than approximations of them. Despite the fact that we 
cannot claim to know absolutely the universal laws of nature, we can make use 
of our approximations of them and attempt to evaluate our natural sciences on 
the basis of their approach to a complete and accurate representation of the 
laws. We can claim that the sciences are making progress because we have a 
notion of what they are making progress towards, even though we do not know 
the goal with absolute clarity. Rickert hopes that similarly, we can claim that 
though we do not know the universally valid values absolutely, we can discover 
the ways in which our relative values approximate or are made valuable by their 
relationships to more universally acknowledged values. We can then evaluate 
our cultural sciences (and our cultural practices and objects as well) in terms of 
their approach to these higher-level values that we can expect that all cultural 
communities will acknowledge as valid. Though we may not understand the 
particular values that inform another culture’s goods and valuations, the hope is 
that we can understand the more general values that inform those particular 
values. Though we may not understand why someone tells a particular myth 
about the creation of the universe, we might recognize the values that make 
telling such myths important to any culture whatsoever (be it the value of a 
relationship to the divine, or the value of understanding one’s own origins, or any 
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of a number of potential values). As Rickert puts it, “to the unconditionally and 
universally valid law of nature, which the generalizing sciences seek to discover, 
must then correspond the unconditionally and universally valid value more or less 
realized by the generally esteemed objects and institutions of cultural life in their 
capacity as expressions of individual complexes of meaning.”124 
 Rickert’s work lends itself to an interpretation of history according to the 
idea of progressive development. For Rickert, the primary historical entity is 
culture, and the epistemology that he develops is oriented around knowing this 
entity (hence the name, Kulturwissenschaft). Human beings certainly play a role 
in the development and expression of culture, through the production of valued 
goods and the activity of valuation. However, as individuals, human beings 
matter little to culture, excepting perhaps some particularly exceptional 
individuals (we might think of great artists, writers or inventors).125 For Rickert, an 
object is a good insofar as it is related to a value, not insofar as it was produced 
by a human being. We might think that a good’s source is incidental to its 
essence as a good. Historically important events, or historically important human 
beings, become so through their relationships to values. Hence, we have 
accounts of the history of Caesar and the fall of the republic that draw their 
emphases from the values that the described events are supposed to exemplify. 
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We might be interested in Caesar’s assassination as a morality tale about 
ambition and hubris or perhaps about the inconsistencies between the demands 
of friendship and the demands of country. Or we might be interested in the 
history, and draw our emphases accordingly, because of the importance of 
Roman law and culture for Christianity, and thereby for the culture of Christian 
Europe.  On Rickert’s account, it is difficult to see how Caesar could be an 
important individual just insofar as he is Caesar rather than insofar as his life 
(and death) had effects for our political and cultural world or insofar as he played 
a part in a transformative cultural moment. Only in his relation to values is 
Caesar important. 
 While Rickert does not explicitly advocate the interpretation of history as a 
progressive development, that is, one from a less developed to a more 
developed culture reaching its current apogee in modern Europe, his work does 
lend itself to that interpretation. Rickert is careful to state that historians should 
avoid the ideas of progress and regress when providing accounts and 
interpretations of history, since those ideas involve making value judgments 
about the past.126 In order to interpret a series of historical events as progressive, 
the historian must regard the series as moving towards a goal (the full or final 
state of the series) which makes the previous events in the series meaningful as 
preliminary, perhaps inchoate, and intermediary stages leading to something. For 
instance, in order to see the series of events that begins with the French 
                                                 
126
 Rickert, 96. 
83 
 
Revolution and ends with Napoleon’s final exile to St. Helena as progress in the 
introduction of modern political institutions into Enlightenment Europe, one would 
have to see that introduction as the goal of the series which makes the previous 
events meaningful as steps leading to that introduction. Moreover, in order to 
view such a series as progressive in particular, one would have to judge modern 
political institutions to have been and be a valuable development. Hence, in order 
to see a progression in history, a historian would have to make value judgments 
about the supposed goal of a historical progression and whether each 
successive stage represents a movement towards or away from that valuable 
goal. Conversely, in order to see a regression in history, one would have make a 
value judgment of the opposite tenor. If one wants to show an historical 
regression, one must judge the goal of a series to be bad or negative and then 
show the meaning of each event as a move towards that negative goal. As a 
historical scientist, though, one should not be making value judgments about the 
content under consideration, according to Rickert. One must relate the content to 
values, in order to select the appropriate material for one’s historical 
representations, but one must not judge whether those values are themselves 
ultimately (or universally) valuable or not. Values guide the historian’s 
representations of events, but they do not constitute value judgments about 
those events. 
 A comment here on the distinction between historians and philosophers 
for Rickert may be apropos. He discusses the ideal activities of each of these 
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professionals, but it must be kept in mind that these are ideal descriptions, not 
descriptions of actual professional practice. Given that values guide historical 
representations and that these representations are both the result of and the 
guiding influence on critical and material research into the historical past, 
historians cannot help but make value judgments in the course of their work. 
(Their work is guided by and results in value judgments.) As a sociological 
observation, it is true that historical representations as the products of historical 
research are inextricably interwoven with value judgments. However, Rickert’s 
focus is on the logical and epistemological conditions and justifications for 
historical interpretation and representation. Value judgments may be inextricable 
from the historian’s representations, but they do not serve to justify those 
representations – they are at best irrelevant and at worst antithetical. The claim 
that historians inevitably make value judgments while producing those 
representations amounts to no more than a claim that no historian is perfect at 
her trade.  
 Though Rickert makes it clear that historians should not make value 
judgments about the past, he does argue that philosophers of history should 
make value judgments about the past.127 Here, Rickert’s work lends itself more to 
the view that the history of human culture is a progressive development towards 
modern European culture. We have already seen that Rickert believed that there 
may be universal values to which the historian or other cultural scientist can 
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relate her subject material, thereby ensuring the universal objectivity of her 
scientific representations. Rickert also believed that it was inappropriate for 
cultural scientists to make value judgments about their material. The historian 
must select appropriate values to illuminate her subject matter with her audience 
in mind, but she does not enquire into the validity (universal or otherwise) of 
those values. She merely selects from the existing stock of values with attention 
to the values’ relations to her and others’ cultural environments. Whether the 
value is actually acknowledged or expected to be acknowledged is relevant to 
the historian. Whether the value ought to be acknowledged is irrelevant for the 
purposes of cultural science. To the philosopher, however, the validity of any 
supposed value is at issue. The philosopher may become aware of values via 
their relation to cultural goods and valuations, but she need not refrain from 
making judgments about those values themselves. In other words, the question 
of whether a particular culture relates itself to a particular value is a question for 
the cultural scientist. The question of whether a particular value ought to be 
universally acknowledged as valid, on the other hand, is a question for the 
philosopher. Hence, the historian should avoid making value judgments about 
the past, but the philosopher of history should judge the values of the past. The 
historian and the philosopher of history are thus in a form of symbiotic 
relationship: the historian furnishes the philosopher with the actual values 
acknowledged and respected by past and present cultures; the philosopher 
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furnishes the historian with refined values and attempts to justify the universal 
objectivity of the historian’s historical representations.128 
 Like on the side of the historians above, Rickert is giving an ideal 
description of philosophical practice as it relates to the discipline of history, rather 
than a description of actual philosophical practice. Surely no philosopher 
approaches “suprahistorical” values from outside of her cultural environment. The 
real philosopher must be something of a cultural scientist if she is to understand 
the values that she studies, even if she studies them abstracted from connection 
to any particular culture. Again though, this is to say that no real philosopher 
completely satisfies Rickert’s logical and epistemological ideal – and that is 
irrelevant for Rickert’s purposes. 
 The philosopher’s attempt to justify the universal objectivity of historical 
representations by discovering and establishing the validity of universal values 
leads to a progressive or regressive (or a combination of the two) reading of 
history. The historian judges cultures in terms of their reference to values. If the 
philosophers furnish universal values, then any culture can be judged 
(“universally”, “objectively”) in terms of its reference to those universal values. 
Once the historian has access to universal values, she can construct 
representations of universal history organized around the (progressive) approach 
or (regressive) retreat of culturally-specific values in relation to the universal 
values. In other words, the historian can begin to judge any specific historical 
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period and culture in their approximation of the universal values. A 
developmental reading of history is a natural consequence of the conviction that 
there are universally valid values that can (and should) inform historical 
representations. The historian need not ask whether human culture is becoming 
what it should be, but the question does have a philosophical foundation for 
Rickert. 
 Clearly for Rickert, values form the basis for any claim to authoritative 
historical interpretation. The historian as a cultural scientist and the philosopher 
can provide such authoritative interpretations only if they can access those 
values. The historian uses values to illuminate her subject matter. Two important 
sources of those values, as mentioned above, are the values that she expects 
her audience to acknowledge and those that the philosopher hands down as 
valuable (be they universally acknowledged or not). The philosopher’s access is 
perhaps less limited in that respect, in that she attempts to access values in their 
universality, not necessarily limited to any particular cultural environment. She is 
still limited in her possibilities of valuation, though. She must attend to that which 
ought to be valued, which is not a matter of choice on her part, but rather a 
matter of the nature of the values themselves. (In other words, the universal 
values of the philosopher are not connected to what human beings choose to 
value; instead, they are what should be valued by human beings, even if they 
choose not to.) The authority of one’s historical interpretation is thus connected 
to the authority of the values that one uses in its genesis. If the authority of the 
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values is limited to a particular cultural environment, then the authority of 
consequent interpretations will be similarly limited. The philosopher attempts to 
overcome this limit by providing universally authoritative values, and thus to 
establish the possibility of universally authoritative interpretation. 
 For Rickert, the values to which the historian and philosopher must attend 
are not a matter of free choice. In order to provide an authoritative interpretation, 
the historian must attend to what is valued in her cultural environment. She must 
submit to what is valued by her audience. The philosopher also must attend to 
external values if she is to provide, or establish the possibility of, authoritative 
interpretation. She must submit her judgments to what ought to be valued. This is 
not to say that there is no possibility of free choice in any manner when 
generating historical interpretations. Of course, there are a great number of 
choices that are made when engaged in interpretive activities. There is always 
some possibility of choice with respect to the focal points, subject matter and 
emphases. Despite these latitudes of freedom, however, the interpreter is not in 
a position to determine the authority of her interpretation absent the appeal to 
values. Its authority will be properly judged by Rickert on the basis of its 
connection to authoritative values, not on its connection to her own free choices 
(except insofar as those choices were guided by those values). 
  
2.3 Husserl and Rigorous Science 
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Like Rickert, Husserl articulates a vision of the objective validity of 
historical and philosophical study. In this section, I discuss Husserl’s articulation 
and argument for that vision. I argue that, as for Rickert, objective validity makes 
claims to be authoritative in Husserl’s account. That is, it demands a measure of 
subordination from those who would participate in the project of objectively valid 
philosophy. 
Husserl exercises an enormous influence over the young Heidegger both 
as a teacher, a mentor and as a philosophical predecessor. The relationship 
between the teacher and student has been investigated at length in many 
excellent studies.129 Heidegger’s Being and Time is written partly in response to 
Husserl’s early articulations of transcendental phenomenology. In particular, we 
might see Heidegger’s response to Husserl’s elaboration of the transcendental, 
world-constituting consciousness of the subject as a recognition of and argument 
for the importance of the historical dimension of consciousness. 
Husserl addresses contemporary philosophies of history is his early 
article, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” published in Internationale Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie der Kultur in 1910-11. This essay clearly made an impression on 
Heidegger since he references the text in several early lectures and in Being and 
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Time.130 In his article, Husserl provides a defense of his vision of phenomenology 
against several contemporary philosophical positions. He broadly groups these 
positions into two categories, naturalism and historicism, and presents these two 
alternatives as untenable philosophical deferrals to the scientific authorities of the 
natural sciences and the historical sciences, respectively. He begins the essay 
with an extended critique of naturalism, in which he argues that scientifically 
inclined philosophers tend to reduce all phenomena to natural objects (hence, 
naturalism). This results in an “absurd” attempt to understand psychic 
phenomena – consciousness itself – in the terms appropriate to natural objects. 
This attempt is problematic in the same way that it would be absurd to inquire 
into “the causal qualities, connections, etc., of numbers.”131 That is, it reduces a 
diverse array of kinds of phenomena to a single kind, one that it studies and 
describes in terms that are only appropriate to that single kind, like causality and 
sense-experience. As Husserl puts it, naturalistic psychology is “the absurdity of 
the naturalization of something whose essence excludes Being as nature.”132 He 
then provides a critique of the historicist position, which he associates with the 
worldview philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. 
The historicist, worldview philosopher’s position implies a strong 
skepticism about the possibility of a fully scientific phenomenological philosophy, 
a skepticism that Husserl is attempting to combat in his essay. The first thesis of 
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the historically-inclined philosopher, according to Husserl, is that many if not all 
meaningful phenomena are historical, in that their meanings are not static, 
instead developing over time through the sense-bestowing acts of many human 
beings both past and present.133 The meaning of any particular phenomenon 
may seem static, when looked at simply in the present tense, but different senses 
can become apparent through historical investigation. For instance, the 
phenomenon of kingship in England in the 21st Century involves a particular 
meaningful character related to a particular conception of monarchy and its 
relation to the democratic will of the non-royal citizenry. It also bears a 
relationship to the phenomenon of kingship in 14th Century England, though of 
course the latter’s meaningful character is related to a different conception of 
monarchy and the divine rights of the heirs of the biblical Adam. The 
phenomenon of kingship, of which these are both examples centred on a small 
island, has changed over the course of the centuries in terms of its sense. 
In order to understand such historical phenomena, the philosopher 
immerses herself in their historical senses. By doing so, as Husserl puts it, she 
can understand the “Being of spirit,” which is a “unity of internally mutually-
conditioning moments of a sense and therefore unity of taking shape and 
developing in accordance with inner motivations and that sense.”134 So, 
according to the historicist, we understand historical phenomena by 
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understanding their inner motivations and sense. For example, when studying 
kingship, the historicist understands that phenomenon by looking to the shifting 
motivations for monarchical government along with the cultural, religious and 
military senses of that particular form of socio-political organization. In doing so, 
she comes to have a better understanding of that phenomenon itself, rather than 
limiting herself to one of its many particular manifestations (as she would if she 
insisted on studying only 21st Century English kingship). Moreover, she comes to 
recognize that while both these phenomena are manifestations of the same 
underlying essence (kingship), each manifestation “belongs” within a particular 
spiritual-cultural environment. Perhaps she recognizes that 14th Century kingship 
is inappropriate and unsuitable in the 21st Century English environment and that, 
conversely, 21st Century kingship would have been anachronistic in the 14th 
Century. They each poorly fit the motivations and senses of their opposing 
environments. 
Another example, particularly apt for Husserl’s purposes, of a historically 
complex phenomenon of meaning is that of philosophy itself. Husserl claims that, 
according to the worldview philosopher, philosophy itself is an explicit expression 
of the underlying meanings attaching to and informing a whole host of historical 
phenomena (“art, religion, morals, and the like,” he says). Explicit expressions of 
the meanings of a cultural totality that are asserted with a claim “to objective 
validity after the manner of science” constitute the philosophical expression of 
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that totality.135 Philosophers engage in objective investigations of the 
constellations of values that inform cultural formations. One might think of 
Rickert’s philosophy of value and culture here. 
The close connection between the values of a culture and their 
philosophical articulation implies that philosophy itself is a historical 
phenomenon. Just as the values that inform different cultures at different points 
in history shift, so do the articulations of those values that are thought to be 
objectively valid. For Husserl, the worldview philosopher who studies 
philosophical expressions of cultural totalities faces the task of “bringing to 
historical understanding the motivations of spirit that determine their essence.”136 
According to the worldview philosopher, if we want to understand philosophical 
phenomena of culture, we must understand the particular constellations of values 
that inform and illuminate those phenomena. In other words, in order to 
understand a philosophical work, we must understand how the philosophical 
articulation of its values fits the cultural formations within which it is embedded. 
The appreciation of historical change leads the historicist to an extreme 
skepticism according to Husserl. Access to historical meanings teaches the 
historicist that meanings are always in flux. He quotes Dilthey for an example of 
this position: 
In the gaze that encompasses the earth and all pasts disappears the 
absolute validity of any one individual form of life-constitution, religion, and 
philosophy. Thus the formation of historical consciousness destroys even 
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more fundamentally…the belief in the universal validity of any one of the 
philosophies that have undertaken to express the world-nexus in a 
compelling way through a nexus of concepts.137 
 
The connection between changes in historical conditions and transformations of 
philosophical positions suggests to the worldview philosopher that the universal, 
objective validity that was claimed by and for philosophy is absurd. Since it is 
embedded within particular cultural formations, philosophy is not the kind of 
phenomenon that can have universal validity. For instance, a philosophical denial 
of the right of any person to own any other person may be appropriate to some 
cultures (cultures with particular concepts of property-ownership and individual 
human rights) but inappropriate to others (cultures characterized by different 
structures of ownership and rights). The denial of chattel-slavery thus would be a 
non-objective, non-universal philosophical claim, even though it may be asserted 
within a particular culture with a claim to objective validity. Thus, the worldview 
philosopher is led from the possibility of philosophical change due to historical 
change to skepticism about the universal, objective validity of any philosophical 
claim or position. 
Husserl does not claim that the worldview philosopher is necessarily led 
from the connection between historical change and philosophical change to 
universal skepticism. Instead, he stresses that “extreme skeptical subjectivism” is 
the result “when historicism is consistently carried through to its conclusion.”138 
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That is, universal skepticism is a logical (through perhaps not psychological) 
consequence of the worldview philosopher’s claim that all meaningful activities, 
including philosophy, are embedded in and derive their sense from particular 
historical environments (that is, the inner motivations and sense that animate the 
“Being of spirit” mentioned above). 
Husserl is particularly worried about the historicist’s skepticism in light of 
Husserl’s own claim to be advancing objective, scientific philosophy. He 
responds to the worldview philosopher’s skepticism by showing that it is based 
on absurd foundations. He argues that the logical consequence of historicism, 
universal skepticism, is inconsistent with a central principle of historicism: the 
historical contingency of all philosophical phenomena. Universal skepticism, 
Husserl argues, implies a distinction between the ideal of philosophical 
phenomena, the claim to objective validity, and the historical reality of 
philosophical phenomena: that it frequently (or always, if you’re a true historicist 
on Husserl’s picture) falls short of the ideal. In order for historical philosophical 
positions to fail to be objectively valid, there must be an intellectually accessible 
standard of objective validity. Universal skepticism implies a distinction between 
philosophical science “as cultural appearance” and philosophical science as “the 
system of valid theory,” in Husserl’s words.139 The latter characterization of 
philosophical science must be non-contingent if it is to support a universal 
skepticism that any cultural appearance could be a “system of valid theory”. By 
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drawing the conclusion that all philosophical phenomena are contingent, the 
historicist highlights a philosophical phenomenon that is not contingent. 
Husserl also accuses the historicist of making an illegitimate induction 
when she draws a universal claim from her historical subject matter. She judges, 
based upon the facts of the matter, that not only has all philosophy hitherto failed 
to meet its ideal and been historically situated, but that for all time it will fail and 
be so situated. However, as Husserl puts it, “an inference from a few millennia of 
higher culture to a boundless future would not be a good induction.”140 The 
historicist denies the possibility of objectively valid philosophical science on the 
shaky grounds that no objectively valid philosophical science has yet been 
articulated. We should not believe that something is impossible until we have 
been presented with a proof of that impossibility, which the historicist has so far 
failed to produce for Husserl.141 
Importantly, the critique of historicism is not only negative for Husserl; it 
also serves a positive function in his essay. He argues that the historicism 
implies an optimistic situation for philosophy: though philosophy has failed to be 
objectively valid thus far, the possibility of an objective critique of historical 
philosophical positions implies the possibility of an objectively valid philosophical 
project. 
If critique proves that philosophy as it has developed historically operates 
with muddled concepts, that it has mixed concepts, and has drawn false 
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inferences, then therein lies undeniably (if one does not want to get mired 
in senselessness) that, put ideally, the concepts can be elucidated, 
clarified, and kept distinct, that in the given field correct inferences can be 
drawn, etc. Every legitimate, deeply penetrating critique itself provides 
means of progress, points to ideally legitimate goals and paths and thus to 
an objectively valid science.142 
 
If a historical critique of philosophy provides us with the criteria to judge that 
philosophy hitherto has failed to satisfy those criteria, then the attempt to satisfy 
those criteria in the future can form our philosophical project. By articulating the 
ideal of philosophy in her critiques, the historicist provides the philosopher with 
the objectively valid project of attempting to satisfy that ideal. 
It is important to note that while Husserl endorses the attempt to satisfy 
the objectively valid ideal of philosophical science, he recognizes that the 
scientific philosophical ideal can never be fully realized: “Generations upon 
generations work enthusiastically on the immense edifice of science and add 
their modest objects of inquiry to it, ever conscious of the fact that the edifice is 
infinite and will never be completed.”143 There is simply too much to know 
scientifically. All scientific knowledge implies further scientific investigations and 
areas that have either just been disclosed to the investigator or have yet to be 
disclosed. Every science is an ordered island of knowledge within an infinite sea 
of possible investigations: “every science, no matter how exact, provides a 
doctrinal system that is developed only to a limited degree and is surrounded by 
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an infinite horizon of science that has yet to become actual.”144 Scientific 
investigation, as something that takes place temporally, is necessarily finite as all 
temporal activities are. Although the discoveries of the sciences are timeless 
(including those of the philosophical sciences), the future always presents us with 
more truths to know. The ideal of objectively valid, philosophical science provides 
the motivation and direction of inquiry, but it can only be satisfied to greater and 
lesser degrees, rather than absolutely. 
At this stage, it may be unclear with what right Husserlian 
phenomenology, the ideal of philosophical science, can claim to be objectively 
valid. Husserl clearly understands the project of philosophical science as an 
objectively valid one, even if all previous attempts to undertake it have failed. But 
why should we not view Husserl’s project simply as an historically delimited 
response to an historically embedded situation, one that will be revealed in its 
turn as essentially doomed to failure through its own essential historicity? The 
answer, for Husserl, lies in his conception of phenomenology in distinction from 
one of the prevailing philosophical movements of the time. 
Husserl argues that “we are under the spell of prejudices that date from 
the Renaissance.”145 We live under an unchallenged accretion of philosophical 
views. These views entail presuppositions about the character of the world and of 
our experience of it. Rickert, for instance, assumes the world to be an 
undifferentiated continuum. The structural characteristics of the objects of 
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experience are constituted by the logical contributions of consciousness, which 
uses concepts to carve out objects. In contrast, Husserl argues that the structural 
characteristics of objects are discerned by consciousness directly in experience. 
The essences of objects are intuited by consciousness in an analysis of the 
intentional correlates of essential structures of conscious uncovered through 
phenomenological reflection. In the “Rigorous Science” essay, Husserl calls this 
“phenomenological intuition in the right sense,” which he characterizes as “the 
phenomenological seizing upon essences.”146 The objective validity of the 
method of phenomenology, the “seizing upon essences,” thus underwrites the 
objective validity of the philosophical scientific project. In the historicist’s critique 
of previous philosophical positions, Husserl discerns the possibility of his project. 
The essence of that project, as it is discerned in previous (and current) 
philosophical striving and critique, determines and justifies its methods and 
direction.147 
Husserl thus argues that historicism, when taken to its logical conclusion, 
reveals a project for philosophical science. Importantly, we can articulate projects 
that are characterized by ideals, which motivate their inquiries. Philosophy, as 
such a project, aims at an objectively valid system of doctrines (in contrast to 
historical attempts and failures to achieve that ideal). In the possession of an 
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ideal, philosophy regulates its own activities. The philosophical ideal allows us, 
both the historicist and the Husserlian phenomenologist, to distinguish between 
success (or relative success) and failure. The project itself makes demands upon 
those who will undertake it, much like other activities make demands upon their 
participants.148 The scientific philosophical project aims at “absolute, timeless 
values” that transcend the idiosyncrasies of any particular historical 
environment.149 Having cleared the way for the articulation of a scientific 
philosophical ideal, Husserl leaves that ideal unarticulated in the “Rigorous 
Science” essay. I do not think this is a problem for Husserl, however, given that 
his stated aim is to show the absurdity of historicism rather than to propose the 
details of a positive doctrine. For our purposes, as well, it is enough to see that 
the criteria of success, the criteria of objectivity, are drawn from the essence of 
the philosophical project.  
Even if philosophy has historically failed to live up to the ideal of objective 
validity, that failure determines a forward-looking project. According to Husserl, 
this possibility is attested to by his own culture’s historical situation. He 
diagnoses his age as one dominated by the rise of historical (and naturalistic) 
skepticism, which has led to an age of “spiritual distress” and “the most radical 
vital distress.”150 He claims that in previous historical epochs, the values 
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according to which one lived one’s life, including those scientific ideals that have 
guided our lives in the modern era, went relatively unquestioned (relative to 
today). The benefit of having unquestioned values to the individuals living in 
those previous epochs was that they needed only concern themselves with the 
practical questions of how to live and act according to those values. They could 
live on stable ground rather than having to worry about constantly shifting (and 
therefore suspect) foundations. In contrast, in the modern era, which is 
characterized by the rise of the natural and historical sciences, all values are 
under skeptical attack.151 The sciences (both natural and human) have told us 
that we cannot trust them, even if they seem stable for our brief time on earth. 
However, we still have to make theoretical and practical decisions and act upon 
them (“all life is position-taking,” as Husserl puts it152), so we are caught in an 
uncomfortable situation: we need values to guide our actions, but all values seem 
to be only relative foundations and guides, so we can only ever act in a relative, 
one might say “subjective,” way. This relativity is somehow unsatisfying because 
values always carry a claim to objectivity153 even though that claim is under 
skeptical attack. This instability and its corresponding distress characterize our 
historical epoch. 
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Modern distress motivates the project that has already been established 
by previous, alleged failures of philosophical objectivity. This project carries the 
promise (even if it can never be completed) of objective values from which one 
can “take positions,” relieving our vital distress. This project gives us hope for the 
future. We are not only distressed but also ready with the preparation of solid 
ground upon which we can found a scientific philosophical edifice with a view to 
posterity. Our distress provides us with the opportunity for a radical beginning, 
the opportunity to consciously inform the future according to ideals that we can 
articulate now (an opportunity that is not afforded to many eras – or perhaps to 
any eras if we follow the historicist). In this way, we sit in a privileged position: the 
beginnings of objectivity are open to us, and though we may not have made 
much progress in philosophically establishing objectivity so far, progress can now 
be made and a progressive project can now be formulated. 
The objective validity of Husserl’s project demands a measure of 
subordination from those who would undertake it. Moreover, because it may be 
of almost universal utility, directed as it is to reveal objective and absolute values 
to relieve our vital distress, the scientific project suggests a measure of 
subordination in most (if not all) areas of human activity. The project delineates 
ideals that act as criteria to which individuals should subordinate themselves, in 
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order to be properly guided in their participation in the project. Since it is 
essential to the project, the guidance of the ideals is authoritative.154 
 
2.4 Nietzsche and Historical Mania 
 
 In the second of his Untimely Meditations, entitled “On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life”, Nietzsche provides a critique of modern 
historical cultural consciousness, which is characterized by the demand that the 
study of history be scientific and by the corresponding substitution of the 
knowledge of culture for the having of culture. Although he predates many of the 
Neokantians, in several ways Nietzsche’s critique of historical consciousness 
anticipates the Neokantian development of the Geistes- and especially 
Kulturwissenschaften. He takes aim at the concern for historical objectivity that 
characterized contemporary theories of historical science. Nietzsche advocates a 
critique of what he characterizes as a mania for historical objectivity, attacking its 
underlying cultural and philosophical pretensions. Heidegger was certainly aware 
of Nietzsche’s critique, as he references it in the penultimate chapter of Being 
and Time.155 
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 While the authors presented above have been interested primarily in the 
epistemology of history and the historical-scientific study of cultural development, 
Nietzsche was primarily interested in what he calls the “plastic power” of an 
individual and a culture. He defines plastic power as “the capacity to develop out 
of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is 
past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate 
broken moulds.” 156 Unlike his predecessors and contemporaries, Nietzsche 
investigated how historical knowledge and understanding affect the living 
impulses that constitute one’s ability to develop and mature. In other words, he 
focused on the way that historical knowledge helps and hinders the way in which 
human beings live their lives. 
 As one might gather from the title of the second of his Untimely 
Meditations, Nietzsche believes that the concern with history is a double-edged 
sword. It can be useful for life, and it can be abusive of life. Nietzsche claims that 
modern Europeans are suffering from “a consuming fever of history,” a kind of 
historical mania.157 This mania has been brought on by the modern recognition 
that we can learn something about ourselves (both individually and communally) 
through historical study. This has led to what Nietzsche regards as a major 
change in the modern age: the demand that history be a science.158 Just as the 
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scope of the natural sciences can seem limitless, so the cultivation of one’s 
historical understanding can be endlessly detailed and endlessly expansive. 
Modern Europeans wanted to know as much as possible about their (and others’) 
history, thereby expanding their horizons and cultivating themselves. Knowledge 
of history can be useful, for instance, in providing people with ethical or aesthetic 
examples, or helping us to appreciate our roots and overcome the injustices of 
the past. However, historical knowledge can be harmful, Nietzsche argues, when 
it becomes an uncritical mania. 
 Nietzsche warns that the modern historical mania threatens to suffocate 
the vital impulses, the life, of living human beings and their cultures. It does so 
through a fixation on historical objectivity, which prevents the historically sensitive 
person from undertaking meaningful activity. Nietzsche understands five 
interconnected dangers to derive from this fixation. While he is interested 
primarily in the vital impulses and plastic power of a culture, his remarks have 
some bearing on the claim to historical objectivity made both by his 
contemporaries and later generations. 
In the first place, the fixation on objectivity induces individuals to withdraw 
from the world, thereby preventing them from taking meaningful action. This is a 
problem that Nietzsche associates with the “weak personality.”159 Such an 
individual responds to the expansion of historical knowledge by trying to remain 
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aloof from her historical circumstances so as to judge the past dispassionately. 
Objectivity demands that she observe the historical world passively rather than 
be vitally involved in it. She thus secures a notion of objectivity in her 
observations of history, becoming a knower of history, rather than a possessor of 
history. 
Nietzsche points out a second danger: historical mania suggests that 
historically sensitive people of the present age are a more just people than those 
of previous ages. For Nietzsche, this suggestion is connected with the view that 
the historical sciences aim at objectivity in their assessments of the past. 
Knowledge of history is thought to give the knower a broader outlook which 
allows her to expose and overcome her historical conditions, thereby becoming 
objective in her historical assessments. Her judgments thus evince greater 
justice than those of previous peoples, dispassionate objectivity leading to 
greater justice. This dispassionate objectivity is bought at the price of withdrawal 
from the world, however. Nietzsche states, “according to this interpretation, 
[objectivity] means a condition in the historian which permits him to observe an 
event in all its motivations and consequences so purely that it has no effect at all 
on his own subjectivity.”160 The historical view is supposed to free us from our 
subjectivity by exposing our own historical circumstances, but it is supposed to 
do so by ignoring the effects that historical events have upon us, thereby ignoring 
those very historical circumstances. There is a whiff of hypocrisy in the view of 
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oneself as essentially historical (and therefore historically subjective) and as 
ahistorically objective at the same time. Nietzsche ridicules this view as merely 
the substitution of our own subjective and historically particular assessments for 
objectivity. 
 The final three dangers each suggest that the fixation on objectivity 
encourages a rigid conformity to the historical conditions of the present age. 
Nietzsche’s third danger is that the claim to objectivity limits the kinds of activity 
that human beings can undertake – in other words, such claims limit our plastic 
powers. The demand that one be objective, required by the fixation on objectivity, 
requires that one live one’s life in ways that fit with what is objectively 
understood. For evidence of this tendency in the modern age, Nietzsche points to 
the way in which modern education is aimed at producing common utility, which 
is taken to be objectively good: 
Our present age is…supposed to be an age, not of whole, mature and 
harmonious personalities, but of labor of the greatest possible common 
utility. That means, however, that men have to be adjusted to the 
purposes of the age so as to be ready for employment as soon as 
possible: they must labor in the factories of the general good before they 
are mature, indeed so that they shall not become mature – for this would 
be a luxury which would deprive the ‘labor market’ of a great deal of its 
workforce.161 
 
That is, in its objectivity, modern scientific culture demands that human beings 
conform themselves to what is of objective value, rather than developing their 
cultural powers from their own subjectivity. The claim to objectivity is an 
authoritative claim, which demands that we conform with what is objectively 
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revealed (since being “objective” about the world and our lives in it is the most 
valued way to live).162 
 The fourth and fifth dangers that Nietzsche emphasizes are closely 
connected. Historical mania and its fixation on objectivity promote the view that 
we moderns are latecomers to the world. Correspondingly, we latecomers are 
encouraged to become ironic and cynical towards our own historical position and 
prospects. In turn, these attitudes encourage conformity with what Nietzsche 
calls the objectively revealed “world-process.” The focus on the past that 
characterizes historical mania forces its sufferers to turn away from and ignore 
the future. Doing so, however, makes one regard the present as the culmination 
of the past, a past in which vigorous people brought our modern world into being. 
Without a view to the future, we cannot regard ourselves as precursors to 
anything new – a view to the future being necessary for action. The modern age 
is thus a latecomer to the world stage rather than the precursor of something 
new. 
An ironic attitude arises in the historically sensitive individual who has 
recognized our latecomer status and feels, according to Nietzsche, a 
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“presentiment of coming disaster.”163 When observing the past, they see 
vigorous, though unrefined and unjust individuals and cultures that led to our 
refined age. The objects of their historical knowledge thus provide a stark 
contrast between the vitality of the past and the passivity of the present. The 
wasteland of the present is doomed by the incompetence of the modern age. The 
hopelessness of the ironic attitude descends into another hopeless attitude about 
both our past and our future: cynicism. The cynic does not view the present as 
the hopelessly barren in relation to the vital past. Instead, she views the present 
as the ultimate justification for the past and us moderns as the worthy heirs of a 
great tradition. Nietzsche describes the “cynical canon” thusly: “as things are they 
had to be, as men now are they were bound to become, none may resist this 
inevitability.”164 Historical mania cynically demands that the individual submit to 
these irresistible historical processes since resistance to the irresistible would be 
foolish. Moreover, submission is actually valued, insofar as the fixation on 
objectivity that characterizes the modern age is regarded as the valuable 
culmination of history. Nietzsche draws attention to this pressure when he says 
that the historical maniac calls the cynic’s “way of living in the fashion of the age 
and wholly without reflection ‘the total surrender of the personality to the world-
process.’”165 
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 Famously, Nietzsche gives a brief taxonomy of historical attitudes and 
discusses what he thinks is healthy and what is harmful with them. These 
attitudes are by far the best known and widely referenced portion of Nietzsche’s 
essay.166 It will be useful here to mention them briefly here as examples of 
healthy and unhealthy relationships to history. His first type of history is 
monumental history. This form of history serves what Nietzsche calls “the man of 
deeds and power” in that it provides him with examples of valuable actions and 
lives from the past.167 Monumental history is important in that it can furnish vital 
individuals with values and ideals even in a mediocre present (a present that fails 
to furnish values and ideals). It teaches that a valuable life was possible in the 
past and is possible in the future, even if the present culture and epoch devalue 
the individual. Monumental history develops contrary to the “objective” 
tendencies of modern historical study, however, because in order to draw 
strength from the past, we have to ignore the historical particularities of that past 
and its dissimilarities to the present. If we want to draw strength from the life of 
Christ, we have to ignore the particularities of the eastern Roman Empire. 
Monumental history also contains a danger for the present individual as it can be 
used by the “impotent and indolent” to suffocate the present. Nietzsche gives the 
example here of an artistic critic who claims that all great art is past and from 
now on, no art can join the pantheon of masterpieces.168 
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 Antiquarian history serves the life of the individual by turning our attention 
to the roots of the present in the past. Nietzsche characterizes the antiquarian 
historian as recognizing the historical conditions that have allowed her to live and 
hopefully flourish in the present and wanting to preserve those conditions so that 
others might use them as she has.169 The antiquarian helps present individuals to 
see the historical resources that have enabled their own lives and, if it goes well, 
to appreciate how those resources might be harnessed with a view to the 
enhancement of their lives. Just like the monumental form of history, however, 
the antiquarian form promotes a potentially dangerous distortion of history. 
Nietzsche claims that, because the antiquarian historian is a product of the 
history that she preserves, she judges it without comparing it to possible 
alternative developments and so fails to judge the relative value of the elements 
of her history.170 Comparison can help to distinguish significant from insignificant 
differences. For the antiquarian, everything ends up seemingly important since it 
potentially all led to her. We might think of the “butterfly effect” here. If we think 
that a small change to an insignificant part of the past can lead to massive 
changes in the present, then we have to assume that everything, no matter how 
insignificant, is important as an element leading to our present. The danger here 
is that, since she cannot separate the significant from the insignificant historically, 
the antiquarian historian must demand that everything be preserved in her 
(laudable) desire to preserve the past for the sake of the present. As Nietzsche 
                                                 
169
 Nietzsche, 73. 
170
 Nietzsche, 74. 
112 
 
puts it, antiquarian history runs the risk of “mummifying culture” to the detriment 
of the future.171 
 Finally, critical history serves the life of the individual by condemning the 
past for the sake of the future. Occasionally, we cannot help but recognize our 
own origins in the injustices of the past.172 In such moments according to 
Nietzsche, we have to condemn the past so that we might hope for a better 
future. He puts it, 
“for since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the 
outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their 
crimes; it is not possible wholly to free oneself from this chain. If we 
condemn these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of them, this 
does not alter the fact that we originate in them. The best that we can do 
is to confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and 
through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and inplant in 
ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature”.173 
 
The critical form of history helps us to acknowledge that the conditions that have 
allowed us to exist, those preserved by the antiquarian, are unjust and condemn 
them in order to support in ourselves a new, second nature. According to the 
critical historian, our own lives and future are not determined by the human 
nature that we see instantiated throughout history; instead, our critical view of the 
past helps us to supplant our old, first nature with a new, second nature that can 
avoid the mistakes and violence of the past. It also helps us to see that this 
second nature will be of our own creation, which can in turn be overcome by 
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another, created nature, should our second nature become historically 
condemnable itself: “for those who employ critical history for the sake of life, 
there is even a noteworthy consolation: that of knowing that this first nature was 
once a second nature and that every victorious second nature will become a 
first.”174 Just like the other two forms of history, however, the critical is also 
dangerous for the present. Its dangers are those of any destructive enterprise: 
critical history may end up doing more harm than good when it is not deployed 
with care. It directly works against the impulses of the antiquarian historian who 
wants to preserve the past in order to preserve the conditions that have enabled 
present life. In the critical destruction of the past, the historian risks destroying 
those conditions that enable life in the present and for the future. 
 To sum up, historical mania thus casts what Nietzsche calls “morbid 
doubt” upon all the vital forces of life.175 Its fixation on objectivity induces an 
ignorance of one’s own historical situation and conditioning. Nietzsche suggests 
that modern historical objectivity is really the modern age’s historically specific 
and subjective judgments and valuations in disguise. Historical objectivity 
involves a self-concealing. In its self-concealing, historical objectivity also 
encourages conformity through submission to the authoritative claims of 
objectivity. Objective valuations restrict the activities that it is appropriate to value 
(and thus to undertake). The claim to objectivity is a claim to place such 
restrictions. Moreover, the ironic and cynical attitudes, developed out of historical 
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mania, encourage irresistible submission to the modern age – an age that is 
unfortunate but unavoidable for the ironic person and fortunate in the security of 
its objectivity and irresponsibility for the cynic. Nietzsche’s analysis thus casts 
serious doubt on the authoritative claims of objectivity. In the next chapter, I turn 
to Heidegger’s critique of objectivity and its authority. I focus on his analysis of 
interpretive activity and elucidate his argument that such activity inevitably 
involves a submission to norms that may offer a false authority. That is, 
interpretation (including objective interpretation) is structurally susceptible to false 
claims of authority. 
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CHAPTER 3: DASEIN AND THE INAUTHENTICITY OF 
UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 In the existential analytic of Being and Time, Heidegger argues that 
scientific objectivity is the result of a special interpretive activity. As interpretive 
stances, the sciences depend upon the hermeneutical possibilities of Dasein. 
This is in marked contrast to the traditional view of scientific objectivity, which is 
taken to be the result of the sciences’ true representations of their studied 
objects.176 In this chapter, I argue that Heidegger casts significant doubt on any 
claim to historical-scientific objectivity (including the claims of his forbears and 
contemporaries). He does so through a critique of Dasein’s possibilities of 
understanding. He argues that Dasein’s individual understanding is structurally 
susceptible to the dominating influence of publicly available understandings and 
interpretations – that is, individual Dasein is structurally susceptible to 
inauthenticity. As a result of interpretive activity based upon a kind of ontological 
understanding, objectivity is susceptible to the same submissiveness. Dasein’s 
inauthenticity enables a kind of false objectivity, the possibility of which casts 
doubt on any claim to scientific objectivity (of history or otherwise). 
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In the first section, I present a brief gloss of Heidegger’s analysis of 
Dasein’s ordinary experience. Because I am ultimately interested in his account 
of historical understanding and interpretation, I focus particularly on the 
contextualizing role that understanding plays in our experience. Having 
presented that gloss, I turn to the structural limitations of our capacity to 
understand the world and the entities within it. Understanding and interpretation 
are essentially linked for Heidegger as implicit and explicit articulations of 
meaning. Accordingly, in the third and fourth sections below I discuss the 
transition from Dasein’s implicit understanding to explicit interpretation. The 
limitations of implicit understanding imply similar limitations for explicit 
interpretation. In the final section, I present the case that scientific objectivity is 
for Heidegger a mode of interpretation and thus is constrained by the general 
limitations of all interpretive activity. 
 
3.2 Understanding 
 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger takes up the theme of scientific objectivity 
in several sections. He identifies such objectivity at times with the procedures 
and intended objects of mathematics and the natural sciences (numbers and 
nature, respectively), with the objects of philosophical study (such as persons, for 
instance), and with objecthood in general. I will discuss his views of objectivity 
below, but it will be useful to have some notion of the peculiarities of his view of 
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objectivity here at the outset. Heidegger argues that the world of human concern 
is constituted at a fundamental level in part by equipment that Dasein uses. This 
equipment is what it is – that is, it derives its Being – due to the place that it 
occupies within a contextualizing structural totality that is understood by Dasein. 
This is in sharp contrast to what Heidegger views as the dominating themes of 
Western ontology, which he identifies as the view that the world consists 
fundamentally of independent (substantial, only extrinsically related), 
scientifically-defined objects. On the traditional view, such objects have basic 
physical properties (we might think here of Locke’s primary qualities) that afford 
them derivative properties that relate to human psychology, physiology, and 
interest (Locke’s secondary qualities). The secondary properties are additions on 
top of what the object fundamentally is. Moreover, those objects are related to 
one another within another frame of reference: extrinsic spatial and temporal 
relations. Heidegger argues that the traditional view is misguided. 
Fundamentally, the relational totality of the world is essential to the phenomena 
that Dasein finds within it, and that totality is intimately connected to the interests 
and concerns of Dasein, as I will clarify below. 
 Understanding is a fundamental existential – that is, a basic feature that 
characterizes Dasein’s existence. Dasein is an entity that always operates within 
its understanding of itself, its world and the other entities that it encounters within 
that world. A major task of Being and Time is thus to provide an account of 
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Dasein as an understanding entity: a hermeneutics of Dasein is necessary to a 
phenomenological account of human existence. 
  Understanding is always directed at possibilities and is responsible for the 
fact that we who understand (in other words, Dasein) have potential – can do and 
be things – rather than just are. As he preliminarily characterizes it, 
“understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and 
it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable 
of.”177 He points out that we typically link understanding with competence.178 We 
think that someone understands an activity when they are competent to carry it 
out. So for instance, a person understands how to play the piano when she can 
put that understanding into practice by playing the piano. 
This link between understanding and competence is not just on the ontic 
level of its interactions with entities and activities, however; it is ontological as 
well. Dasein is not just an entity that understands other entities and activities. 
Dasein also understands itself.179 In understanding itself, Dasein is competent at 
being itself, at “existing”; in Heidegger’s terminology: “in understanding, as an 
existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a ‘what’, but Being 
as existing”.180 When we understand something, either ourselves or a 
phenomenon other than ourselves, our understanding primarily consists of what 
Heidegger calls the “projection” of the possibilities of that something and our own 
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possibilities in relation to it.181 If our understanding is directed towards a 
phenomenon, like a tool or an animal or a human being, then we understand that 
phenomenon when we recognize that it has associated possibilities that make it 
what it is, be they possibilities of use or of fear or sympathy, or of some other 
range of possibilities. 
 It is important to note here that, while our understanding of entities 
consists of the projection of possibilities, this projection should not be regarded 
as thematic. Heidegger tells us that it is not to be confused with a plan.182 For the 
most part, we do not project possibilities explicitly. We usually simply act upon 
possibilities without thinking much about them. In fact, it is impossible for Dasein 
to think explicitly through all the possibilities of all the entities that it is interacting 
with and participating in all the time. There are simply too many. It need only act 
appropriately given the contexts of its actions, and that usually does not require 
explicit, thematic consideration of those contexts. Moreover, the unthematic 
character of understanding explains how a person might be confused about the 
character of her own actions. It is not uncommon for a person to realize that her 
actions do not conform to the explicit understanding that she entertains about the 
entities with which she interacts. (One might point here to the electorate’s 
attempts to judge political candidates not on their rhetoric but on their past 
performance. We might consistently believe that a candidate is attempting to be 
truthful while making claims that are wildly at odds with his or her record in 
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office.) This gap between one’s explicit understanding and implicit understanding 
can be explained by the generally non-thematic character of the understanding 
with which we interact with the world and with ourselves. 
 The possibilities through which we understand ourselves and entities form 
contexts within which we and those entities are understood. In other words, our 
understanding, our “potentiality-for-Being,” discloses contexts for our activities 
and horizons within which we have to determine what entities (including 
ourselves) are. The contextualization that is disclosed to Dasein in understanding 
is the focus of Heidegger’s discussions of understanding in Being and Time. With 
this general idea of contextualization and understanding in view, I now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of Heidegger’s analysis. 
 For Heidegger, entities do not just happen by chance to be in contexts that 
our understanding discloses. Instead, contexts are essential to our encounter 
with entities. This is not to say that any given context is essential; it is only to say 
that contextualization (whatever that context may be) is essential to any 
encounter. Heidegger calls the enabling context within which phenomena show 
themselves, the world. To show the enabling priority of the world over 
phenomena, Heidegger turns to a lengthy consideration of the worldly character 
of phenomena and the phenomenon that he calls “the worldhood of the world,” 
the way that worlds show themselves as worlds.183 His discussion centers 
around his analysis of the Being of equipment, readiness-to-hand, and of its 
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concomitant world, the work-world. His argument centers on the notion that the 
worldhood of the world is constituted by structures that allow entities within the 
world to show themselves. 
 Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a single piece of equipment.184 
Any piece of equipment always sits within a totality of equipment that makes the 
single piece precisely what it is. A particular piece of equipment, his famous 
hammer for instance, is what it is because it is used in a particular way with other 
pieces of equipment for particular ends. As he observes, “equipment is 
essentially ‘something in-order-to…’”185 A hammer is for hammering other pieces 
of equipment, nails perhaps, in order to accomplish particular tasks, like 
attaching wooden boards together in the process of building a house-frame. It is 
in-order-to hammer nails into boards in-order-to build a house-frame. The 
hammer is not a hammer first which then gets attached to such activities 
subsequently; instead, the hammer is a hammer, and not something else, 
precisely by fitting into a larger context of equipment in the specific way that it 
does. It only becomes intelligible as equipment within that larger context. 
Heidegger creates several neologisms to capture the contextual nature of 
equipment. A piece of equipment always implies a towards-which, a for-which, a 
whereof, and a for-the-sake-of-which. That is, equipment implies goal-
directedness, an understanding of how it used in a particular environment, an 
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understanding that something precedes Dasein’s particular use of it, and an 
ultimate way in which the equipment fits into the life of Dasein.186 
 Equipment always implies potential goals for its use, a towards-which as 
Heidegger terms it.187 The use of equipment is directed towards a goal. Of 
course, this is not to say that equipment only has a single potential goal, or that it 
is always used explicitly for a particular goal. Instead, there can always be a 
range of potential goals towards which the equipment can be directed by the 
user. Importantly, Heidegger points out that that towards which equipment is 
directed almost always has the same ontological structure as a piece of 
equipment.188 
The goals of our equipment use can always be expanded outwards further 
and further, drawing more and more equipment and purposes into their contexts. 
The outcomes of our purposive activity are almost always something that can be 
the subject of further purposive activity and is intelligible in that light. Thus, not 
only does equipment point forward to its immediate purposes; equipment points 
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forward towards further mediate possibilities for its use as well. Through its 
towards-which equipment implies a far-reaching, purpose-oriented context that 
determines what equipment it is. 
 Equipment always implies an understanding on behalf of its user of what it 
can be used for, which Heidegger denotes at times as the equipment’s usability 
and associates with its for-which.189 We might think of the for-which of equipment 
as how the equipment can be used in order to achieve the goals of its use. A 
piece of equipment thus implies other pieces of equipment, in its immediate uses 
in conjunction with other equipment to carry out the user’s purposes, or it at least 
implies other equipment that can be used once the user’s immediate purposes 
have been carried out. As Heidegger might put it, that for-which equipment is 
again shares the ontological character of equipment. In the for-which 
relationship, Heidegger brings out the overall context of other pieces of 
equipment within which the hammer (or other single tool) fits. 
 Equipment also implies a source of the equipment and materials that are 
in use, which Heidegger terms the equipment’s whereof.190 No equipment bursts 
into being ex nihilo; it is always at least made of some material, presented via 
some material or directed at the organization of pre-existing material. Importantly, 
as with the towards-which, Heidegger points out that that whereof equipment is 
also has the ontological character of equipment. Equipment thus points not just 
forward to purposes with which it is used and to a context of other equipment in 
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conjunction with which it is used; equipment also points backward to its sources 
in other equipment.191 
 Equipment is always for the sake of something, which Heidegger calls its 
for-the-sake-of-which.192 The for-the-sake-of-which of equipment is closely 
connected to its towards-which. As the towards-which of equipment is extended 
toward more and more distant purposes, eventually it arrives at an interest of 
Dasein. In other words, the intelligibility of any piece of equipment in terms of its 
towards-which is ultimately its orientation towards Dasein. The for-the-sake-of-
which of any piece of equipment is Dasein. Heidegger illustrates this in the use of 
a hammer.193 A hammer is oriented towards hammering, one possible use of 
which is driving nails into boards in the construction of a house-frame. A house-
frame is oriented towards the potential construction of a house, which is itself 
oriented towards the creation of a space protected from the weather. The 
creation of spaces protected from the weather is oriented towards providing 
shelter to Dasein, for the creation of a home. At this point, one might inquire into 
the intelligibility of a home, but it is difficult to see how this can be explained in 
terms of anything other than Dasein’s interest in having a home for its own sake. 
Thus the hammer is ultimately for the sake of Dasein. On Heidegger’s account, 
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all equipmental towards-whichs ultimately lead to Dasein, which the equipment is 
for-the-sake-of (Heidegger calls Dasein “the primary towards-which”194). 
 Equipment does not just imply its context; it requires that the context be 
disclosed before the equipment can show up as what it is at all. Heidegger 
introduces a new term for a piece of equipment’s orientation towards its context: 
the equipment’s involvement.195 Any given piece of equipment is essentially 
involved in its context, in that the context makes the equipment what it is. A piece 
of equipment implies the prior disclosure of its context, into which the equipment 
can fit (or not) and thereby be the equipment that it is. As Heidegger puts it, “the 
totality of involvements which is constitutive for the ready-to-hand in its 
readiness-to-hand, is ‘earlier’ than any single item of equipment.”196 To illuminate 
this priority of context over individual item of equipment, he considers two pieces 
of evidence: cases of disruption in equipment use and the functioning of signs. 
 Disruptions in the normal functioning of equipment make the prior context 
of involvements explicit.197 Heidegger notes that, in each of the three situations of 
disruption, “the context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen 
before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand”.198 Heidegger considers 
three types of disruption and their ontological implications. The first type is 
broken equipment. When a piece of equipment breaks, he claims it becomes 
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“conspicuous” in a way that it was not before the break.199 Particularly, its 
towards-which relationship becomes apparent in the attempted use of the 
equipment. Whereas in the normal use of equipment, it must remain 
inconspicuous so that it does not ‘get in the way’ of the user, broken equipment 
shows itself as unusable for the task to which it has been assigned and so 
illuminates that towards which it is directed. Moreover, just as the towards-which 
of a piece of equipment draws in a series of purposes towards which the 
equipment is aimed, terminating at a general interest of Dasein, the 
conspicuousness of broken equipment illuminates this entire context towards 
which the tool is aimed. Without that prior disclosure of the use-context to the 
user, the equipment could not be broken. 
 Similarly, use-contexts become explicit when a piece of equipment is 
missing. Heidegger claims that when equipment is missing, it makes its context, 
its purposes and the other equipment with which it cooperates, “obtrusive.”200 
When a piece of equipment is missing, its absence renders the rest of the 
equipment in its context unusable. The user is explicitly alerted to what the 
equipment was for and what it was to be used with. As Heidegger puts it, “the 
environment announces itself afresh.”201 The essential element of a missing 
piece of equipment, that which allows the equipment to show up in its absence, is 
its already-disclosed context of use. Again, without the prior disclosure of the 
                                                 
199
 SZ, 73. 
200
 SZ, 73. 
201
 SZ, 75. 
127 
 
use-context to the user, the equipment could never show up specifically as 
missing. 
 The third type of disruption that Heidegger considers is a case in which 
the equipment is out of place or “in the way” of the user.202 For instance, we 
might think of a situation in which one wants to paint a wall but needs to sand the 
wall first, or when one wants to go home but has to complete one last task at 
work. Heidegger claims that in such situations, the overall contexts of equipment 
use show themselves as “obstinate.”203 Their obstinacy is important, in that it 
illuminates the use-contexts of equipment as making demands of their own, over 
which the user has no control. In one sense, this amounts to the banal 
observation that we cannot use equipment in any old way we want; we must use 
it in a way that is appropriate to it. In another sense, it amounts to the important 
observation that the overall contexts within which equipment shows up as 
equipment, including the broadest contexts of Dasein’s interests, make demands 
upon the us over which we have no control.204 We do not and cannot use 
equipment in just whatever way we want; instead, we have to attend to contexts 
in the ways that they demand. Once again, without the prior disclosure of the 
context to the user, the equipment could never show itself as out of place and 
obstinately demanding of the user’s attention. 
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 Along with the analysis of disruptions in the world of equipment, 
Heidegger discusses a second phenomenon that illuminates priority of 
understood contexts over the individual items of equipment that appear within 
those contexts. Signs highlight this priority. 
 A sign is a piece of equipment, and like any other piece of equipment, a 
sign always belongs within a context of equipment that enables it to be the sign 
that it is. Specifically, for Heidegger a sign is a piece of equipment used for 
indicating something. We might apply the same analysis to a sign as I have 
already outlined above in Heidegger’s general analysis of equipment. A sign 
always has a towards-which, a for-which, a whereof, and a for-the-sake-of-which. 
For example, we might consider a yield sign. Such a sign is oriented towards a 
purpose and such orientation is essential to the sign. A yield sign alerts drivers to 
the potential presence of traffic, the need for caution, and the appropriate 
behavior that one should take when confronted with other cars. Without 
recognizing that towards-which the yield sign is oriented, one could not recognize 
the sign itself as a yield sign (or perhaps as a sign at all). Moreover, the sign 
indicates an entire complex of equipment within which a driver must orient herself 
(roads, other cars, the controls of her car, traffic signage, etc.). Indicating this 
complex of equipment is the sign’s for-which.205 The sign is particularly useful for 
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bringing the equipmental context in which it belongs to more explicit attention. 
The yield sign also has an essential whereof, in that both the sign is created from 
materials (metals, paints, etc.) and the driver’s recognition of the sign, by which 
the sign is a yield sign, is determined by a prior background of traffic regulations. 
Finally, the yield sign has a for-the-sake-of-which founded in Dasein’s interests 
and needs. Yield signs are ultimately for the sake of creating orderly traffic flow, 
so that drivers might get from one place to another in (relative) safety. The yield 
sign is for the sake of the drivers. 
 The sign’s essential for-the-sake-of-which is important. It shows that signs 
serve the purposes of entities who must orient themselves within the sign’s 
highlighted context. Additionally, it shows that the highlighted context is prior to 
the sign. Signs are not useful, they are not equipment, for entities that cannot 
take orientations towards their situations. Signs therefore play a special role in 
Heidegger’s ontological analysis: they explicitly illuminate the peculiar way in 
which Dasein is in the world. As Heidegger puts it, “the sign addresses itself to a 
Being-in-the-world which is specifically ‘spatial’…the circumspection which goes 
along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit ‘survey’ whatever 
aroundness the environment may have at the time.”206 The environment of 
Dasein, within which it must orient itself according to the sign, must be prior to 
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the sign. It is not something that only comes into being when the sign is 
recognized; it is instead something that shows up for the Dasein that is using the 
sign as a context that was already there and within which Dasein already was. 
Signs are conspicuous equipment for drawing attention to an inconspicuous 
context.207 When the driver sees a yield sign, the sign brings the equipmental 
totality of cars and traffic into explicit focus as a context in which the driver was 
already participating. In already participating in the traffic system, in being 
already in the middle of driving, the driver is called by the yield sign both to 
attend to the orientation that she has already taken within her environment and to 
respond to that environment with appropriate orientations (caution, attentiveness, 
etc.). The context within which the sign operates therefore bears an essential 
relation to Dasein. Dasein is already implicated in the context within which the 
sign appears, not just as something that can orient itself but as something that 
must orient itself. It is essential to the ontological character of the sign that it fit 
within a context that it highlights and which shows itself to Dasein as meaningful. 
 Dasein, as the entity who understands, plays a crucial role in the 
disclosure of what entities are. As we have seen, understanding is required for 
the phenomena of equipment to show themselves as what they are. This fact has 
important consequences for the possibilities and limitations for the ways that 
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entities can show themselves. In the remainder of this section, I clarify how 
exactly Dasein plays this role in Heidegger’s account. 
 Dasein is the for-the-sake-of-which of every involvement, as noted above. 
The involvements of any piece of equipment, and thereby the involvements of 
any world, ultimately refer to and imply Dasein as an essential part of that world. 
The world is organized along the lines of that for the sake of which it is (that is, 
along the lines of Dasein’s interests). Thus, in Heidegger’s account Dasein itself 
is essential to the contexts that enable entities to show themselves as what they 
are. 
 Dasein’s place within the background contexts that enable entities to show 
themselves is not one of neutrality or non-involvement. Dasein is not just one 
small element of the worldly context. Instead, Dasein plays an effective and 
influential role in enabling entities to show themselves. Heidegger claims: 
 Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something 
beforehand, our  doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as 
letting something be involved, and  such things as the ‘with-which’ and the 
‘in-which’ of involvements. Anything of this sort,  and anything else that is 
basic for it, such as the ‘towards-this’ as that in which there is an  involvement, 
or such as the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ to which every ‘towards-which’ 
 ultimately goes back – all these must be disclosed beforehand with a 
certain intelligibility.208 
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He calls these structural items of the involvement of equipment “a primordial 
totality,”209 indicating their place in the necessary background of the phenomenon 
of equipment and their relationship to Dasein’s understanding. Since the 
primordial totality of enabling conditions of involvement determines the general 
characteristics of any given equipment, that totality must be accessible to Dasein 
if the equipment is to show up as what it is.  
Dasein understands the involvements in which an entity can enmesh itself 
(perhaps not all of them all at once, but it understands how a piece of equipment 
might fit in at least some contexts). In order to have a structured world (which is 
essential to a totality of involvements), the contexts of involvement must be 
disclosed to Dasein beforehand as intelligible possibilities. Thus, an essential 
element of the enabling context within which entities show themselves is that 
Dasein understands the possibilities of those entities, the ways in which they can 
fit together with other entities into a totality of involvements or, in other words, a 
world. As Heidegger puts it, “Dasein…is the ontical condition for the possibility of 
discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement 
(readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves 
known as they are in themselves.”210 Dasein is thus an influential part of that 
intelligible world. Dasein plays an essential part in making entities within a world 
intelligible as what they are. 
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 Dasein’s understanding of the world and entities is effective in that if 
Dasein were to interpret entities and the world differently (as different kinds of 
equipment, or not as equipment at all), entities would show themselves 
differently. In other words, the ways in which entities show themselves is tied 
closely to Dasein’s understanding: changes in the latter imply changes in the 
former. Immediately after analysing the relationship between the world and 
equipment, Heidegger illustrates the effective character of understanding in his 
analysis of Descartes’ interpretation of entities and the world. I discuss his 
interpretation of Descartes in much more detail below, as we can read it as an 
extended attack on a misunderstanding of scientific objectivity. It will suffice to 
say here that he argues that there are a number of phenomena that cannot show 
themselves within Descartes’ metaphysical interpretation of objects. He claims 
that the interpretation reduces the world to an extended space composed of 
extrinsically-related physical objects, rather than a context within which those 
entities have possibilities and can be used. Descartes accesses the world 
through indifferent mathematical understanding and so this is the only way that 
the phenomenon of the world can show up for him. 
 Dasein is essential to the contexts that make up the world and which allow 
entities to show themselves as handy. The ways in which entities can show 
themselves is dependent upon Dasein’s understanding of them. This should not 
be taken to mean that Dasein is perfectly free to choose its understanding and 
thereby free to choose how phenomena can show themselves to Dasein. On the 
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contrary, Heidegger argues that Dasein is embedded within a context that limits 
the possibilities of understanding that are available to it. Its context limits Dasein 
in a number of ways. In addition, the self-showing of the entities themselves 
(their Being) limits Dasein’s understanding. This should be relatively 
straightforward; the phenomena of an entity that one can access limit one’s 
understanding of that entity. Inaccessible phenomena cannot play a part in the 
formation of an understanding (except perhaps negatively). In what follows, 
though, I will leave this limitation to one side. I am primarily interested in the one 
side of the relation between Dasein’s understanding on the one hand and entities 
on the other. That is, I am primarily interested in the constraints that Dasein’s 
context put upon its understanding, rather than upon the constraints that the 
phenomena place upon it. Accordingly, in the next section I focus on the 
particular ways in which Dasein’s context limits its possibilities for understanding. 
 To sum up, with his analysis of equipment and specifically of signs, 
Heidegger has argued that the ontological structure of equipment, which he 
terms “involvement,”211 implies contexts that enable the equipment to show itself 
as what it is. A piece of equipment is essentially involved in its context and shows 
itself as what it is in accordance with that involvement: its towards-which, for-
which, whereof and for-the-sake-of-which. These characteristics of equipment in 
general delineate the structural features of the equipment’s involvement. 
Importantly, they are not had by self-contained and independent entities. The 
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structural features of a piece of equipment always refer to progressively wider 
contexts within which the equipment fits and is thus understandable. The wider 
contexts of equipment fit into and essentially show themselves as what they are 
within still wider contexts of the equipment. The disclosure of the progressively 
wider contexts by means of the ontological structure of equipment thus implies 
the disclosure of a totality of involvements within which the involvement of the 
particular equipment fits. What enables the equipment to show itself as 
essentially involved in its context is the prior disclosure of a totality of 
involvements. The totality of involvements that is implied by the ontological 
structure of equipment is the world that enables that equipment to show itself as 
what it is. Heidegger sums it up: 
 “As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself 
discovered only on the  basis of the prior discovery of a totality of 
involvements. So in any involvement that has  been discovered (that is, in 
anything ready-to-hand which we encounter), what we have  called the “worldly 
character” of the ready-to-hand has been discovered beforehand.”212 
 
3.3 Limitations of Understanding 
 
 For Heidegger, the world of equipment implies the existence of other 
Daseins. In doing so, the world of equipment also implies the possibility of 
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inauthentic Dasein. Inauthenticity sets important limitations on Dasein’s ability to 
understand its circumstances. Heidegger explicates the concept of inauthenticity 
and the problem that it poses for genuine understanding (of one’s historical 
situation, for instance) in his discussions of das Man and Dasein’s falling. 
Accordingly, I turn to a commentary on his discussions in this section. 
 Dasein does not escape from involvement in the world by playing its 
particular role. Heidegger claims, “Dasein always assigns itself from a “for-the-
sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an involvement.”213 In the food production 
world, which is for the sake of Dasein, Dasein is an essential participant, not just 
as she for whose sake it is, but as someone who has to act appropriately with 
that world and its equipment in order to make that world work for it.214 This 
participation could take the direct form of working in the food-world in some way, 
for example as an operator of a harvester, or as a waiter in a restaurant, or as 
the navigator of a grain freighter. Participation could also take an indirect form, 
such as a customer at a supermarket, a diner at a restaurant, or simply a 
consumer of an evening meal. In every case, as someone who needs to eat food 
occasionally, Dasein must participate in the world of food. Dasein participates not 
solely as someone structuring the food world and allowing entities to show 
themselves as equipment through their involvement in that context, but as 
someone who works with that world, who harnesses it for Dasein’s sake. 
Dasein’s involvement requires that it learn to behave appropriately when acting 
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within that world. Equipment must be used in concert in particular ways 
(delineated by its towards-which and for-which). The operator of the harvester 
must use the harvester with wheat within the range of possibilities for which 
those two pieces of equipment can be used together in order to extract any 
usable wheat. The waiter at the restaurant has to work with the food and the 
equipment for cooking it, consuming it and paying for it. In short, Dasein must 
work with the equipment of the world in the ways in which the equipment’s 
structure demands if it is to be used for Dasein’s sake. In sum, as part of the 
phenomenon of equipment, Dasein is implied as embedded within the world that 
makes that phenomenon possible and as an entity that involves itself in the ways 
that the world demands.215 
 Not only do the phenomena of equipment and the world imply the 
individual Dasein as a participant; they also imply Dasein as Others. Heidegger 
argues that “Others are encountered environmentally,” that is, within the world of 
equipment.216 He makes this clear when discussing Dasein’s encounter with 
Others in the shared world of equipment.217 Corresponding with the ontological 
structure of involvement, Heidegger outlines several ways in which Others are 
encountered by Dasein in the world of equipment: as the potential destination of 
the equipment, as the potential source of the equipment, as those potentially at 
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work alongside Dasein with the equipment, and as those potentially for whom the 
world of equipment exists at all.218 Equipment aims at the production of 
something for Dasein. In principle, it is not necessarily solely for the individual (or 
collective) Dasein that is using the equipment at the moment, however. The work 
need not be “destined” for the maker; it can be “destined” for someone else. 
Heidegger gives the example of a tailor: “along with the equipment to be found 
when one is at work, those Others for whom the ‘work’ is destined are 
‘encountered too’…there lies in [its involvement] an essential assignment or 
reference to possible wearers, for instance, for whom it should be ‘cut to the 
figure’.”219 Others are implied by equipment in that the equipment can be used for 
someone other than the user’s purposes. Equipment also contains a reference to 
Others as its source. We almost exclusively make use of equipment in our daily 
lives that was designed and made by someone else. Even if one has a tool that 
one designed and built alone, the materials with which it was made may have 
been extracted from the earth by someone else. Equipment implies a “supply-
chain”, implying Others providing us with the equipment: “Similarly, when 
material is put to use, we encounter its producer or ‘supplier’ as one who ‘serves’ 
well or badly.”220 Others are also encountered as one’s co-workers. In the 
workspace, Others show themselves as potential users and co-users of 
equipment. They might be individuals who use the same machines as one uses 
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(other forklift operators, for instance), and they might be individuals with whom 
one must cooperate in order to be productive (in order to empty a delivery truck, 
for instance). They are encountered as other Daseins also embedded and at 
work within the world: “we meet them ‘at work’, that is, primarily in their Being-in-
the-world.”221 To round out the description, as embedded within the world, the 
Others are encountered as potentially those for whose sake the equipment, and 
its world, is at all. Dasein’s interests, which all equipment is ultimately supposed 
to serve, are not unique to a single individual. They are potentially had by any 
other individual. This is particularly clear when it comes to the basic necessities 
of life: food, clothing and shelter. These items are required for continued life, and 
so equipment serving those needs are for the sake of any individual. It is true 
also insofar as any individual might share higher-order interests with any other 
individual. There is no priority of interest between individuals; the yo-yo that 
entertains, and so is for, me could easily entertain, and thus be for, someone 
else.222 Since the world of my projects is structured according to the for-the-sake-
of-which, and any Dasein could potentially play the role of the for-the-sake-of-
which, the world constitutively could be for the sake of other Daseins. Other 
Daseins are encountered through the world as Others for whose sake Dasein’s 
world could be. 
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 Even if there are actually no Others around, Heidegger is clear that Others 
are implied within the world of equipment: “Being-with is an existential 
characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or 
perceived.”223 Even if the tailor has no customers, the clothes must be designed 
and made so that they could be worn, should there be any customers. If one 
comes across a wristwatch in the woods, one must assume that it was made by 
someone, even if there is no one around. If one comes across a wristwatch 
frozen under a mile of Antarctic ice, one must assume that someone made it and 
put it there, either recently or in the remote past. When one is using equipment, 
one has to recognize that one’s equipment could in principle be used by anyone 
in the way in which one is using it. A hammer could be used in the same way by 
an Other as it is by oneself. Hubert Dreyfus, in his interpretation of the 
equipmental world, provides some helpful examples of how for Heidegger, the 
world requires references to Others even when Dasein is alone. He gives the 
example of equipment used in the consumption of food.224 Forks, knives, plates, 
stoves, tables, to-go containers, all work together to allow Dasein to consume 
food. These all have a standard or normal way in which one uses them, and 
these normal ways in which they are used come together to sustain the world of 
food consumption. Food is cut and prepared in such a way that it can rest on a 
dish or bowl and be picked up with a fork or spoon, and different food 
preparations imply different appropriate utensils. It is necessary that there is a 
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normal way in which one uses these utensils. They fit together in a specific way, 
with some freedom for improvisation built in. The construction of replacement 
utensils must allow them to be used in the way that they are normally used. If 
there was not a normal way that they are used, that system of equipment would 
be impossible. For instance, if everyone had their own, perfectly unique and 
individuated way of using meal utensils, there would be a chaos of activity at the 
dinner table, not the ordered and structured world of food preparation and 
consumption. If a dozen people bring a dozen uniquely-functioning utensils, then 
a dozen potentially-incompatible preparations will be implied for the food. One 
would not be able to serve a meal that can be dealt with by everyone’s tools. 
 The idea of normalcy is important here.225 The world of equipment not only 
requires Dasein as a participant and other Daseins as possible participants, it 
also requires norms that set the terms within which Dasein can act in that world. 
It is essential to the equipmental functioning of the world that there be a normal 
way that one uses various items of equipment (and, indeed, interacts with the 
entire equipmental totality). Again, Dreyfus provides a helpful commentary on this 
idea.226 The world of equipment requires a kind of cooperation between the 
people involved in that world (both as participants and as possible participants). 
The producers of goods need to know how the users and consumers of goods 
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are going to use and consume them, if the producers are to know how to make 
the appropriate goods. If I make spoons, I must have at least some idea of how 
my spoons are going to be used before I can make them appropriate to the task 
they will be expected to perform. (So, for example, I should not make a slotted 
soup spoon, since a soup spoon is used to carry liquid.) Similarly, those 
cooperating in the use of equipment (in a workshop, for instance) must know how 
others will use the various pieces of equipment, and must cooperate to make the 
machines function appropriately. Again similarly, those of us who use large-scale 
equipment, like the transportation system or electrical appliances (in other words, 
everyone) must cooperate in the use of that equipment in order for it to serve its 
function. I must drive on the right side of the road (in America), stop at red lights, 
use my turn signals before turning, press a particular pedal to accelerate and 
another to stop, and so on, in order for the transportation system (that is, cars, 
roads, buses, traffic lights and other regulative objects, drivers, gas engines, and 
so on) to function properly. If a significant number of people decided to stop 
abiding by the norms of transportation, the system (that particular equipmental 
context) would cease to function. 
 Heidegger discusses the norms that govern (and thereby enable) the use 
of equipment in the context of das Man. Two helpful ways to translate this term is 
to think of it as “the One” and “the They.” The One is helpful when thinking about 
the ways in which norms are frequently stated. Heidegger points out that when 
engaging in discussion of norms, we put them in terms of “what one does”: “We 
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take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as One takes pleasure; we read, see and 
judge about literature and art as One sees and judges.”227 If we saw someone 
using a fork to pick his nose at a restaurant, it wouldn’t be inappropriate to think 
(at least), “that’s not how one uses a fork.” We can give a general form of these 
statements that judge deviation from social norms as “that’s not what one does.” 
The They conveys a slightly different sense, but it is useful to keep in mind. We 
should not mistake the norms that enable equipment as being determined by the 
actions of some particular person. They are not what the most popular 
businessperson in town does or what the most respected politician does. Instead, 
the norms are what are usually done by people in general. The norms are what 
They do, They taken as a reference to no one in particular.228 This should not be 
interpreted to mean that the norms are only what others do, not oneself. Instead, 
the norms are what everyone (impersonally) does. The norms are not an external 
imposition by either a single person or by a group of people. No one takes 
responsibility for the norms; they just are. 
 Heidegger’s conception of normalcy, of das Man, has positive and 
negative functions, as Dreyfus describes them.229 The positive function is that 
normalcy underpins the intelligibility of equipment. The norms that regulate 
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Dasein’s interactions with and within an equipmental context are required for 
those activities. The negative function is that normalcy tends to take control away 
from Dasein. In order to play an effective role in an equipmental context, Dasein 
must submit itself to the norms of that context. Thus, the world’s norms provide 
the arena for Dasein’s inauthenticity. I will argue for these two functions briefly in 
turn. 
 As already discussed above, cooperation in the large-scale systems that 
make up the equipmental context within which Dasein lives requires norms of 
behavior. Without norms, no one can anticipate the ways in which equipment will 
be used and consumed and so cannot fit particular pieces into their appropriate 
contexts. Another way of making this claim is to say that, because equipment is 
intelligible precisely by fitting into a context of equipment (constituted by the 
ontological structures of involvement), no things can be intelligible without the 
norms of their use. Hence, the norms of das Man are necessary to the 
intelligibility of the equipment. Heidegger puts this as follows: “the ‘they’ itself 
Articulates the referential context of significance. When entities are encountered, 
Dasein’s world frees them for a totality of involvements with which the ‘they’ is 
familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the ‘they’s’ 
averageness.”230 Furthermore, since everything (including the individual Dasein 
itself) is involved in the world of equipment (and so can be understood via 
involvements), the intelligibility of everything, including Dasein, requires the 
                                                 
230
 SZ, 129. 
145 
 
norms of das Man. In order to understand itself and its world, Dasein requires 
some understanding of normalcy, of the norms that govern those things.231 
 Alongside the positive function, normalcy has a negative function as well. 
The requirements of normalcy press Dasein to submit to the norms of das Man 
as they regulate the world. Heidegger discusses this in the context of what he 
calls the publicness of das Man.232 Publicness is constituted by three ways that 
Dasein can be, which Heidegger calls distantiality, averageness and leveling 
down.233 In its concern for the norms that govern its activities, Dasein must 
concern itself with its relationship to others. More precisely, it must concern itself 
with how others are living up to and failing to live up to those norms. This 
concern with the possibilities and failures of others is the distantiality of the 
public. Dasein can be so concerned only because it can be concerned with 
averageness (or normalcy) of its fellows’ activities (that is, “their” averageness, 
the averageness of das Man). In order to see the possibilities and failures of 
others, Dasein must be able to concern itself with the norms that govern the 
context of equipment. Otherwise, it has no standards according to which it and its 
fellows can succeed or fail. This concern with the norms of activity results in a 
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leveling of Dasein’s activities. Equipment and the shared world demand that 
Dasein act according to norms, and Dasein’s concern with those norms and the 
behavior of its fellows tends towards conformity and sameness. My operation of 
a television set should be much like everyone else’s; if it is not, the set will fail to 
work. In other words, the individual’s activities tend towards an identity with 
others’ activities. This identity is what it means to act according to norms and 
standards. Such submission to the norms of das Man results in a loss of the 
particularities and quirks of individual Dasein’s activity. All differences are leveled 
down to sameness. Dasein comes to understand itself not as an individual, but 
as das Man. 
 Dasein gains something through its concern for normalcy and 
identification with das Man at the cost of negative consequences for its 
understanding of itself and its circumstances. It gains the ability to act within a 
shared world and context of equipment. In addition, in Heidegger’s words it gets 
to “disburden” itself of the responsibility for making decisions about what it should 
do and how it should interpret the entities that it encounters.234 In the shared 
world, one does what one does (in Dasein’s identification with das Man, it does 
what “they” do). Dasein thus is not responsible for what it does. After all, it is only 
acting according to the norms that it finds already structuring and enabling the 
world. It is being normal, and it cannot be reproached for acting normally (or at 
least, if it is reproached, it has the excuse of the very normalcy of its actions – if 
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everyone is doing it, you cannot blame me for doing it). Heidegger puts it thus: 
“because the ‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives 
the particular Dasein of its answerability.”235 This deprivation is not necessarily 
experienced as a loss; answerability is a burden to the individual, and the 
required concern for norms relieves it. This relief does bear a cost, however. 
When Dasein disburdens itself by submitting to the norms of das Man, it thereby 
submits itself to the understandings and interpretations of das Man. Since the 
norms determine the contexts within which Dasein encounters entities (both 
equipment and others), they determine the kinds of entities that can be 
encountered by Dasein and the manners in which those entities can be 
encountered. Heidegger observes, “publicness proximally controls every way in 
which the world and Dasein get interpreted.”236 The norms themselves imply 
explicit interpretations and implicit understandings of the entities and 
circumstances to which the norms apply. (They are the norms of this or that 
piece of equipment, for use in this or that situation, by this or that user for this or 
that purpose, and so on.) By identifying itself with das Man in its submission to 
norms, Dasein identifies with the latter’s understandings and interpretations. 
Dasein understands and interprets the entities that it encounters in the world as 
‘they’ understand and interpret. One understands in the normal way, and so 
Dasein, in its submission to norms, submits itself to the prevalent norms of 
understanding and interpretation. Heidegger makes this argument as follows: 
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If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time 
that the ‘they’ itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and 
Being-in-the-world which lies closest…the ‘they’ itself Articulates the 
referential context of significance. When entities are encountered, 
Dasein’s world frees them for a totality of involvements with which the 
‘they’ is familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the 
‘they’s’ averageness.237 
 
Dasein thus bears a cost for disburdening itself of responsibility for its own 
understandings and interpretations: it submits itself to the normal understandings 
and interpretations that it finds already governing itself, its fellows and the world. 
 Heidegger labels Dasein’s submission to publicly available norms and 
interpretations inauthenticity. Dasein is inauthentic insofar as it does not take 
responsibility for itself and its actions, but instead disburdens itself of such 
responsibility and acts simply as one acts, understanding itself simply as one 
understands oneself, as one of the crowd rather than as a concrete, particular 
individual. Dasein’s inauthenticity places limitations on its understandings and 
interpretations of the entities that it encounters. Heidegger provides us with a 
much more detailed analysis of Dasein’s submission to the understandings and 
interpretations of das Man when he discusses Dasein’s everyday existence and 
the existential characteristic of falling. I will provide a more extended discussion 
of this characteristic later in the section on interpretation below.  
 
3.4 Interpretation 
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 For Heidegger, interpretation is the explicit development of the 
understanding. That is, “the projecting of understanding has its own possibility – 
that of developing itself. This development of the understanding we call 
‘interpretation.’”238 He characterizes it as “the working-out of possibilities 
projected in understanding.”239 In order for Dasein to understand a phenomenon, 
as we have already seen, the phenomenon has to be situated within a significant 
context. The significant context lends the phenomenon significance (in other 
words, the relational totality of significance of the context determines the 
significance of the phenomenon), which enables the phenomenon to be 
encountered by Dasein at all. 
 In interpretation, that context of significance is made explicit, both in terms 
of the significant contextualizing features of the world and in terms of the 
meanings that are implicit in Dasein’s understanding of itself in relation to that 
world. When Dasein interprets a phenomenon, it “takes it apart”, to use 
Heidegger’s phrase,240 according to the structures of significance within which it 
is encountered. It makes explicit the implicit relations of the phenomenon as 
delineated by the relational totality of its world. For instance, when a chair is 
interpreted, it is taken apart according to the relationships that constitute the 
significance of the work-world. Equipment is characterized primarily by an “in-
order-to,” as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. So when the 
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understanding of the chair is made explicit through interpretation, it is done along 
the lines of the relationships already implied in the “in-order-to” understanding of 
an entity. Accordingly, the interpretation of the chair describes what the chair is 
for (its towards-which), how it is to be used (its for-which), the materials that are 
used to accomplish its task (its whereof), and its orientation towards the interests 
of Dasein (its for-the-sake-of-which). Interpretation of the chair makes one’s 
understanding of the chair explicit in these ways, but it need not make them all 
explicit. Interpretation is a possible development of understanding, but it is not 
necessarily carried out, either partially or completely, in any given circumstance. 
One might interpret the chair, making its towards-which and for-which explicit, 
without ever considering the chair’s relationship to its own conditions of 
production or its orientation towards one’s own larger purposes. Frequently, I just 
sit down in chairs without considering their place within the larger picture of my 
life. What marks the interpretive relation to a phenomenon is that something is 
taken “as something.” Heidegger argues that this “as” is what separates the 
explicit interpretation from the implicit understanding of a phenomenon. He puts 
it, “the ‘as’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is 
understood.”241 Even when I simply sit in a chair without “taking it apart,” I am 
taking the chair “as something.” I have already understood and interpreted it as 
something within a relational totality of significance. In interpretation, though, I 
make explicit my implicit understanding of that entity as a chair. I make the 
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entity’s significance within its context explicit. Moreover, I can go further and 
make that entity’s meaning explicit through interpretation of my own place within 
the contextualizing significance of the world within which the chair fits. 
 It is important to recognize that for Heidegger, interpretation is always 
guided by prior understanding (and indeed, understanding is always guided by 
prior understanding). He states it thus: “an interpretation is never a 
presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us…In an 
interpretive approach there lies an assumption, as that which has been ‘taken for 
granted’ with the interpretation as such.”242 This structure of priority has three 
elements that Heidegger discusses. First, every interpretation “is grounded in 
something we have in advance.”243 What we have in advance, Heidegger calls a 
“fore-having.” In the case of a ready-to-hand entity, we have in advance the 
totality of involvements, the relational totality of significance of the work-world. 
Any interpretation of ready-to-hand entities is guided by that relational totality, as 
I have already outlined above. My interpretation of the chair is guided by the 
totality of significance that lends the chair significance. Second, every 
interpretation “is grounded in something we see in advance.” What we see in 
advance, Heidegger calls a “fore-sight.” Every interpretation is directed towards 
something that already shows up as significant to Dasein (and as relevant to the 
interpretation), even if not thematically or explicitly. If it the interpreter were not 
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directed towards the interpreted in some respect, the interpreted would never 
show up at all as something understood implicitly and to be interpreted explicitly. 
My interpretation of the chair is guided by my directedness towards the chair as it 
is (implicitly) elaborated in the understood significance of the chair. Third, every 
interpretation “is grounded in something we grasp in advance.” What we grasp in 
advance, Heidegger calls a “fore-conception.” That is, before explicitly 
interpreting any phenomenon, we already have a store of conceptualizations that 
we have implicitly applied to that phenomenon. We do not invent new concepts 
upon every encounter with phenomena; instead, we make use of the concepts 
that we are already competent to use. So, when I interpret something as a chair, 
I make use of a number of concepts that are already accessible to me, such as 
chair, use-object, solid surface, status symbol and so on. My interpretation of the 
chair is guided by various ways in which I can conceive of the chair, ways that 
are accessible to me in advance. 
 
3.5 Limitations of Interpretation 
 
 Dasein is guided by prior understandings and interpretations of itself, its 
world and its relationships to others. These guiding understandings and 
interpretations are frequently not Dasein’s own, however. Rather, they develop 
out of the norm-concerned context highlighted above as das Man. Dasein usually 
understands and interprets in the context of submission to the public normalcy of 
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das Man. This has implications for the kinds of interpretations that are available 
to Dasein. Heidegger describes the situation in the following way: 
Proximally, and with certain limits, Dasein is constantly delivered over to 
this interpretedness, which controls and distributes the possibilities of 
average understanding and of the state-of-mind belonging to it. The way 
things have been expressed or spoken out is such that in the totality of 
contexts of signification into which it has been articulated, it preserves an 
understanding of the disclosed world and therewith, equiprimordially, an 
understanding of the Dasein-with of Others and of one’s own Being-in. 
The understanding which has thus already been ‘deposited’ in the way 
things have been expressed, pertains just as much to any traditional 
discoveredness of entities which may have been reached, as it does to 
one’s current understanding of Being and to whatever possibilities and 
horizons for fresh interpretation and conceptual Articulation may be 
available.244 
 
He goes on to describe Dasein’s articulation of this average understanding and 
interpretation as “idle talk.”245 
 Heidegger takes communication as the exemplar of the average 
understanding that governs Dasein’s interactions with itself, with others and with 
its world. He states that communication “is aimed at bringing the hearer to 
participate in disclosed Being towards what is talked about in the discourse.”246 
That is, a speaker aims to bring her listeners into a similar relationship to the 
subject of her talk as she has herself, for example to make them pay attention to 
it, to recognize something important about it or to take on the same attitude 
towards it. He points out, however, that a great deal of communication does not 
require speakers and listeners to acquire a “primordial” understanding of the 
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subject of their communication.247 They need have no genuine access to what is 
being communicated. In fact, most communication does not require anyone to 
take up any relationship to the subject at hand, other than simply as the subject 
of their communication. All that is essential to workable communication is that 
everyone involved understands and, to some extent, abides by the norms of 
communication itself. In other words, not only can Dasein engage in 
communicative activities from the position of das Man; Dasein must engage in 
those communicative activities heeding the position of das Man to at least some 
minimal degree.248 Heidegger suggests that this is actually why we are capable 
of communicating about a wide range of subjects, even though we do not have a 
great understanding of much of our world. (One might imagine that the modern 
mass media would be impossible without this ability to communicate without 
understanding anything beyond the norms of communication.) Heidegger names 
this communication that articulates nothing about its subject other than 
perpetuating the norms of communication “idle talk.”249 
 Heidegger points out that idle talk is easy and powerful in that it requires 
nothing of Dasein but allows Dasein to understand everything. It enables Dasein 
to disburden itself of the necessity of understanding and interpretation beyond a 
submission to public interpretedness. One needs not understand anything to 
understand what is being said in the idle talk to which we are constantly exposed. 
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One needs only understand how to cope with the idle talk as such. As Heidegger 
puts it, “idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously 
making the thing one’s own…it not only releases one from the task of genuinely 
understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which 
nothing is closed off any longer.”250 From the position of das Man, in the 
intelligibility afforded by idle talk, Dasein thus can understand and bring to explicit 
interpretation everything. 
Idle talk guides many of Dasein’s possibilities of interpretation, but in 
connection to Dasein’s submission to the norms of das Man, this guidance 
comes at a price. Dasein can understand everything and participate in 
interpretive activities regarding anything, but because idle talk releases one from 
the obligation to understanding anything genuinely, it closes off possibilities as 
well. Heidegger argues that “by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to 
go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it leaves 
undone.”251 All one needs do to interpret any given entity is participate in the idle 
talk surrounding it; one need not go any further. Moreover, interpretation guided 
by idle talk will not suffer any further understanding. Idle talk involves a kind of 
leveling (derived from the phenomenon of das Man) in which one must submit to 
the norms of the average understanding of communication in order to participate 
effectively in that communication. By submitting to the average understanding, 
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Dasein is both released from and prevented from articulating an interpretation of 
its own. 
Heidegger presents communication in the form of idle talk as the exemplar 
of the way in which average understanding guides and delineates the 
possibilities of understanding and interpretation. However, one should be careful 
to remember that interpretive activities are not just linguistic activities. The world 
of the ready-to-hand, permeated as it is by norms and significances (that is, by 
particular understandings of how things are used), is uncovered in part by non-
linguistic interpretive activities. Nonetheless, the average intelligibility that is 
evident in idle talk can be generalized to cover these norm-guided activities as 
well. The average intelligibility of the entities of the work-world delineates the 
possibilities of their uses and their interpretations within the total context of 
significance. Their average intelligibility as objects of use both releases one from 
acquiring any further understanding of them, but also prevents one from 
articulating any interpretation of one’s own. As we saw above, this average 
intelligibility is required for the functioning of the work-world and its equipment. 
But again, that functionality comes at a price. Heidegger puts this price as 
follows: 
There are many things with which we first become acquainted in this way 
[through average intelligibility], and there is not a little which never gets 
beyond such an average understanding. This everyday way in which 
things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the 
first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and 
against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all 
re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a 
Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been 
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interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself’ so that it just 
beholds what it encounters.252 
 
 As we have already seen, participation in the public world requires Dasein 
to submit to the norms of that world, and thus to submit to the pre-guidance 
afforded by average intelligibility. Heidegger goes further than this claim, 
however. Not only must Dasein submit to the average understanding of itself, its 
world and the entities within it if it wants to participate in that world; in fact, the 
submission is inevitable for Dasein as an interpretive entity. Rather than being a 
merely contingent sociological or psychological fact about Dasein, it is a 
constitutive aspect of existence, and thus inescapable. Heidegger makes this 
clear in his discussion of Dasein’s existential characteristic of falling. 
 Heidegger claims that for the most part, Dasein has always already fallen 
into the world as it has been publicly understood. He means here that Dasein is 
constituted such that it is usually absorbed in the practical world of its concerns. 
We are always in the midst of things, already participating in the world in some 
way (even if that participation takes the form of protest or withdrawal). That is, we 
are constituted by Being in the world with one another. Heidegger characterizes 
this absorption in the world of one’s activities as “Being-lost in the publicness of 
the ‘they’.”253 That is to say, we exist mostly undifferentiated from others. The 
articulation of our understanding and their understanding of the world is the 
same. I am not the authority when it comes to equipment use, nor am I an 
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authority when it comes to the interpretation of my own behavior, nor am I an 
authority when it comes to my place within the larger world (to give just a few 
areas of concern). Instead, I accede to the understandings of those things that 
are presented to me by das Man. I use equipment as one does in order to 
participate in the work world; I behave in order to be understood by others (and 
when I fail to do so, frequently someone else will tell me why I behave as I do); I 
act as one acts who occupies my particular place in the world, a place that fits 
into a larger context over which I have no (or at most, very little) power. Arguably 
there is nothing in my public life that in principle could differentiate me from 
anyone else.254 
 Heidegger argues that Dasein’s falling has an associated movement, 
which he calls a turbulent “downward plunge” into the world and which has 
several important features. These are falling’s temptation, tranquility, alienation 
and self-entanglement.255 I will focus on the first two of these elements, along 
with his brief discussion of turbulence, since these are more significant for the 
limitations of interpretation. 
 Heidegger interprets Dasein’s interest in the average understanding of 
entities as a kind of interest in losing itself in das Man. Not only does Dasein 
accede to the publicly available interpretations of itself, its fellows, its world and 
the entities within it; as an interpretive entity, it aims to lose its own peculiarity by 
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covering over its differentiation from others. In other words, Dasein constitutively 
aims to submit itself to the guiding norms of das Man. Heidegger does not 
provide a straightforward argument for this claim when discussing the temptation 
of falling, but I believe one can be constructed along the following lines. Nothing 
external to Dasein enforces its submission. In fact, in principle nothing external 
could enforce Dasein’s submission to the norms of public existence.256 
Enforcement is itself an interpretive activity. In order to enforce anything 
(including the norms that guide public understanding and interpretation), the 
enforcer must be understood as such and there must be norms already in place 
that guide the target’s response to the experience of enforcement. One cannot 
encounter enforcement without certain understandings and interpretations 
already in place. (We can imagine that a typical American police officer would be 
quite ineffective if there were no norms that guided one’s interactions with her. 
Without pre-guiding norms, she could not know what to expect from me when 
she asked for my license and registration, and I would have no way of knowing 
how to respond when she asked for the same. Without norms, such interactions 
would be impossible.) So, in order for anything to enforce interpretive norms on 
Dasein, Dasein must have already submitted to certain norms of interpretation. 
At some point, Dasein must have submitted to norms without being forced to do 
so. The guidance of individual Dasein’s interpretive activities by das Man’s norms 
requires that Dasein have already submitted to those norms. Hence, we cannot 
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claim that our public interpretations have been forced on us by external powers 
outside of our control. Dasein submits to the norms of public interpretation 
unprompted. Heidegger claims, as a result, that Dasein’s falling existence is 
tempting.257 
 Heidegger argues that, because Dasein’s existence in falling is tempting, it 
is also tranquillizing. His argument here ties back into the discussion of idle talk. 
Since Dasein is tempted into submitting to the public interpretation of das Man 
and operating as in interpretive entity only on that level, it is disburdened of the 
need to do any real interpretive work. It is assured that its interpretations are the 
correct and complete interpretations because they accord with everyone else’s. It 
finds reassurance and reinforcement everywhere. It need not struggle to 
understand and interpret anything, other than the usual amount of struggle that 
comes from coping with the publicly “obvious” interpretations of anything. This 
seeming ease of understanding and interpreting tranquillizes Dasein. Heidegger 
puts it thus: “Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the ‘they’, it gets 
spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or 
the state-of-mind that goes with it.”258 For the tranquillized Dasein, there is no 
point in struggling for further and novel interpretations of itself and its fellows, the 
world and the entities within it. At a fundamental level of interpretive practice, we 
already know everything that we need to know. That is to say, our interpretations 
are already as objective as they need be. 
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 Heidegger does not go so far as to claim that Dasein is always 
tranquillized. Sometimes, perhaps in extreme situations, public interpretations 
are shown to be faulty and new interpretations are required. We might think of 
moments of scientific or political crisis as examples of this situation. They need 
not be so extreme, though. We might also think of moments of personal crisis 
(the mid-life crisis, the crisis precipitated by the loss of one’s home and 
possessions, etc.). Though Dasein is normally tranquillized to some degree, 
there are moments when something more than a public interpretation is needed. 
Heidegger gestures toward such situations when he claims that idle talk shelters 
Dasein from an “uncanny” and “ever-increasing groundlessness”.259 These 
moments, in which average understanding is not sufficient, are moments of 
authenticity and “the projecting of authentic possibilities.”260 Since Dasein’s falling 
existence is tempting, these moments do not last long. No sooner has the crisis 
passed than Dasein re-establishes itself within the confines of das Man’s 
interpretations. Dasein cannot rise to authenticity for long; it is always swept up in 
what Heidegger calls the “turbulence” of its falling existence.261 It is constantly 
torn back and forth between authentic existence and tranquillized, inauthentic 
existence. 
 These three factors of Dasein’s existence set significant limitations on the 
interpretive activities that it can undertake. As already noted, Dasein cannot 
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escape its publicly available interpretations and the average understanding that 
makes them possible: “In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, 
interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are 
performed.”262 In other words, Dasein is incapable of presuppositionless 
understanding and interpretation. The pre-guiding prejudices of Dasein as das 
Man are an inextricable part of any interpretive activity. So, Dasein is not free to 
interpret itself and others, the world and the entities within it in whatever way it 
chooses. Its explicit interpretations always develop out of a tradition of 
interpretation that precedes and enables any interpretive activity. One need not 
always be aware of those prejudices, but they are there and they do make a 
difference to the kinds of interpretive activities that one can undertake now and in 
the future. If we want to be clear about any given interpretation, we must 
examine the origins of that interpretation (and, by extension, the origins of our 
existence as interpreters). Moreover, interpretation will always be done from out 
of tempting and tranquillizing preconditions, and these preconditions are not 
neutral. They are suggestive and have a pull of their own. Submission to one’s 
prejudices is both required for understanding and interpretation and reassuring 
with regard to their outcomes. Interpretation that attempts to escape, run contrary 
to or cast light upon public interpretation must run in the opposite direction, away 
from comfortable tranquility. Such interpretation is made difficult by the conditions 
under which all interpretation can take place. 
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 I have presented a structural account of inauthenticity. That is, my claim is 
that the movement of falling into inauthenticity is a basic structural aspect of 
Dasein. Dasein’s temptation to submit to the public interpretations of das Man is 
inescapable. Hubert Dreyfus has taken issue with such a structural account.263 
While he interprets Heidegger’s discussion of falling and das Man along much 
the same lines as I have above, he argues that the discussion conflates two 
accounts of Dasein’s tendency to fall into inauthenticity. Dreyfus claims that in 
some sections of Being and Time, Heidegger presents a structural account of 
this tendency; in others he presents what Dreyfus calls a “psychological” 
account. According to the psychological account, Dasein is motivated by the 
discomfort of anxiety (and of authenticity generally) to flee into the relative 
comfort of publicly available understandings and interpretations.264 Importantly, 
Dreyfus points out several problems with the structural account. Since they bear 
on my presentation of Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity, I will address these 
problems here. 
 The structural account of falling and inauthenticity fails on two counts, 
according to Dreyfus. First, it fails to explain Dasein’s tendency towards what 
Heidegger calls “fascination” with the world.265 This is Dasein’s tendency to 
submit to the public interpretations afforded by das Man to such a degree that it 
submits itself to those interpretations, thereby accepting their authority over its 
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own understanding of itself. It thus closes itself off to any self-understanding that 
evades passively accepting the public world’s interpretations. Heidegger 
characterizes this movement as a turn away from itself. Dreyfus argues that the 
structural account does not explain why Dasein must submit its understanding of 
itself to publicly available interpretation. On his construal, it only requires that 
Dasein submit to public interpretation of other entities in the world (that is, 
everything but itself). Everyday intelligibility need only govern the understanding 
of our shared world; it need not govern Dasein’s understanding of itself. Dreyfus 
goes on to argue that even if the tendency toward fascination could be explained 
by filling out a structural account in greater detail, it would still fail for a second 
reason. Heidegger argues in Division II that Dasein can resist its tendency 
towards inauthenticity to become authentic. If inauthenticity is structural, 
however, then only inauthenticity is possible for Dasein. As Dreyfus puts it, the 
structural account “would make Dasein essentially inauthentic.”266 
 Any discussion of the existential status of inauthenticity must be 
concerned with Dreyfus’s critique of the structural account. Dreyfus suggests that 
Heidegger fails to see the above problems with the structural account because 
he had the resources of the psychological account to explain why Dasein 
occasionally flees from itself into the world without making this flight essential 
(and thus inevitable).267 However, relying upon a psychological account is 
problematic for Heidegger (and for his faithful interpreters), because Heidegger 
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insists that his existential analytic of Dasein should not be construed as a work of 
psychology or of anthropology.268 Moreover, psychologically evading the 
discomfort of responsibility for one’s interpretations is an existentiell behavior of 
Dasein; that is, it is a behavior that is made possible by Dasein’s existential 
structure (and so its analysis serves to illuminate that structure without grounding 
it). Dasein’s activity of psychologically fleeing itself into the world exhibits the 
existential of falling under the proper analysis, but we should not confuse that 
fleeing with any of Dasein’s existential characteristics. Heidegger repeatedly 
warns us throughout Being and Time that we must avoid confusing the 
existentiell with the existential, and we should avoid doing so in this particular 
case.269 A purely structural account of inauthenticity thus seems most 
appropriate given Heidegger’s aims. 
 Dreyfus’s first complaint about the structural account of inauthenticity, that 
it only implies that Dasein submit to publicly available interpretations when it 
comes to entities in the world, fails on Dreyfus’s own discussion of the contextual 
character of understanding and world. Presumably Dreyfus means that public 
interpretation is only necessary for the functioning of inhuman equipment in the 
world and thus does not imply any public interpretation of Dasein itself. 
Heidegger is clear, however, that Dasein itself forms a particularly important part 
of the context within which equipment (and other innerworldly entities) are 
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understood. Principally, the for-the-sake-of-which of any piece of equipment 
ultimately ends in an interest of Dasein. Dasein is itself the ultimate context within 
which the entire equipmental world is understood. As a part of the context of 
public understanding, Dasein must participate in (and submit to) public 
interpretations. To have a public world (which is essential to our experience of 
equipment and normal, living activity), Dasein must submit all elements of that 
world – including itself – to public interpretation. It is not just as the for-the-sake-
of-which that Dasein must submit itself to public interpretation. Dasein also 
relates itself to equipment in terms of the for-which and with-which. Dasein is an 
entity that fits into particular roles within the equipmental totality as another piece 
of equipment. Workers in a factory, customers in a department store, and 
scientists in a laboratory are all examples of human beings fitting themselves into 
and operating within equipmental contexts in which they play a necessary role in 
the normal functioning of equipment. They are for-whiches and with-whiches of 
other relevant equipment. Hence, the normal functioning of the public world 
requires (and thus implies) not only the acceptance of public interpretations of 
equipment in the world; it also requires the acceptance of public interpretations of 
Dasein itself. 
 Dreyfus’s second criticism of the structural account fails due to a 
confusion about the mutual exclusivity of authenticity and inauthenticity. He 
claims that if Dasein is structurally inauthentic, then it is impossible for it to ever 
be authentic. Presumably, his argument for this is that inauthenticity and 
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authenticity are mutually exclusive, so if something must be one, it cannot be the 
other. I can find no firm support for their mutual exclusivity, though, and there are 
reasons to think that Dasein can be both authentic and inauthentic at once.270 
Heidegger describes Dasein as having a “tendency” to submit to public 
interpretations and as having a “temptation” to do so.271 Dasein must be so 
structured, given the requirements of the public world of equipment. Heidegger 
does not mean to suggest that Dasein always and completely succumbs to the 
tendency to interpret itself in terms of the public world. In fact, he spends a 
significant portion of Division II arguing against that suggestion. Sometimes, 
Dasein struggles against its structural tendencies and, importantly, sometimes 
Dasein recognizes itself as struggling against or affirming the ways that it finds 
itself publicly interpreted. Of course, since the tendency toward inauthenticity is 
structural, Dasein can never fully win against it. It will always have to struggle, 
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but this does not entail that it cannot be authentic.272 The struggle against the pull 
of the world is one of Heidegger’s significant characterizations of authenticity. I 
will explore no further here Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity since that is 
the subject of the next chapter. The point here is that Dasein does have a 
tendency to slip into inauthenticity, and it must act inauthentically most of the 
time in its engagement with the world, but this does not exclude the possibility of 
struggle against particular elements of its public interpretations. Dasein can be 
authentic with respect to some experiences of its world without being authentic 
with respect to all experiences of its world.273 
 
3.6 Interpretive Pitfalls of Scientific Objectivity 
 
 In chapter 1 I discussed several notions of objectivity as they might be 
applied to philosophical analyses of history. In this section, I turn to the outlines 
of a Heideggerian critique of scientific objectivity. Heidegger’s views on scientific 
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objectivity are complex and disputed.274 I do not wish to weigh in on the disputes 
here, since I think I can provide a critique of objectivity that draws only upon 
Heidegger’s less controversial positions. My aim here is to establish that any 
scientific interpretation, like any interpretation whatsoever, is susceptible to the 
inherent limitations of Dasein’s understanding outlined above. In this section, I 
begin with a brief discussion of Heidegger’s concept of thematization in Being 
and Time. Through this discussion, it will become clear that Heidegger views 
scientific objectivity as a kind of interpretive stance. I provide an example of 
Heidegger’s critical analysis of objectivity in connection with his brief discussion 
of Cartesian philosophy. 
 Heidegger argues throughout Being and Time that scientific objectivity is 
an interpretive position that develops out of Dasein’s normal understanding of the 
equipmental world.275 Commentators are divided on the precise relationship 
between scientific objects and pieces of equipment, but it is clear that, for 
Heidegger, the philosophical tradition has taken the understanding of the former 
to be independent of and superior to the understanding of the latter. The claim is 
that philosophical accounts of the scientific disciplines (particularly positivism in 
its various forms) have repeatedly claimed that those disciplines offer 
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interpretations of the world that aim to represent the world as it really is, 
independent of the volatility of human experience and interpretation. And not only 
do they claim that the natural sciences represent the world as it really is; they 
represent it in the only way that it really is (that is, the objectivity that positivist 
philosophers have ascribed to scientific understanding purports to be unified, 
universal and exclusive).276 Even when accounts of scientific practice do not 
claim that the sciences represent the incontrovertible truth, they suggest that the 
sciences aim at the supposed limit-case of the whole (and only) truth. Moreover, 
this positivistic understanding of science claims to be guided by attention to the 
objects themselves. The sciences, after all, study the world as it really is. 
Methods and areas of inquiry are suggested by the ontology of the objects and 
entities under study, rather than their relationship to human interests.277 In their 
quest to describe and justify scientific objectivity, the positivists fail to see that the 
scientific understanding of objects in the world is an understanding, characterized 
by the same influence and effectivity that characterize Dasein’s understanding.278 
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 Heidegger is clear that understanding is concerned with contextualization. 
We already saw that this was the case with equipment. It is also the case with 
scientific objects.279 The understanding is concerned primarily with possibilities. 
In order to understand a scientific object, Dasein must project the possibilities of 
that object. This projection, in the case of an entity that is not subject to the 
context of a particular equipmental world, focuses upon the possibilities for the 
scientific definition of its objects. Primarily, scientific projection focuses upon the 
possibilities of an object that are thought to be most evident and certain.280 In 
fact, it must do so if it is to serve its end of uncovering entities as they really are. 
Thus, the projection delineates a host of scientifically defined properties and 
relations that serve to define any given entity discovered within that projection. 
Like any understanding projection, the scientific projection sets the context within 
which those entities show themselves as what they are. Heidegger calls such 
scientific projections, thematizations that guide the inquiries into their objects of 
study. A thematization is an articulation of the understanding that governs the 
study of a particular subject-matter. He puts it thus:  
The Articulation of the understanding of Being, the delimitation of an area 
of subject-matter (a delimitation guided by this understanding), and the 
sketching-out of the way of conceiving which is appropriate to such 
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entities – all these belong to the totality of this projecting; and this totality 
is what we call ‘thematizing’.281 
 
 Thematization is tied up with what Heidegger calls a “productive logic” that 
“leaps ahead…into some area of Being, discloses it for the first time…and, after 
thus arriving at the structures within it, makes these available to the positive 
sciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry.”282 He closely identifies 
this productive logic with ontology. In order to constitute a positive science, the 
basic concepts of that science must be gleaned from the disclosure of the Being 
of the entities that that science is going to study. Moreover, the basic concepts 
determine the ways in which the studied entities can be discovered by scientific 
Dasein: “Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding 
beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science 
takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this 
understanding.”283 And these basic concepts, like all understandings, are drawn 
from interpretations and understandings that are already had in advance (the 
fore-having of understanding). As Heidegger argues, the “preliminary research, 
from which the basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else than an 
interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of Being.”284 Thus, 
thematizations and the various understandings of the sciences that rely upon 
them are interpretations. 
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 Heidegger presents an example of scientific thematization as a guiding 
interpretation in Descartes’ metaphysical foundations of mathematical physics. 
Heidegger argues that Cartesian metaphysics constituted a thematization of 
entities and of the world which governed the ways in which entities could show 
themselves.285 Descartes understood the world and entities within the world as 
extended substances. Physical (natural) objects are essentially extended, in that 
one cannot imagine a physical object that has no extension. Space is also 
essentially extended for the same reason.286 All other properties that one can 
perceive of a physical object or a space are modes of its extension (Heidegger 
points out shape and motion in particular here287). For a philosopher with this 
basic interpretation in mind, Heidegger asks what sort of access is appropriate to 
the world and the entities within it. If entities are fundamentally extension, and all 
their properties can be understood as modes of extension, then, Heidegger 
claims, “the only genuine access to them lies in knowing, intellectio, in the sense 
of the kind of knowledge we get in mathematics and physics.”288 That is, 
extension is understood and described on the basis of indifferent mathematical 
knowledge. Modern physics is the application of abstract mathematics to entities 
and ultimately to the world that those entities make up. Relationships between 
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entities are also conceived within the framework of extension and thereby 
accessed as mathematical knowledge. The only kind of relationship that two 
physical entities can have to one another is distance, both spatial and temporal. 
Hence, entities can only show themselves to Descartes (or to anyone with this 
basic interpretation of entities) as extended things. The presupposition about the 
essence of physical things extends even to Dasein. Heidegger argues that 
Descartes’ dismissals of hardness as an essential property of physical things and 
of touch as a way of accessing them rely upon his interpretation of perception as 
a spatial relationship between two physical things.289 Descartes’ mathematical 
understanding of entities and of the world dominates his philosophical analyses 
and restricts the ways in which phenomena can show themselves. Once they 
have been understood as essentially extended, they can only show themselves 
as extended.  
 One should be careful to avoid taking Heidegger’s attack on Cartesian 
metaphysics as a denial of the extended character of physical objects. Heidegger 
is not claiming that Descartes got it completely wrong, that the world and entities 
are not really extended and cannot be explained through the analysis of the 
modes of extension. Heidegger acknowledges that modern physics is a powerful 
interpretation that has allowed human beings to manipulate and control 
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significant swathes of the natural world.290 He objects to the positivistic view that 
the world and entities are solely and simply extended objects. He claims that 
there are other phenomena that cannot be captured and explained as modes of 
extension of objects. Equipment provides one example of such a phenomenon. 
The world itself is another.  
Thus, the disclosures of objects are guided by thematizations of those 
objects, even allegedly objective disclosures of those objects. Thematizations are 
interpretive stances, and so are liable to the potential problems that plague any 
such stance. Interpretive activity is structurally governed by the norms of das 
Man, and it is always open to (and necessary for) Dasein to submit to publicly 
available interpretations. Activities that are interpreted as aiming at scientific 
objectivity (in the positivist sense) are just as susceptible to inauthenticity. The 
interpretation of institutionalized science may be particularly susceptible to the 
idle talk, falling and downward plunge into the world of inauthentic interpretation. 
We saw above that successful collaborative activity (that is, activity that is 
contextualized by the equipmental world) requires the participants’ submission to 
guiding norms. Science is precisely such a collaborative activity. No individual 
can be the authority when it comes to the meanings of basic scientific concepts. 
Nor is she free to interpret those concepts (and the entities that they 
conceptualize) in whatever way she wants when engaging in practices that are 
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taken to aim at scientific objectivity. She must submit to the authority of the 
publicly available interpretations through which her science is thematized. 
While submission to guiding norms does not guarantee the slide into 
inauthenticity, it does not arrest the slide either. I do not want to dwell on 
particular ways in which scientific Dasein slides into inauthenticity. It suffices here 
to reiterate several of the limitations on interpretation that were clarified above as 
they apply to philosophical accounts of scientific practice. The communication of 
scientific results, both with specialists and non-specialists, inclines toward idle 
talk. I would suggest that public, pseudo-scientific discourse is an example of 
this. Scientific terms and interpretations have permeated public dialogue to a 
larger degree than one would expect from a limited sphere of activity undertaken 
by a relatively small minority of the general population.291 (For comparison, we 
might think about how infrequently carpentry terms come up in public dialogue – 
particularly in public dialogue that does not concern the world of carpentry.) 
Scientific Dasein, as interpreted by the positivist philosopher, must fall into its 
scientific world. Falling is primarily characterized by Heidegger as a losing of 
oneself in the publicness of das Man. In positivistic scientific practice, the 
scientist must efface her own particularity in the course of her research. To the 
positivist, science attains its objectivity precisely by denying the individual 
specificity of the scientist. Research results are supposed to be replicable by any 
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other similarly positioned scientist. The personal scientist must become nothing 
more than the impersonal scientist, the scientist who is everyone and no one 
(das Man). We can also see how scientific Dasein is susceptible to the 
temptation and tranquility of the downward plunge of falling. No external power 
need force the scientist nor the philosopher of science (the latter more 
importantly, perhaps) to submit to the authority of the thematizations of a 
science. In the interpretation of scientific practice (particularly, institutionalized 
science), the philosopher of science accedes of her own accord to the basic 
interpretations of the science. One is doing the science if and only if one has 
already acceded to the basic interpretations of the science.292 Moreover, the 
interpretation of scientific practice that supports its objectivity can be tranquil. For 
example, Kuhn’s concept of normal science could be read as the tranquil period 
of a science (that is, one that is not riven by a crisis in its basic concepts). The 
obviousness of the Kuhnian paradigm (basic scientific interpretation) within which 
one works assures the philosophical interpreter and the public at large that there 
is no need for any real interpretive work. Under conditions of normal science, 
Dasein can disburden itself of any questions about the thematization of the 
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science. Only in a crisis must the scientist confront the thematic foundations of 
her science, and hence must the philosopher do the same.293 
None of the above is to suggest that any particular scientific thematization 
and subsequent practice is inauthentic. The point is that the positivistic Dasein, 
like any other Dasein, must face the possibility that her interpretations are 
inauthentic. The thematic interpretations of the sciences do not escape 
interpretive scrutiny. This is particularly important in the case of any interpretation 
with a claim to exclusivity (like the positivist view of the sciences). Such 
interpretations are even more susceptible to the temptation of falling into 
inauthenticity than interpretations that make no such claim. An interpretation that 
claims that it is the only true one, or even the only one aimed at the truth, implies 
that only one way of discovering entities discovers them truly (or aims at 
discovering them as they really are).294 The temptation of falling was the 
tendency of Dasein to submit itself to public interpretations without being forced 
(or even prompted) to do so. Scientific Dasein might claim that it does not submit 
itself to public interpretations of entities; rather, it submits itself to the way that 
entities really are (independently of interpretation). This is one of the more 
socially powerful interpretations of modern science. However, the understanding 
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that is articulated in the interpretation effectively limits the ways in which entities 
can show themselves in terms of that understanding. If one thinks that one’s 
interpretation captures entities as they really are, one cannot be shown entities 
that are not captured by that interpretation. The positivist might claim that she is 
submitting herself to the ways that entities really are, but this claim is problematic 
if no other interpretations can possibly be suggested by her studied entities.295 
The necessity of critical scrutiny of scientific interpretation is thus especially 
pressing. 
Heidegger’s analysis of inauthentic interpretive practice poses problems 
for a positivistic view of scientific objectivity. The claim to objectivity with respect 
to interpretation should always be regarded with a critical eye, particularly given 
that typically positivistic accounts of scientific study do not guarantee the 
authenticity of the results. Widespread agreement and the belief that one has 
acquired a genuine understanding of a phenomenon can be afforded by the 
average intelligibility of publicly available interpretations. The purported 
universality and exclusivity of scientific understanding and interpretation can be 
afforded by Dasein’s inauthentic activity. The interpretation of scientific Dasein is 
just as susceptible to submission to public interpretation as anyone else. 
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORY AND AUTHENTICITY 
 
4.1 Understanding and Interpretation of One’s Historical Circumstances 
 
 It remains to be seen how Heidegger’s analysis of understanding and 
interpretation can be applied to history and one’s historical circumstances. The 
previous chapter presented the basic features of understanding and 
interpretation as they are in Dasein’s inauthentic existence. Here I aim to 
describe the basic elements of understanding and interpretation that underpin 
any understanding of history and historical circumstance. I focus on the 
existential structures of Dasein’s historical understanding, rather than any 
particular existentiell structures. (In other words, I do not aim here to provide a 
particular understanding of a particular Dasein’s place within a particular 
historical milieu. Instead, I will discuss several of the general features of any 
Dasein’s understanding.) 
The phenomena of history and one’s historical circumstances, like any 
phenomena, are contextualized by the significances and meanings of the world 
within which they are encountered. In understanding these phenomena, Dasein 
must also at least tacitly understand the phenomenon of the world and its own 
place within that world. That is, the understanding of history and historical 
circumstance are tied up with Dasein’s understanding of its world and its self-
understanding within that world. The possibility of understanding one’s own 
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historical situation requires and is in part guided by an understanding of one’s 
world and oneself. The inquiry into one’s historical understanding thus requires 
an inquiry into one’s understanding of the world and one’s place within it. 
Moreover, interpretation of one’s place in history, as an explicit development of 
the understanding, demands an interpretation of one’s world and oneself if it is to 
be rigorous and substantial. The interpretation of history, like the interpretation of 
any other phenomenon, suggests a larger, contextual interpretation. 
 Dasein’s understanding is always guided by the three structural 
characteristics detailed in the previous chapter: fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-
conception. In that sense, Dasein’s understanding of history is effective and 
influential. The phenomena of history and circumstance show themselves 
differently in different contexts, guided by different fore-havings, fore-sights and 
fore-conceptions. One might approach history and historical circumstance within 
the context of the work-world, wherein the significances are structured according 
to the totality of involvements (in other words, within a particular fore-having).  
Professional historians or politicians are examples here. The professional 
historian, working to get her new book published, might view history as a field of 
anecdotes or of possible causal explanations, that is, as raw material from which 
she must craft products to be eventually sold in a market. Her relationship to 
history is structured by her world’s significance. Moreover, the meaning of history 
for her is structured according to her own self-understanding. She may view 
herself as an object of exploitation by the publication system within which she 
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lives, or by the marketplace in general, and her relationship to the history that 
she studies is structured by that meaning. History becomes an object upon which 
she must labor in order to maintain herself against others. Conversely, she might 
understand herself as delving into the sources of the modern world, and so 
relates to history much as a spelunker relates to a cave (that is, as a 
subterranean site of exploration, rather than a site of exploitation). In either case, 
she understands herself as oriented towards history, even if only implicitly (in 
other words, she is guided by a particular fore-sight). History is significant to her, 
though its significance may not be entirely clear. If she were not oriented towards 
history at all, then it could never show itself as the subject of a significant 
encounter. When she considers history within the context of her work, she is also 
guided by particular historical and scientific concepts that inform her work (that is, 
she is guided by a fore-conception). She is not inventing the science of history or 
the work of the historian anew as she studies. Instead, she works for the most 
part within established models of historical interpretation and production. She 
may generate new concepts as she works, but these concepts reference and 
relate back to concepts that she began with, either as counter-concepts or as 
new members of established constellations of historical concepts. The new takes 
its place amongst the old, either in antagonism or cooperation.  
The example of a politician illustrates an encounter with one’s historical 
circumstances. A politician may encounter historical circumstance in the course 
of her work, within the work-world. Her understanding of her circumstances will 
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thus be structured according to the significance of that world. She may then view 
her circumstances as obstacles to be overcome or as resources to be 
harnessed. Perhaps she recognizes that, due to her historical environment, 
women have trouble attaining positions of political influence and power. Those 
circumstances are therefore encountered as obstacles that interrupt her work; 
they become “obstinate,” to use Heidegger’s terminology. She might also view 
her circumstances as affording her certain possibilities for further development. 
Perhaps her historical environment affords women great political influence, so 
she experiences her circumstances as resources to be harnessed for her own 
purposes. In either case, the significance of the work-world, within which she 
encounters her historical circumstances, structures her understanding of those 
phenomena (in other words, she is guided by a fore-having). We can also see 
that her understanding is guided by fore-sight and fore-conception. She is 
oriented towards her historical circumstances as relevant elements in her world, 
be they help or hindrance. Without that orientation, she could not encounter them 
in either mode. She conceptualizes those elements according to concepts that 
were already available to her as well, rather than inventing her 
conceptualizations anew as she encounters her historical circumstances. She 
encounters them as obstacles or as resources. Though she may deal with those 
circumstances in novel ways, she conceptualizes her life and activity according 
to political concepts (power, authority, electoral success, demagoguery, etc.) that 
predate her. 
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 Above, I characterized Dasein’s encounter with history and circumstance 
as sharing many structural characteristics with its encounter with any other 
phenomena. Its encounter with history and circumstance is importantly different 
though. History and circumstance are not only elements that are encountered 
within the context of Dasein’s understanding of its world and itself; they are also 
constitutive elements of Dasein’s understanding of its world and itself. Dasein 
and its world are temporal phenomena, in that they take place over time. 
Dasein’s life is not just an isolated series of moments. It “stretches along 
between birth and death,” as Heidegger puts it.296 Moreover, Dasein’s self-
understanding is temporally structured with orientations towards the past and the 
future. One can see this in Dasein’s interpretations of itself, structured as they 
are by fore-havings, fore-sights and fore-conceptions. At birth (assuming that 
Dasein has some self-understanding, which is doubtful), Dasein understands 
itself through instinctual processes – its needs to eat, sleep and so on. Past that 
point, Dasein’s self-understanding is always experienced in media res, guided by 
its prior understanding of itself, by others’ understanding of it, and by its 
orientation towards itself as something about which it cares.297  
Similarly, the world is not something that has sprung into being ex nihilo. 
Instead, it is something that already predates Dasein’s involvements in it. The 
involvement in the work-world and the structures of significance that make that 
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involvement possible have a temporal structure. As Heidegger observes, 
Dasein’s understanding of the world has the structure of a “retention which 
awaits.”298 Understanding pieces of equipment within the work-world requires 
understanding, at least implicitly, the contextualizing totality of involvements. In 
other words, due to the priority of the totality of involvements, the user must 
retain that totality in understanding, bringing it to the understanding of a particular 
piece of equipment. This world-retention is constituted by the three structural 
characteristics of understanding and interpretation. Dasein’s understanding of its 
world requires the retention of a fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception: that 
is, elements that precede, and are experienced as preceding, Dasein’s 
understanding. Moreover, Dasein’s understanding is not only backwards-looking 
in the sense of a retention; it is also forwards-looking as an awaiting. The 
towards-which and the for-the-sake-of-which are essential elements in the 
encounter with equipment and the totality of involvements. In these elements, 
Dasein awaits and expects the continuation of that world’s significance. When 
baking bread, Dasein awaits the further involvements of that bread (be it for 
eating, for selling, for ceremonial purposes, for educational purposes, or for some 
other purpose) and expects that those involvements will be structured according 
to the significances that are already structuring its world. 
 Dasein and the world’s histories and historical circumstances are thus 
important elements in Dasein’s understanding of anything. Dasein’s orientation 
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towards the past makes them important. Dasein also must be able to understand 
those phenomena, though, if we are to interpret our own historical moment and 
to undertake the destruction of our history that Heidegger thinks is necessary. 
Our understanding of history is thus characterized by a hermeneutical circle: we 
already must understand our history and current historical circumstances in order 
to further understand those same phenomena. Our understanding of them 
presupposes our already having some understanding of them. This is not to say 
that our understandings of historical phenomena are stagnant, that they cannot 
develop since they always presuppose an understanding of them. Just as one’s 
understanding of a text can develop through further reading and interpretation, 
without the intervention of any “external forces,” the understanding of historical 
phenomena can develop from out of itself. 
 Heidegger is perfectly comfortable with hermeneutical circles. On his 
account, his descriptions of understanding and of historical understanding in 
particular are an advance over previous conceptions of that understanding. As he 
puts it, “if the basic conditions which make interpretation possible are to be 
fulfilled, this must rather be done by not failing to recognize beforehand the 
essential conditions under which it can be performed.”299 He reads historians up 
until that point as having attempted to satisfy a “more rigorous” ideal of 
knowledge – that handed down by the natural sciences – in order to qualify 
history as an objective science. Since they could not get rid of the hermeneutical 
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circle in historical interpretation, because it is essential, historians had to resign 
themselves “to less rigorous possibilities of knowing.”300 However, once 
historians acknowledge the circular structure of historical understanding and 
interpretation, and in that circle the essential preconditions for understanding, 
they can put their studies on an ultimately more rigorous footing. Heidegger 
observes: “what is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to come into it in the 
right way.”301  
Heidegger suggests, moreover, that the possibilities for self-understanding 
implied by the historical sciences actually exceed those enabled by the natural 
sciences. If we can turn our scientific attention to the structures of our self-
understanding and our world-understanding that bring meaning and significance 
to ourselves and the world, we may develop those understandings upon a more 
rigorous basis. The recognition of the limits and presuppositions of our 
understanding can help advance our own understanding. Heidegger puts it thus: 
This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of 
knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure 
of Dasein itself…In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most 
primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this 
possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our 
first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, 
and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular 
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out 
these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves.302 
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 The structure of Dasein’s understanding of itself and its world raises a 
question: how do we acquire a “genuine” historical understanding if our 
understanding is always conditioned by previous understanding? In other words, 
how do we “make the scientific theme secure” if we are always being guided by 
hermeneutical fore-structures? Answering this question requires delving into one 
of the possibilities for Dasein’s understanding that Heidegger discusses in detail: 
authenticity. The next task is to determine how the possibilities of this mode of 
understanding and interpretation affect the possibilities of historical 
understanding, and in particular the possibility of genuine historical 
understanding. 
Though my interpretations of myself and of the world may be formulated 
primarily in submission to inauthentic interpretations that are gleaned from the 
public world, Heidegger spends much of Division 2 of Being and Time analyzing 
the possibility of authentic self- and world-interpretation. In other words, in 
Division 2 he attempts to answer the question of how Dasein comes into the 
hermeneutical circle in the right way. 
 As already described in the previous chapter, everyday inauthenticity is 
characterized by the existential falling. In its involvement with the world, Dasein 
understands and interprets itself in terms of that world. The world, as the 
background of our encounters with equipment, things and each other, is already 
structured according to interpretations and meanings prior to the encounters that 
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take place in it. Those prior interpretations and meanings condition Dasein’s 
understanding of itself, its world and its objects. 
Falling into the world and its meanings suggests that, if one is to have an 
authentic understanding, one that does not unthinkingly submit to the pull of the 
world and its everyday interpretations, one must resist this hermeneutic 
temptation. Accordingly, Heidegger must establish the possibility of such 
resistance. He finds this possibility in his analyses of the phenomena of anxiety 
and conscience.303 
 
4.2 Anxiety 
 
 The world’s significance is almost entirely pervasive, but it is not 
uninterrupted. The interruption of meaning affords Dasein the possibility of 
resistance. There is a peculiar and (potentially) distressing experience that 
Dasein sometimes has in which the world loses its significance: anxiety. Anxiety 
in Heidegger’s sense is not to be understood as the anxiety one feels about 
something particular in one’s life, about something that one is concerned about. I 
might describe myself as anxious about a test because I am unprepared for it, 
but this is not the phenomenon that Heidegger is attempting to highlight. That 
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anxiety is more akin to what he calls fear,304 which is directed at something 
particular and is concerned about it because of the possible harms that it might 
inflict upon the fearful person. When I am afraid of a test because of my lack of 
preparation, I am afraid of something particular (the test) and I am particularly 
concerned with the harm that it may do to me (failure on a test and perhaps a 
concatenation of other failures). Heidegger’s anxiety, in contrast, is a diffuse and 
non-particular mood. It is not anxiety about something or other but rather anxiety 
directed at nothing at all. As he puts it, “that in the face of which one is anxious is 
completely indefinite.”305 The feeling of threat that one feels in anxiety does not 
come from any identifiable direction. One might describe it as coming from 
everywhere and nowhere. Furthermore, and tellingly, we might describe it as a 
feeling that nothing has any meaning (and the attendant difficulties in deciding 
what one should do and what one should be – what does it matter in a world that 
does not matter?). 
 The indefiniteness of anxiety, that it does not seem to be directed towards 
anything at all, is existentially important. Heidegger argues that anxiety does 
provide us with an experience of interruption in the world’s meanings. The 
interruption of meaning arises in the indefiniteness of anxiety. Heidegger claims, 
“not only does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-
the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world are 
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not ‘relevant’ at all.”306 As a result of indefiniteness, Dasein cannot concern itself 
with anything particular and deal with that which concerns it. An illustrative 
contrast can be drawn here between fear and anxiety. In fear, Dasein can 
attempt to act appropriately towards the fearful entity. Entities in the world are 
precisely relevant to the fearful Dasein. If a tiger gets out of the zoo and is 
walking down the street towards me, an entity within the world is relevant to my 
fear and I can deal with that fearful entity by various means (by running into a 
building to put a barrier between myself and the threatening tiger, for instance). 
In contrast, since anxiety is in the face of nothing, the entities in the world are 
revealed in their irrelevance to the problem. I understand that the prior structures 
of significance that constituted the world could lose their significance and in fact 
that they have lost their significance. Heidegger puts it thus: “Here the totality of 
involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-
the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has 
the character of completely lacking significance.”307 This irrelevance of entities 
within the world announces their insignificance. Anxiety is thus the experience of 
the meaninglessness of the world. 
 Heidegger provides us with several descriptions of the experience of the 
interruption in the world’s meaningfulness. Importantly, he describes it as 
“distressing” and “threatening.”308 Unlike fear, for which we can easily pick out 
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the distressing or threatening entity, in anxiety nothing is threatening. Heidegger 
thinks that it is significant that we use the word ‘nothing’ to describe the threat. 
What is threatening is the insignificance of entities within the world, in other 
words, the fact that they mean nothing to the anxious Dasein. Heidegger 
describes it in a later discussion: “the threatening does not come from what is 
ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 
‘says’ anything any longer. Environmental entities no longer have any 
involvement.”309 The entities of the world have no involvements, no meaning, and 
thus they are nothing to the understanding Dasein. 
Of course, the expectation that the world and its entities mean something 
remains, and indeed the world remains as something that needs to be dealt with. 
In anxiety, Dasein does not become radically alone, separated from the world; 
instead, the world with which it still needs to cope remains as a structure of 
meaning that has been revealed as meaningless. The world thus becomes 
obtrusive.310 Heidegger provides us with a nice analogy for this meaninglessness 
and obtrusiveness of the world in the experience of navigating a completely dark 
room: “In the dark there is emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, though the very world 
itself is still ‘there’, and ‘there’ more obtrusively.”311 Meaning is what allows 
Dasein to navigate the world, to encounter entities as entities and moreover to 
encounter itself as something. The interruption of meaning prevents Dasein from 
                                                 
309
 SZ, 343. 
310
 It is significant that Heidegger uses this particular word (aufdringlich/aufdrängt) for the 
character of the world in anxiety. It is the same word used when describing the disruption of 
involvement (and thereby the revelation of a world of involvements) in missing equipment. 
311
 SZ, 189. 
193 
 
understanding what things are and what it is. It ends up navigating its existence 
in the dark, bumping into things to be sure, without its typical way of organizing 
that existence. 
As an entity for whom its own being is an issue, Dasein must interpret 
itself in one way or another. It must be something definite. The world is supposed 
to furnish fallen Dasein with meanings and interpretations according to which 
Dasein can be something definite, but the interruption of meaning in anxiety 
shows the world as something that may not fulfill expectations. It may refuse to 
make anything comprehensible in its own terms. The world refuses to do what it 
has heretofore done for Dasein: “The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither 
can the Dasein-with of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the 
possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way 
things have been publicly interpreted.”312 In doing so, it is revealed as something 
that cannot make the seemingly-irresistible demands for submission on Dasein 
that it did before. Public interpretations seemed to be the only interpretations 
available to Dasein. The loss of worldly meaning in anxiety shows Dasein the 
possibility of understanding itself in another way. 
The loss of a source of meaning, and thus of a source of possibilities, 
shows Dasein its character as an entity that is characterized primarily by 
possibilities. Dasein is simultaneously robbed of any publicly available 
possibilities and shown that, as a self-interpreting entity, it must choose to be 
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something or other. Heidegger terms this aspect Dasein’s “Being-possible”: 
“Therefore…anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible, and indeed as the only 
kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in 
individualization.”313 That is, anxiety ultimately forces Dasein to recognize itself 
as a potential source of meanings and interpretations for itself. Dasein is the kind 
of entity that can be its own foundation of meaning; it need not submit 
unthinkingly to the everyday, public interpretations that the world offers (and 
enforces). 
 
4.3 Conscience 
 
 Now that we have established the possibility of resisting the pull of the 
world’s meanings, demonstrated in anxiety, we can turn to the possibility of 
meaningful resistance. Anxiety reveals the possibility of meaninglessness, of 
Dasein being robbed of its typical, everyday standards of meaning, but it does 
not yet reveal the possibility of meaningfully resisting the pull of the world once 
the everyday structures of meaning reassert themselves. Anxiety is a passing 
mood, one that may reveal something peculiar in the moment but fade back into 
the everyday. It may not be a mood that can be cultivated and so Dasein may 
remain submitted to the public meanings and interpretations of the world except 
for those exceptional moments of anxiety, which feature as momentary blips in 
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an otherwise uninterrupted, submissive existence. In contrast to this pessimistic 
reading of anxiety, Heidegger locates the possibility of meaningful resistance in 
the phenomenon of conscience. 
 In his existential analysis, Heidegger argues that conscience demands the 
articulation of alternate (that is, non-public) interpretations and meanings. He 
begins his analysis by characterizing conscience as a kind of call to which 
Dasein can (and indeed, must) listen: “In the phenomenon of conscience we find, 
without further differentiation, that in some way it gives us something to 
understand. Our analysis of it takes its departure from this finding.”314 As a call, 
conscience is never inarticulate; it pushes Dasein to understand something. He 
compares this to our typical interpretation of the human voice: “If the everyday 
interpretation knows a ‘voice’ of conscience, then one is not so much thinking of 
an utterance (for this is something which factically one never comes across); the 
‘voice’ is taken rather as a giving-to-understand. In the tendency to disclosure 
which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push – of an abrupt 
arousal.”315 
However, it is unclear, from the point of view of fallen Dasein, what the 
conscience calls to us to understand. Unlike for instance a lecture on atomic 
physics, conscience does not push Dasein to understand some particular entity 
that it has encountered in the world. Unlike atoms, one’s conscience is not out 
there in the world somewhere, waiting to be encountered. In fact, Heidegger 
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believes the origin of the call of conscience is unmistakably unrelated to entities 
encountered within the world.316 He claims that, as a matter of phenomenological 
description, the origin of the calls resists innerworldly interpretation: “That which 
calls the call, simply holds itself aloof from any way of becoming well-known, and 
this belongs to its phenomenal character.”317 Moreover, the call of conscience 
cannot be avoided or evaded like an innerworldly entity. Like anxiety, it seems to 
come from nowhere identifiable. “‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even 
against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from 
someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from 
beyond me and over me.”318 That is, the call pushes Dasein to understand it but 
resists being understood as something within the world, to which one can then 
respond in a worldly manner. Instead, the call requires interpretation that does 
not take its cues from the public world. In the case of conscience, the locus of 
understanding is not in the public world. Conscience suggests the articulation of 
alternative, non-public interpretations and meanings. 
 Conscience suggests a particular source for an alternative context of 
significance: Dasein itself. Like anxiety, and in connection with anxiety, 
conscience individualizes Dasein. If the call is to be intelligible, then its 
intelligibility cannot come from within the world (its intelligibility cannot be 
innerworldly). The indefiniteness of the call rules out the possibility of 
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understanding it as either ready-to-hand or as present-at-hand, that is, along the 
ontological lines of entities encounterable within the world. This leaves Dasein as 
the only possible source of the intelligibility of conscience. Indeed, in the common 
experience of conscience, we regard conscience as individualized. My 
conscience speaks to me, and your conscience speaks to you. I do not know 
what it would mean for my conscience to speak to others (except perhaps 
through me as an intermediary between, again, my conscience and others), nor 
what it would mean for someone else’s conscience to speak to me. Moreover, 
conscience individualizes both sides of the call (both the caller and the listener). 
It individualizes itself as my conscience and no one else’s (the caller), and it 
individualizes me (the listener) by calling directly to me and to no one else. 
In individualizing Dasein, conscience refuses to provide Dasein with an 
explicit context within which to locate the call’s intelligibility. The call, as 
Heidegger explains it, forces individualized Dasein to listen to it, but it does not 
say anything particular or definite. “What does the conscience call to him to 
whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no 
information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set 
going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed…Conscience discourses 
solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent.”319 Conscience is not like a 
voice giving advice, nor like an angel perched on one’s shoulder. If it were, it 
could be dealt with in a worldly manner. Instead, it keeps itself out of any 
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particular context. It forces Dasein to deal with it (it makes a demand of 
understanding), but by staying silent, it forces Dasein to supply that context 
within which it can be understood.320 
 By individualizing Dasein in its call, conscience forces it to confront the 
conditions of its own existence. It establishes the possibility that Dasein might 
listen, as an individual, to its own individual conscience. In other words, 
individuation opens up the possibility for Dasein to be itself.321 Heidegger 
observes that conscience “calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost 
possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.”322 As 
already noted, however, its conscience does not afford Dasein any worldly 
resources for understanding the silent call. It does not say anything particular. 
So, conscience does not (and indeed it cannot) provide Dasein with a particular 
self. It only individuates; it does not provide the content of that individuation. It 
does not tell Dasein what to be, only that it is. Conscience thus confronts Dasein 
with its own existence and nothing else. Heidegger calls this condition of 
conscientious Dasein “discretion”: conscience “forces the Dasein which has been 
appealed to and summoned, into the discretion of itself”323 and it “calls him 
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back…into the discretion of his existent potentiality-for-Being.”324 The call forces 
Dasein to acknowledge that it is (that it exists) but not as anything in particular.  
In this connection with potentiality, Heidegger points out that conscience 
and anxiety are phenomenally linked. Dasein is attuned to the call of conscience 
in the mood of anxiety.325 Conscience calls from “nowhere” and says “nothing,” 
and it refuses to be understood in terms of worldly interpretations. In other words, 
the conscientious Dasein is anxious. Moreover, as an entity for whom its own 
Being is an issue, Dasein must be something or other. In anxiety, the refusing 
conscience again reveals Dasein not as characterized by being this or that, but 
instead as characterized primarily by possibilities. Even though the call of 
conscience does not provide definite content for Dasein to be, it nonetheless 
does reveal two basic possibilities of existence: Dasein can be itself and it can 
fail to be itself. 
 As I described it above, I believe that the phenomenon of conscience 
establishes the possibility of meaningful resistance to the pull of everyday 
meaning and interpretation. Thus far, however, I have not shown that conscience 
affords Dasein the possibility of some degree of constancy in its resistance. The 
problem with anxiety as resistance was that it is fleeting and exceptional. Anxiety 
demonstrates the phenomenal possibility of another order of meaning and 
interpretation, but it does not demonstrate the possibility of determined 
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resistance to the everyday. Thus far in my discussion of conscience, it is unclear 
whether conscience can provide the stability and constancy for resistance. In 
fact, Heidegger describes the call as coming “over me” and as something that is 
not “explicitly performed by me”.326 The call of conscience comes when it wants, 
not when I want. This suggests that conscience is also momentary and fleeting. I 
think this interpretation is ultimately incorrect, however, and to show that it is, I 
will turn to the phenomenon that Heidegger calls “wanting to have a 
conscience”.327 This phenomenon establishes the possibility of meaningful 
resistance. 
 
4.4 Guilt and Wanting to have a Conscience 
 
 Whereas the call of conscience is fleeting and exceptional, wanting to 
have a conscience (even if one does not actually hear the call at any particular 
moment) seems to be a much more stable state for Dasein. Wanting something 
need not be as fleeting as actually attaining it.328 Heidegger claims that wanting 
to have a conscience just means “understanding the appeal” that conscience 
makes to Dasein.329 As such, we have to explore in greater detail what more 
there is to understand in the call of conscience than merely that Dasein is. 
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Heidegger observes that guilt and conscience are frequently connected in our 
common, non-existential concept of conscience. We usually feel the pangs of 
conscience when we feel that we have done something wrong (even if we cannot 
fully articulate what it was). He takes this clue seriously and attempts to draw out 
the existential meaning of this frequent association.330 A slight detour through the 
concept of guilt is therefore appropriate. 
 Heidegger notes that guilt is usually linked to responsibility, failure and 
lack. We are guilty when we were responsible for something and fail to live up to 
those responsibilities. In such circumstances, we are responsible for the fact that 
the situation is not the way it would have been (had we not failed). In other 
words, when Dasein is guilty in the common sense of that word, it is frequently 
interpreted as responsibility for a lack (for a negative) in the relevant situation. 
The possibility of this common interpretation of guilt implies that Dasein itself is 
capable of failure, of being responsible for lacks. Heidegger calls this Dasein’s 
“Being-the-basis of a nullity.”331 He pursues this interpretation of Dasein’s guilt in 
connection with the existential phenomenon of conscience. Conscience not only 
forces Dasein to confront its individual existence; it also silently forces Dasein to 
confront its own guilt. 
 In innerworldly interpretations of Dasein’s guilt, Dasein is presumably the 
basis of a innerworldly nullity. Heidegger gives the example of debts. One might 
fail to pay one’s monetary debts, in which case the nullity of one’s non-payment 
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is in the world as a lack of money (on a bank’s balance sheet, for instance). With 
respect to the anxious call of conscience, however, the nullity cannot be 
something in the world. Innerworldly interpretations are not available to Dasein in 
this state. This raises the question of how individualizing conscience can accuse 
Dasein of guilt. Accordingly, Heidegger has to explain what nullity Dasein is 
responsible for when it is individualized and how it is the basis of that nullity. He 
finds the nullity in Dasein’s existence. 
 When it is confronted with its own existence by the call of conscience, 
Dasein encounters a lack of its own. Conscience confronts Dasein with its 
individual existence, forcing it to acknowledge its “that-it-is”. But this is not all that 
Dasein must acknowledge about itself in its moment of conscience. It also 
recognizes itself as characterized primarily by possibilities. It must understand 
itself in one way or another, and it understands itself in terms of possibilities of 
interpretation. As I have described it above, in the un-innerworldly call of 
conscience, there are two possibilities disclosed to Dasein: being itself and not 
being itself. One might reasonably ask at this point what the basis of these 
possibilities is. Something must afford these possibilities in order for them to be 
available to Dasein. In the grip of anxious conscience, though, there is nothing 
but Dasein itself to be the basis of its possibilities. Therefore, Dasein is revealed 
as the basis of its own existence. Heidegger puts it thus: 
As long as Dasein is, Dasein, as care, is constantly its ‘that-it-is’. To this 
entity it has been delivered over, and as such it can exist solely as the 
entity which it is; and as this entity to which it has been thus delivered 
over, it is, in its existing, the basis of its potentiality-for-Being. Although it 
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has not laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made 
manifest to it as a burden by Dasein’s mood.332 
 
Dasein as the basis of its own existence constitutes a lack, and therefore a 
nullity, because it is its basis but is not responsible for so being. Heidegger 
observes, “‘Being-a-basis’ means never to have power over one’s ownmost 
Being from the ground up.”333  
Heidegger’s point here is that, as a self-interpreting entity, Dasein is as 
possibilities. In understanding, it is characterized primarily by potentiality. So, in 
being its own basis, it is the basis of the constellation of possibilities that it is. 
However, this formulation may suggest that Dasein in some sense precedes its 
own possibilities, either as an entity in which these possibilities are grounded or 
perhaps in a similar way to the way that a significant world precedes (and 
thereby contextualizes) the significances of individual items within it.334 
Heidegger contends that this is a misunderstanding: “In being a basis…Dasein 
constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but 
only from it and as this basis.”335 He goes on to say, “Dasein is not itself the basis 
of its Being…rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the Being of its basis.”336  
Hence, through the call of conscience, Dasein is revealed as being in a 
seemingly impossible situation. It is revealed as the only possible basis of its own 
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Being, i.e., as the only possible basis for the meaning and interpretation that 
characterize its own existence. In other words, conscience demands that Dasein 
provide meaning. It is simultaneously revealed as always lagging behind those 
possibilities of meaning and interpretation that characterize that existence. It 
ultimately cannot be responsible for those possibilities. It cannot in principle 
provide an unassailably authoritative, binding meaning. So, just as the world 
does not provide any ultimately binding meaning as revealed in anxiety, Dasein 
does not seem to be the solid foundation for meaning and interpretation that 
conscience demands. It is thus revealed as the basis of a nullity in this regard 
and hence as existentially guilty.337 
 Despite lacking power over itself as its own basis, Dasein is nonetheless 
called by conscience to be this basis. Though Dasein cannot stipulate any 
enduring meanings or interpretations for itself, it is still shown by conscience that 
it is and that it must be by choosing to be itself or not itself. Heidegger describes 
being open to this call and recognition of one’s own possibilities as wanting to 
have a conscience. In this openness lies the possibility of meaningful resistance 
to the everyday world’s interpretations. The phenomenon of guilt suggests that 
Dasein can be a source of meaning even during the breakdown of worldly 
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meaning, though any meaning that it can provide must be provisional. That is, 
the appeal of conscience reveals to Dasein the possibility of determining its own 
interpretations against those suggested to it by the public world. Heidegger puts 
it thus: “Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, 
which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as 
Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. ‘Understanding the appeal’ means 
‘wanting to have a conscience’.”338 That is, understanding the call of conscience, 
because it does not demand this or that interpretation from Dasein, is an 
understanding of oneself as free to choose from amongst available 
interpretations (and perhaps to generate one’s own, too). Understanding the 
appeal of conscience is recognizing oneself as an entity who is presented with 
choices and has the power to actualize some of those possibilities to the 
exclusion of others. 
 To sum up, the phenomenon of conscience is not something that Dasein 
controls and so can actualize whenever it wants. Dasein can choose, however, to 
be open to the call of conscience for whenever it calls. Being open to that call 
means always being ready to acknowledge oneself as the ultimate basis for any 
interpretation and meaning. No possibility of interpretation is ultimately binding 
upon Dasein. In this way, by always being open to the possibilities of being 
oneself and not being oneself (that is, being ready to choose between them), 
Dasein can resist the publicly available meanings and interpretations of the 
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world. Moreover, not only can it resist, but it can resist in a determined fashion, 
rather than being once again at the whim of something (or someone) else. 
Dasein can be open to and ready for the call of conscience without having to wait 
for any actual call. In this way, Heidegger locates the possibility of meaningful 
resistance to the pull of the world in the phenomenon of conscience. 
 
4.5 Resoluteness and the Situation 
 
 Thus far, my characterization of Heidegger’s discussion of the phenomena 
of anxiety and conscience has lacked concrete content. I have focused on the 
possibilities that these phenomena disclose to Dasein without filling out those 
possibilities in any definite the sense. (The most concrete possibilities have been 
Dasein’s being itself and not being itself, possibilities which remain indefinite 
insofar as they have not been related to any concrete possibilities of who Dasein 
is.) Heidegger describes the position thus far as being oriented towards 
“potentiality-for-Being”: 
Though the call [of conscience] gives no information, it is not merely 
critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein’s most primordial 
potentiality-for-Being as Being-guilty. Thus conscience manifests itself as 
an attestation which belongs to Dasein’s Being – an attestation in which 
conscience calls Dasein itself face to face with its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being.339 
 
However, the resistance to the pull of public interpretation cannot remain merely 
potentiality. Dasein only exists by being the basis of, i.e. choosing to be, 
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something or other. Accordingly, it must choose something concrete if it is to 
meaningfully resist the world, rather than merely hold itself aloof as possibility 
(which is impossible anyway). Additionally, it is always chasing behind its 
possibilities. It does not precede them in any way. The possibilities from which it 
can choose must then precede (in some sense yet to be defined) Dasein’s 
choice of them. My task in this section is to describe the origin of the concrete 
possibilities that Dasein must choose between, which are nonetheless 
conditioned by its openness to the call of conscience and the recognition of itself 
as a source of meaning (guilty). Heidegger describes this origin in his discussion 
of resoluteness. 
 Heidegger defines resoluteness as “letting oneself be called forth to one’s 
ownmost Being-guilty”.340 As guilty, Dasein is called to be the basis of 
possibilities that it has not determined. What, then, determines the possibilities? 
As already discussed previously, Dasein is primarily pulled into the world and 
understands itself in terms of the possibilities that the significance of the world 
affords it.341 These worldly possibilities are those concrete possibilities that go 
ahead of Dasein and that it uncovers as its own in resoluteness. Dasein always 
already is in the ways that the world enables it to be. Heidegger points out that 
“resoluteness…is always the resoluteness of some factical Dasein at a particular 
time.”342 So resoluteness as being called to existential guilt is the call to take up 
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in a new way the worldly possibilities with which one has concerned oneself thus 
far. The call of conscience allows one to be resolute, that is to choose to be 
oneself and to choose to allow other things and people to be what and who they 
are. 
The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its 
content’, nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but 
both one’s Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and 
concernfully, and one’s solicitous Being with Others, are now given a 
definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-
Selves.343 
 
It thus would be a misunderstanding to think that anxiety and conscience isolate 
and separate Dasein from the world. On the contrary, the world becomes more 
obtrusive in anxiety, and in their anxiousness, it must become obtrusive in 
conscience and resoluteness as well. The demand that Dasein be itself in the 
face of an obtrusive but ultimately insignificant world requires that Dasein take 
that world all the more seriously. 
 In taking the factical possibilities afforded it by the world seriously, Dasein 
discloses what Heidegger calls “the situation.” The situation is the contextualizing 
significance that enables Dasein to understand the determinate circumstances 
and possibilities that it must abide and take up.344 In resoluteness, Dasein must 
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be the basis for its possibilities. That is, it must take responsibility for those 
possibilities. Dasein must take up circumstances and possibilities as they have 
been publicly understood so far, but this does not mean that they remain so 
understood by resolute Dasein. By being the basis of its possibilities, Dasein 
explicitly takes up those possibilities as its own. Heidegger claims that resolute 
Dasein for the first time discloses the genuine circumstances and possibilities of 
any given situation.  
The claim here is not that there are no circumstances and possibilities 
prior to resolute Dasein; instead in resoluteness Dasein takes itself as the basis 
of the circumstances and possibilities that are disclosed to it in whatever situation 
it finds itself. It recognizes the situation as its own. That is, it discloses itself as 
the only entity that can give those possibilities and circumstances their 
contextualizing significance. To put it in Sartrean terms, in resoluteness, Dasein 
acknowledges itself as radically free to affirm or deny the significance of any 
factical possibility. Conscientious resoluteness discloses to Dasein that it can 
choose to be the basis of the significance of its own situation or that it can 
(illicitly) ignore its role in determining the significance of its situation (that is, it can 
submit itself to the determinations of something else – namely, the significance of 
the world). 
 It is worth noting that Heidegger’s analysis of resoluteness is not 
completed by connecting it to the disclosure of the factical situation. At this point 
in the existential analytic, he has not yet shown that in resoluteness, Dasein 
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cannot affirm possibilities that are not its own. It seems like, given Dasein’s 
proclivity for falling into the world, it is possible that one resolutely affirm the 
possibilities that the world offers as what one does (rather than what I do). 
Following the analysis of resoluteness, Heidegger goes on to discuss the 
phenomenon of anticipation in connection with the former. To show that resolute 
Dasein must understand as its own the possibilities that are afforded to it in its 
situation, he connects resoluteness to Dasein’s anticipation of its own death.345 
He points out that only in the recognition of its own impending (though indefinite) 
death, does Dasein acquire the definiteness that is required for resoluteness, and 
in particular the definiteness of being itself as opposed to not being itself. 
Heidegger repeatedly calls death “Dasein’s ownmost possibility.”346 That is, 
death is the one possibility that is unavoidably one’s own. Someone else cannot 
die my death, nor can I die someone else’s. In this sense, death is individualizing 
in much the same way as anxiety and conscience.347 
Dasein’s anticipation of its own death individualizes any resolution that it 
can take in any given situation. In other words, in anticipation of our own deaths, 
we recognize our respective situations (the specific circumstances in which we 
find ourselves and the particular possibilities that are opened and closed to us) 
as unavoidably our own. By being resolute in the face of the indefiniteness of its 
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own death, Dasein can resolve to be the basis of its situation. Heidegger puts the 
point thus: “anticipatory resoluteness…is rather that understanding which follows 
the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power 
over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-
concealments.”348 In other words, anticipatory resoluteness is the understanding 
of itself that frees Dasein to be authentic.349 
 It is important to mention that Dasein’s resoluteness does not allow 
Dasein to give authoritative and certain interpretations of itself and its situation. 
Heidegger makes this clear in a discussion of the kind of certainty that is possible 
for Dasein in its resoluteness.350 Dasein’s resoluteness is always tentative and 
open to revision. It cannot be bound by its past and future resolutions. Dasein 
does not create its situation through resoluteness; instead, it makes itself the 
basis of its situation through the recognition both of the factical possibilities that 
are afford to it by the situation and its free relationship to those possibilities (that 
is, the potentiality that characterizes those possibilities for Dasein). In light of the 
changeability of any given situation, resolute Dasein must keep itself ready to 
respond to shifting conditions and circumstances. In other words, to remain 
resolute, Dasein must remain malleable and responsive to the possibilities that 
characterize it and its situation at each moment. Heidegger puts this in terms of 
Dasein’s rigidity, openness and freedom: Dasein “simply cannot become rigid as 
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regards the Situation, but must understand that the resolution…must be held 
open and free for the current factical possibility.”351 That is, no resolution (and 
hence, no characterization of a given situation) can be taken authentically as 
absolute and unchangeable for all time. Situations change and Dasein’s 
resolutions have to change with them. In recognition of its own finitude with 
regards to its understanding of its current situation, authentically resolute Dasein 
must be tentative. Heidegger observes this point when he claims that, “the 
certainty of the resolution signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of 
taking it back – a possibility which is factically necessary.”352 Thus, in interpreting 
itself as the basis of its situation, Dasein does not form a static, authoritative and 
certain basis of its possibilities. Rather, it becomes a dynamic and tentative (i.e. 
finite) basis of its interpretations of its situation. 
 We should not draw the conclusion at this point that Heidegger has 
concrete, particular possibilities for authentic Dasein in mind. The kinds of 
possibilities with which any authentic Dasein is presented, and of which it can 
become the basis, belong more within what Heidegger calls “existential 
anthropology,” and that presentation falls outside the purview of the existential 
analytic (which is, of course, concerned only with the existential structure of 
Dasein).353 Despite this, we can extrapolate already the importance that history is 
going to have for authentic Dasein. Conscience and resoluteness are oriented 
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towards the worlds and possibilities that Dasein already finds itself in and 
amongst. In resoluteness, Dasein is to disclose its concrete situation by being the 
basis of these structures into which it has already been thrown and located. In 
the penultimate chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger turns to providing an 
analysis of Dasein’s authentic access to history. This analysis will establish the 
possibility of an authentic interpretation of history. 
 
4.6 Existential History 
 
 I will argue in this section that his philosophy of history contains a robust 
notion of how we historical beings can legitimately interpret our own history even 
as we are inextricably caught up in it. Heidegger’s discussions of the previous 
phenomena (anxiety, conscience and resoluteness) set the stage for his later 
presentation of a philosophy of history in the penultimate chapter of Being and 
Time. As we have already seen, these phenomena focus upon the world and the 
meanings and interpretations that it offers to Dasein. History is an important 
dimension of this source of meanings, and hence these phenomena are, at least 
in part, directed towards the historical element of Dasein’s existence. The 
challenge here then is to show that these phenomena, as they contribute to 
authentic existence, can underpin the possibility of authentic historical 
interpretation. 
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 To motivate the importance of history for Heidegger’s existential analysis, I 
want to point to a joke that was reported by Karl Löwith among Heidegger’s 
students. Apparently, in connection to resoluteness and authenticity, students 
were sometimes heard to say, “I am resolved, only towards what I don’t know.”354 
Resoluteness is certainly important in Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity and 
the authentic disclosure of Dasein’s situation, but his existential analysis provides 
us with little concrete content. As I have noted above, this is not problematic, 
since it would be inappropriate to examine Dasein’s concrete, existentiell 
possibilities in an existential analysis (which is concerned primarily with the 
existential structures of authenticity, not its concrete possibilities). I want to 
suggest here though that the analysis of history is an analysis of the source of 
our concrete possibilities (though, again, Heidegger will not provide us with 
concrete possibilities in an existential analysis of the historical dimension of 
existence). That towards which we should be resolved, the existential source of 
our resolutions, is history. Authentic interpretations of the sources of Dasein’s 
possibilities are, in part, authentic interpretations of Dasein’s historical situations. 
 The possibility of authentic historical interpretation has two important 
elements that should be distinguished here in order to clarify the path forward for 
Heidegger. First, he must show that Dasein can always have an implicit 
understanding of its historical situation that has not been captured by the world’s 
inauthentic meanings. In other words, it can authentically access its historical 
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situation. Second, he must show that Dasein’s authentic, implicit understanding 
of its own history can be made explicit through interpretation, and that such 
interpretation need not submit to inauthentic, publicly available interpretations. 
Heidegger approaches these questions in this order and I will follow his lead 
here. 
 Heidegger begins his analysis of Dasein’s implicit understanding of history 
by considering several ‘ordinary’ meanings and implications of talk about 
history.355 He discovers through this exploration of ordinary and commonsense 
views of history that the past has what he calls “a remarkably privileged 
position.”356 That is, when we think commonly about history, we normally orient 
ourselves around the temporal dimension of the past, rather than around the 
present and the future. This is not entirely accurate, since sometimes we seek to 
understand the history of the present, and so are oriented around that particular 
dimension as well, but the past certainly seems to have an important position in 
any historical reflection. Moreover, when we discuss historical objects or events, 
our discussions privilege the past as an important dimension. Historical objects 
and events seem to be what they are (that is, historical) precisely in that they are 
importantly related to the past. (This seems to be true even if we are primarily 
concerned with historical events and objects because of their effect on our 
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present and the future. For instance, one might be concerned with a deed to a 
parcel of land because of a present legal dispute, but when we do so, we 
privilege the authority of the past in settling questions of property ownership. The 
past remains important even in our concern for the present. With this importance 
of the past in mind, Heidegger’s question becomes, how exactly does the past 
contextualize those things that show themselves as historical? 
 Heidegger turns to objects that we typically think of as historical: namely, 
the antiquities that we find in museums.357 There are several reasons that one 
might think of them as historical and hence as being contextualized primarily by 
the past. It cannot be that they are in the past in some strong sense, since when 
they are encountered in the museum, they are precisely not in the past but in the 
present. It cannot be that they are in the museum because they are objects of 
what Heidegger calls “historiological interest,” that is, simply because they 
interest professional historians. They interest historians precisely because they 
are historical, not the other way around. It cannot be that they are historical 
because they were once being used and now are no longer being used 
(supposing that the antiquity in question is a tool of some sort). There are many 
pieces of equipment that are no longer being used and are not thereby historical, 
and there are many heirlooms that are still being used and are still historical.358 
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Instead of these features of the antiquities, Heidegger points to their belonging to 
a world that is past as their distinctly historical feature.  
 The antiquities in a museum are historical because they belong to a past 
world, that is, a world that is not anymore. They had a place within a context of 
equipment, a meaningful world that Dasein does not inhabit anymore. Any given 
world depends upon Dasein’s understanding. It is a meaningful world because 
Dasein inhabits, navigates, and understands it. Without Dasein, there would be 
no contextualizing structure to constitute a world (for such a structure is 
constituted by the understanding and interpretation of meaning, which is 
accomplished only by Dasein). Thus, the historical character of antiquities 
depends upon the existence of Dasein. To be precise, their historical character 
depends upon the historical character of Dasein as an entity that can have 
enabled a world in which those derivatively historical antiquities fit. Heidegger 
concludes that “Dasein is what is primarily historical” and “that which is 
secondarily historical…is what we encounter within-the-world.”359 With this 
priority in mind, he turns to an examination of Dasein’s fundamental historical 
character, which he calls historicality. 
 Dasein cannot escape the historical dimension of its world. Considered 
solely in itself, Dasein is not what Heidegger calls a “free-floating potentiality-for-
Being.”360 In resoluteness, Dasein is not free to resolve upon just anything. 
Instead, it already lives enmeshed within a meaningful world that affords it 
                                                 
359
 SZ, 381. 
360
 SZ, 144. 
218 
 
possibilities. The analysis of conscience shows this. Dasein is always in some 
sense coming along behind the possibilities with which it finds itself. For instance, 
one cannot resolve upon being a feudal knight because that world is not 
anymore. To be a feudal knight requires a host of meaningful relationships and 
involvements; one needs a liege-lord (along with the rest of the feudal hierarchy), 
wars fought over personal disputes between private citizens, perhaps holy relics 
to quest after, and so on. Without the proper contextualizing structure, one might 
act how one imagines a knight would act in the appropriate setting, but one 
would not be a knight. On the upside, though feudal knighthood is denied to us, 
there are many meaningful possibilities available to us through the world we 
inhabit. We have to decide who to be from the possibilities that we already find 
ourselves amongst. 
 Like any other dimension of its world, Dasein can understand the 
historical. It can do this in either of two modes: inauthentically or authentically. 
Heidegger is clear that for the most part Dasein understands itself, even its 
history, in terms of the publicly available, inauthentic possibilities of its existence. 
On the one hand, this is problematic in that Dasein is caught up in the 
interpretations of average publicness (from which escape is difficult, as we have 
seen). On the other hand, this is positive in that it provides Dasein with access to 
the phenomena of the historical. Heidegger’s challenge here is to explain how 
authentic understanding of history can arise out of the inauthentic understanding 
that Dasein already and usually lives through. He argues, in connection with 
219 
 
history, that although Dasein cannot escape the possibilities afforded by the 
world (and indeed, that it requires those possibilities in order to be anything at 
all), it can authentically transform those possibilities. This transformation is the 
heart of his account of how Dasein can authentically understand its historical 
situation even while being inextricably caught up in the midst of it.361 
As already clarified above, Dasein lives primarily out of the publicly 
available possibilities that the world affords it. Heidegger puts this thus when 
discussing historicality: 
As thrown, Dasein has indeed been delivered over to itself and to its 
potentiality-for-Being, but as Being-in-the-world. As thrown, it has been 
submitted to a ‘world’, and exists factically with Others…It understands 
itself in terms of those possibilities of existence which ‘circulate’ in the 
‘average’ public way of interpreting Dasein today.362 
 
The analysis of conscience and guilt established that this was true of Dasein 
existentially. When discussing historicality, Heidegger is also clear that Dasein’s 
authentic possibilities of self-interpretation, and hence of interpretation of its own 
historical context, are based upon these inauthentic, publicly available 
possibilities: 
The authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself 
from the way of interpreting Dasein which has come down to us, that in 
each case it is in terms of this interpretation, against it, and yet again for it, 
that any possibility one has chosen is seized upon in one’s resolution.363 
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The relationships that Dasein’s authentic existentiell understanding, “seized upon 
in one’s resolution,” can have towards the publicly available interpretation of 
Dasein and, importantly, the history of that interpretation as it has “come down to 
us” are indicative of the kind of transformation that is possible with respect to that 
ground of Dasein’s authentic understanding. Dasein’s understanding is always in 
the terms that the world sets, but this does not mean that Dasein always exists 
as captured by those meanings. A range of responses to the world’s meanings 
are possible. 
 Although Dasein is always tied up in the world and must start from that 
basis, moments of anxious conscience provide it with the possibility of taking 
charge of its own interpretations of that world and itself. As we already saw 
above, anxious conscience discloses to Dasein that the meanings of the world 
are not authoritative on their own. Instead, they require the acquiescence of 
Dasein to give them force. The phenomenon of conscience demonstrates the 
possibility of meaningful resistance to the world’s meanings. The phenomena of 
wanting to have a conscience and guilt disclosed that Dasein must take 
responsibility for the possibilities amongst which it finds itself. It could become 
resolute in choosing certain possibilities of existence over others, and of thereby 
understanding its situation in terms of the possibilities (meanings) that it has 
authorized by becoming their basis. Dasein transforms the possibilities that are 
afforded it by the world in the moment of resoluteness when it discloses its 
situation as its own and thereby discloses the factical possibilities with which it is 
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confronted by the world also as its own. It thus can take up the relationships to 
the world’s meanings that Heidegger mentioned in the observation above. It 
always interprets in terms of, against and for the publicly available interpretations 
that the world affords. It can affirm or negate any particular meaning, but it must 
always do so with the meaning. The world’s meanings always form an 
inextricable part of the situation that Dasein discloses, even in authentic 
resoluteness. Heidegger describes the realm of factical meanings that Dasein 
lives in and from which Dasein draws the possibilities that it makes its own 
(through choosing or rejecting) as Dasein’s heritage: “The resoluteness in which 
Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic 
existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as 
thrown, takes over.”364 
 Heidegger observes that in relating itself to its heritage, Dasein hands 
down the possibilities of existence: “In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s 
thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that 
have come down to one, but not necessary as having thus come down.”365 To 
understand what he means here, it might be useful to spend a moment on the 
idea of handing down. This is a translation of the word überliefern, which does 
mean to hand or to pass down, but as Thomas Sheehan and Corinne Painter 
point out, this word’s etymological roots lie in a word meaning to set free (it is 
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actually a cousin of the English word liberty).366 When Heidegger uses this word, 
he does not simply mean that something has been simply passed down (like 
parents might pass down a family heirloom to their children). In addition to the 
idea of having been handed a heritage that one must grapple with, Heidegger 
also means for the reader to understand ourselves as being freed up to grapple 
with that heritage. Hence, Dasein need not uncritically take over the possibilities 
of existence that are attested to in its heritage; in taking over those possibilities 
(in recognizing its heritage), it is freed to authorize or withhold authority from 
those possibilities as well. In being handed a heritage, there is hidden the 
possibility of affirming and (importantly) rejecting the public interpretation of that 
heritage. 
 Heidegger calls this existential structure, in which Dasein grapples with its 
heritage and recognizes the possibilities of existence that that heritage hands 
down (frees up), Dasein’s fate. He defines it thus: fate “is how we designate 
Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which 
Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has 
inherited and yet has chosen.”367 It is important to note that by fate, Heidegger 
does not mean some external imposition or some unavoidable future. He is clear 
that fate involves free choice by Dasein. In fact, it seems that only the fateful 
Dasein is authentic and so resists public worldly meanings. He goes on to say 
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that only the fateful Dasein can actually be affected by adverse events and 
circumstances. In other words, only the Dasein that grapples with its heritage in 
fate can have an authentically meaningful world (that is, a world that is its own). 
The structure of fate, as it arises out of conscience, guilt and resoluteness, 
enables Dasein’s authentic understanding of its world.368 
 Having established the possibility of authentic understanding as 
Heidegger has it, I want to pause here to consider some controversial points of 
my discussion. Tobias Henschen has provided an interesting (though ultimately, I 
think, problematic) account of some recent literature on the subject of 
authenticity. He claims that authenticity has been given a wide array of 
interpretations that are both diverse and have problematic implications.369 He 
discusses one implication that I should respond to, given that it may directly 
contradict my discussion above. He claims that a common view of concept of 
authenticity is that, for Heidegger, “Dasein’s existentiell possibilities are 
necessarily public.”370 I have endorsed this view above as well. It seems clear to 
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me that in several of the passages that I have quoted above, and in the 
phenomenon of guilt, Heidegger asserts that the authentic Dasein must choose 
from amongst the possibilities that it already finds itself amongst. 
To argue that this cannot have been Heidegger’s view, Henschen 
(somewhat bizarrely) draws upon the literature surrounding the necessary 
publicness of understanding for Wittgenstein.371 (It is difficult to know why we 
should think that Wittgenstein’s views matter for an interpretation of Heidegger.) 
More pointedly, though, Henschen goes on to argue that the possibility of cultural 
experts (that is, experts at using the meanings and involvements that they find 
around them) is inconsistent with the publicness of all existentiell possibilities. He 
states the following: “Experts who excel at what they do are capable of using 
tools and language in radically new ways. And if they are capable of using tools 
and language in radically new ways, they have existentiell possibilities that no 
one else has.”372 Hence, the existence of experts implies that some people have 
non-public possibilities.  
This argument seems to miss the meaning of publicness, though. 
Heidegger does not claim (and neither does Dreyfus, as I will explain briefly 
below) that publicness implies that more than one person actually share any 
given possibility of activity. All that it implies is that other people in principle could 
undertake the activity. So, perhaps there is a piano virtuoso who is the only 
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person who can play (expertly) Prokofiev’s second piano concerto (a notoriously 
difficult piece, I have been given to understand). Nonetheless, this is not a non-
public possibility. In principle, there could be other virtuosos (in the past or in the 
future, or undiscovered in the present) who could also expertly play the concerto. 
Dasein is always Being-with-Others, even when Dasein is alone. So, Henschen 
may be right to claim that experts can perform activities in radically new ways 
(presumably, ways in which no one else has ever performed them), but he is 
wrong to claim that the possibility of performing in that way is in principle denied 
to every other Dasein. Thus, Henschen has not shown that Heidegger cannot 
possibly have meant that Dasein’s existentiell possibilities are necessarily public. 
 It might be helpful at this point to consider another interpretation of 
Heidegger’s authentic Dasein. Hubert Dreyfus calls authentic Dasein “history-
making” and a “cultural master.”373 He compares such a virtuoso to the 
Aristotelian phronimos and claims that such a virtuoso can act in new and 
unexpected ways without drawing on non-public possibilities. The cultural 
master, according to Dreyfus’ analysis of skill acquisition, does what is 
particularly appropriate to whatever situation she finds herself in without following 
any prescribed rules of behavior. Since she is not following any rules, she cannot 
explain why it is that she acts in the way that she does. She thus may seem to be 
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acting unintelligibly to her peers, and hence it may seem possible that she has 
access to possibilities that are not publicly available. (The thought here is that, if 
the possibilities were publicly available, then any other Dasein would understand 
what the virtuoso was doing. Other Daseins do not understand what she is doing; 
so the possibilities that she is coping with must not be publicly available.) 
However, Dreyfus is careful to observe that the authentic Dasein 
undertaking masterful activity is in fact drawing upon culturally available 
possibilities. She is drawing on possibilities that have been revealed to her in the 
situation, revealed precisely through her conscientious and resolute activity. That 
is, he points out that the virtuoso can act in two different authentic ways that 
seem unintelligible in the moment, but that nonetheless are accessibly intelligible 
in the light of a wider context.374 The virtuoso can act in a way that is momentarily 
unintelligible but can become so in retrospect to its peers within its cultural 
context. One might think here of the first performance of Stravinsky’s Rite of 
Spring, the unorthodoxy of which was supposed to have occasioned a near-riot. 
It may have struck the audience as unintelligible in the moment, but it has since 
gained recognition as intelligible within the very culture that spurned it. In 
contrast, the virtuoso might also act in a way that is unintelligible in the moment 
but becomes unintelligible to those whose understanding has been transformed 
by the cultural production, and remains unintelligible to the un-transformed. 
Perhaps one could think of Jesus Christ as just such a virtuoso. One might argue 
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that his actions remain unintelligible to those who were not transformed by them. 
To those who underwent a transformation with the advent of Christianity, 
however, they became intelligible within the context that they produced.  
In neither of the above cases is the authentic Dasein drawing upon 
individualized, non-public possibilities. Instead, it is disclosing possibilities that 
were there all along and that in principle, other Daseins could perform. It is 
perhaps true that no one else recognized the possibilities that were inherent in 
the situation, but they were nonetheless there and drawn upon to provide a 
virtuosic performance in either mode. Dreyfus makes this point when he argues 
that the cultural master recasts “marginal practices” in a new light, thus 
transforming the context within which they are intelligible.375 Recasting draws 
upon possibilities that were already there. 
 
4.7 Existentiell Historiology 
 
 It is possible for Dasein to authentically understand its historical situation. 
The foregoing analyses of conscience, guilt and resoluteness establish this 
possibility. (Whether any human beings ever actual do understand their 
situations authentically is an open, ontic question at this stage.) It thus can enter 
into the hermeneutical circle in the right way (in a way that resists the pull of the 
world’s everyday interpretations). In anticipatory resoluteness, this happens 
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implicitly and need not rise to the level of explicit awareness. The task of this next 
section is to establish that Dasein can bring its implicit historical understanding 
into explicit interpretation without being pulled into the world’s inauthentic 
meanings. Doing so will ground the possibility that we might “make the scientific 
theme secure” and thereby show the possibility of “scientific” history as an 
activity of Dasein.376 
 First, a brief word about the idea of scientific history: Heidegger 
distinguishes the science of history (Historie) from several common 
understandings of history (Geschichte).377 He calls the science of history 
“historiology” and I will use this terminology in what follows. Historiology is a 
science, and as a science, it is “constituted primarily by thematizing,” to use 
Heidegger’s words.378 Scientific thematization is the explicit interpretation of a 
determinate region of entities. Heidegger puts it thus: “that which is familiar pre-
scientifically in Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the 
Being which is specific to it.”379 That is, in thematization, Dasein separates off a 
determinate region of entities that it already implicitly understands (with which it 
is familiar), and then explicitly interprets the entities of that region. The scientific 
interpretation of the region then makes explicit the structural characteristics that 
determine the relevant entities as belonging to that region: “The ways of access 
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to [the relevant entities] get ‘managed’ methodologically, and the conceptual 
structure for interpreting them is outlined.”380 
The role of prior understanding is important here. Dasein cannot engage 
in scientific interpretation where there is no pre-scientific familiarity. This is not to 
say that the pre-scientific understanding completely determines beforehand the 
scientific methodology and conceptual structure of what becomes scientific. The 
articulation of scientific procedures and definitions can (and I would imagine 
almost always does) clarify the entities under scientific study and makes possible 
unanticipated discoveries that were not prefigured in the pre-scientific 
understanding of them. That said, Dasein’s understanding of a region of entities 
conditions its access to those entities. The existential character of that access 
thus has implications for the possibilities of scientific interpretation that are open 
to it. The implications here are in terms of existential inauthenticity and 
authenticity.381 
Importantly for our purposes, Dasein can understand inauthentically, in 
submission to the public interpretations that are available to it, or it can 
understand authentically, from a position of anticipatory resoluteness towards the 
possibilities that characterize Dasein’s own life. It follows from these possible 
characters of understanding that the sciences, which inevitably depend upon 
Dasein’s understanding, can be inauthentic or authentic themselves, depending 
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upon whether they are developed from an inauthentic or authentic pre-scientific 
understanding. To put it in terms of history, historiology can be either inauthentic 
or authentic, depending upon how the possibilities of the past are disclosed to 
Dasein in its understanding of that past. Just as the individual Dasein can 
become inauthentic in its submission to worldly, public interpretations, 
historiology can become inauthentic in its submission to publicly available 
interpretations of the past. 
 The concept of repetition plays an important part in Heidegger’s analysis 
of explicit historical interpretation. Fateful Dasein understands the possibilities 
that its historical heritage has handed down to (freed up for) it as possibilities that 
it has inherited and yet has also chosen, since its possibilities run ahead of it and 
yet have no intrinsic authority (they can only elicit Dasein’s choice but cannot 
require a particular choice). Heidegger suggests that we can understand this 
handing down and freeing up as a kind of repetition. When Dasein makes a 
choice, becomes the basis of a possibility, from amongst the array of possibilities 
that characterize its existence in any given situation, it repeats that possibility. As 
Heidegger puts it, “the resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself 
down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come 
down to us.”382 
It may seem odd for him to claim that choosing a possibility is a kind of 
repetition, given that we normally think of repetition as implying that something 
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that has already happened before, while there is no indication that Dasein’s 
choice of a particular possibility implies that it has chosen that possibility before. 
For instance, repeating the 10th grade cannot be done without having gone 
through the 10th grade already, but Heidegger seems to be claiming that in acting 
like a 10th grader, one is repeating the possibility of being a 10th grader. Yet I 
think we can understand this as a repetition if we keep in mind that every 
possibility of authentic Dasein is a possibility that is tied up in Dasein’s 
circumstances (including its heritage), behind which Dasein is always following. It 
has to choose to be the basis of the possibilities that it already finds itself 
presented with in the world. As such, it must first take up the possibility as a 
possibility of its existence (that is, it must understand its possibilities as such), 
and then it must enact that possibility by freely choosing it (that, by giving it the 
authority over Dasein’s life that only Dasein can give it). Moreover, such 
choosing, in order to be authentically resolute, requires repetitive commitment. 
The student does not simply choose to be a 10th grader and that is that. (If she 
were to do so, as soon as she stopped choosing to be a 10th grader and just 
“went with the flow,” she would become thereby inauthentic in her continuing 
existence.)  To be authentic, she must at each moment choose to be what she 
has chosen for as long as she is resolute in that choice. 
The choosing of the possibility involves a repetition of the possibility: it is 
first handed down to Dasein as (falsely) authoritative, then it is chosen by Dasein 
and thereby made (genuinely) authoritative. To use the example from above, a 
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teenager is first presented with the possibility of being a 10th grader by the world 
(it is a significant possibility with a heritage and so forth), which the teenager can 
then repeat by explicitly acting in the ways that the possibility prescribes. The 
teenager can repeat the possibility as not merely a possibility that characterizes 
her existence, but rather as the possibility that characterizes what she is at this 
point in time. 
 We can understand repetition in another, closely related sense. The 
possibilities that are handed down to fateful Dasein in its heritage are not in 
principle unique to that particular Dasein (though they may be in fact unique at 
that point in time). Dasein is always Being-with-Others. The possibilities that 
Dasein understands for itself are repeatable possibilities of existence in the 
sense that other existing Daseins could choose them as well.383 The worldly 
possibilities that are handed down as a heritage are possibilities that have 
already been understood (and perhaps interpreted) as such. Dasein chooses 
from amongst possibilities that have already been. This is, after all, what it means 
for guilty Dasein to follow along behind its possibilities and have to make itself 
the basis of possibilities that already are. So, to once again take the above 
example, the possibility of being a 10th grader is one that many people have 
already had to choose or reject and that many people currently are choosing or 
rejecting. All that is up to any particular teenager is whether they are going to be 
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yet another instantiation of a possibility, that is, whether they are going to be yet 
another repetition of a common possibility. 
 The phenomenon of repetition makes possible Dasein’s genuine 
interpretation of its historical circumstances. Heidegger states that, “repeating is 
handing down explicitly.”384 This repetition need not be a repeat of some 
common possibility. In authenticity (that is, anticipatory resoluteness), Dasein 
precisely does not repeat some possibility simply because it is there for one to 
repeat. That would be to submit to the world’s everyday interpretation of a 
possibility of existence. Rather, in authenticity, the choice is made to be that 
possibility or not. Heidegger argues that the repetition, when the subject of 
authentic choice, makes a “reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that 
existence which has-been-there.” In doing so, genuine repetition “does not 
abandon itself to that which is past.”385 
Unfortunately for the reader, there is little surrounding these passages to 
fill out what Heidegger means here. Macquarrie and Robinson, in their translation 
of Being and Time, suggest that he means that in authentic repetition, the past 
proposes possibilities to Dasein which Dasein reciprocates with a rejoinder 
proposing new possibilities “as a sort of rebuke to the past, which one now 
disavows.”386 One should articulate here what the new possibilities are Dasein 
proposes against the possibilities that are handed down to it in its heritage. I think 
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we can understand these new, rejoining possibilities as those of Dasein either 
being or not being any particular, handed-down possibility. While the possibilities 
are handed down and freed up for Dasein from the past in its heritage (that is, 
they form the possible content of Dasein’s resolve in any particular situation), 
Dasein is still characterized by the unique possibilities of being or not being those 
possibilities at that particular time and place in its life. What is new is this 
particular Dasein’s resolute choice from amongst the possibilities of its existence. 
In repeating the possibilities of existence that have been handed down to it, it 
does not simply repeat some previous possibility (in other words, abandon itself 
to the past), but rather it takes up that possibility as what it can be now and in the 
future. Heidegger describes this phenomenon as follows: “The authentic 
repetition of a possibility of existence that has been…is grounded existentially in 
anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the 
choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps 
of that which can be repeated.”387 That is, in authentic repetition, Dasein has the 
possibility of disclosing to itself the genuine historical possibilities of its existence. 
This peculiar form of repetition establishes the possibility that Dasein 
authentically interpret its own existence in light of its historical circumstances. 
 Heidegger indicates the importance that repetition has for Dasein’s 
interpretation of its historical circumstances when he concludes that, “in 
repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the 
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heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own 
history made manifest.”388 By repeating a possibility of existence that has come 
down to it through its heritage, Dasein takes up its implicit historical 
understanding explicitly, and thereby enables historical interpretation. Explicitly 
repeating the possibilities of existence is an essential element of interpreting the 
possibilities that the world makes available to it. Choosing who it is going to be 
inextricably ties Dasein up in the world’s historical meanings (its heritage), but it 
does not thereby submit itself to that world so long as it recognizes that heritage 
as merely freeing up possibilities for it, amongst which it has the final and only 
authority. 
 It is important to note that authentic Dasein does not dismiss the 
possibilities that its heritage hands down to it. It does not simply “rebuke” and 
“disavow” the past.389 Instead, the possibilities discovered in the past are taken 
seriously by Dasein as the foundational possibilities of its existence. Its heritage 
provides the possibilities from which Dasein can and must choose. To answer 
Löwith’s joke, historical interpretation provides us with a range of possibilities 
towards which to be resolute. It provides us with the concrete possibilities of 
existence both in the past and in our given moment. The fact that it has a 
heritage enables Dasein to be something at all. In this sense, the hermeneutical 
circle of historical interpretation is important and not to be escaped. Coming into 
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the circle in the right way involves historical interpretation, since elucidating the 
possibilities that run ahead of Dasein is essential to Dasein’s existence. For this 
reason, Heidegger claims that “mathematics is not more rigorous than 
historiology [explicit interpretation of history], but only narrower, because the 
existential foundations relevant to it lie within a narrower range” and that “in the 
[hermeneutical] circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing.”390 
In the understanding and interpretation of history, we get the closest to 
self-understanding Dasein. Heidegger makes this point when discussing the 
relationship between historiology and the factual past of Dasein. He argues that, 
contrary to the common view of historical study as being about the past, 
historiology takes “the possible for its theme.”391 As already discussed in detail in 
a previous chapter, Dasein understands its existence in terms of what is possible 
for it. For Dasein, being something requires a “projection of itself upon a chosen 
potentiality-for-Being.”392 In order to be anything at all, it must choose to be 
something determinate, the possibility of which is afforded by its circumstances. 
This is as true for human beings in the past as it is for living human beings now 
(that is, the Dasein that has been is characterized by existence just as the living 
Dasein now exists). If one is to understand past Dasein and its worlds, one must 
understand the constellations of possibilities that characterized those existences. 
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Moreover, understanding one’s own historical circumstances involves 
understanding the possibilities that that dimension of circumstance affords. The 
possibilities of the past collaborate with Dasein’s power of choice to take power 
over the present and future. This is another way of saying that the past 
constrains and affords the possibilities of the present and future, from amongst 
which Dasein must make its choices about what it is to be. Hence, in studying 
history, Dasein engages in the attempt to understand the possibilities that 
characterize its existence. The concern with history is precisely the concern with 
one’s own existence. Heidegger observes, “because in each case existence is 
only as factically thrown, historiology will disclose the quiet force of the possible 
with greater penetration the more simply and more concretely having-been-in-
the-world is understood in terms of its possibility.”393 To take up his comparison 
of mathematics and historiology once again: mathematics is one way of 
understanding the world, but its relationship to, and resources for, self-
understanding are limited. Historiology in contrast is more robust, in that it is 
directed at the possibilities of the past and their relationship to the existential 
choices in the present. Historiology thus augments Dasein’s self-understanding. 
It performs a vital role in clarifying the ontical foundations of the ontological and 
thereby does more to disclose Dasein’s existential foundations. 
 Thus, Dasein can understand and explicitly interpret its own historical 
situation in a way that does not submit unthinkingly to readily available, public 
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interpretations of the past. This authentic understanding and its derivative 
interpretation depend upon Dasein recognizing in itself a power over the 
possibilities that the past affords it. Dasein must both recognize that it is 
constrained (and enabled) by the possibilities of its present as they have been 
handed down from the past, and that it has ultimate authority over which of those 
possibilities it chooses to be. Historical study and interpretation that is 
accomplished from this recognition has the potential to disclose genuinely the 
possibilities enabled by the past in the present for the future.  
 
4.8 Inauthentic Historiology 
 
 While it is possible for historiology to be authentic, it is of course possible 
for it to be inauthentic. Inauthentic historiology is submissive to the interpretations 
and meanings into which the world pulls Dasein. In this connection, I want to turn 
in this final section to Heidegger’s critiques of Rickert and Husserl’s accounts of 
historical interpretation. He argues rather obliquely that their accounts are 
inauthentic in that they do not recognize the possibility of irresponsibility toward 
historical interpretation. In other words, they do not recognize the possibilities of 
authenticity and inauthenticity in the interpretation of one’s own historical 
situation. There is thus reason to worry that their presentations of historical 
understanding do nothing more than inauthentically recapitulate the meanings 
and interpretations provided to them by the world. This problem is made 
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particularly acute and problematic in their claims to scientific objectivity in the 
science of history. 
 In the penultimate chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger presents three 
connected criticisms of Rickert. He merely mentions these critiques without 
providing much context or development. Having discussed the possibilities of 
authenticity and inauthenticity in historical interpretation, we are now in a position 
to understand the critique of Rickert’s philosophy of history. He names Rickert 
explicitly when clarifying what he takes to be “the problem of history.”394 He 
claims that philosophical accounts of history have too often focused on providing 
epistemological analyses of the science of history. They have viewed the 
problem of history as one of philosophically grounding the science of history as 
they presently find it. Rickert is particularly called out for focusing too much on 
“the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed” 
resulting in an analysis that assumes that history is only “the Object of a 
science.”395 The problem here is that Rickert takes the historical sciences as 
given facts, rather than as activities that one can interpret with a fair degree of 
latitude. 
Heidegger presents a similar criticism later in the chapter when he points 
out that as an activity of Dasein, we cannot explain the science of history by 
“‘abstracting’ the concept of historiology from the way something is factically 
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done in the sciences today.”396 This criticism is not explicitly aimed at Rickert, but 
we can see that the complaint at Rickert’s account of history, drawn as it is from 
an attempt to abstract scientific methodology from the present practice of the 
science. In the analysis of concept formation in history as a science, he does not 
question the viability or aims of the historian’s project. As a philosopher of history 
attempting to provide a logic of that science, he is trying to provide a firm, 
objective foundation for that already given science. In doing so, however, he 
does not make responsibility for that science a central theme of his analysis (as it 
must, if he is to provide an existentially adequate account). Instead, he tasks the 
philosopher with discovering objective values that are not the responsibility of 
any individual, and the historian with providing a generally acceptable (or 
philosophically acceptable in the light of objective values) representation of the 
historical past. 
 Heidegger levels a third criticism against Rickert. He argues that, in 
contrast to Rickert’s account, the theme of historical science is neither something 
individual in the heterogeneous continuum, nor a universal value that illuminates 
the individuals of the world in their meaningfulness.397 Instead, the theme of 
history as a science is “the possibility which has been factically existent.”398 The 
focus on possibility signals Heidegger’s radical break with Rickert’s conception of 
historical science in the context of his existential analysis of Dasein (and all of 
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Dasein’s activities). Through this focus, one can introduce the theme of 
existential responsibility for historical practice. 
 Heidegger’s three criticisms are developments of a central point that 
Heidegger makes against Rickert’s account of historical objectivity and practice. 
They each, and the third in particular, amount to shift of emphasis from the 
thematic content of Rickert’s philosophy of history to a new emphasis in 
Heidegger. Rickert stays firmly embedded in the Neokantian epistemological 
investigations and fails to take account of the existential dimension of historical 
study (that is, the dimension that is concerned with possibility and oriented 
primarily toward the future rather than the past). Once we admit, with Heidegger, 
that historical study is oriented toward disclosing possibilities (and is thus future-
oriented), we open the possibilities of taking responsibility for or of acting 
irresponsibly toward those historical possibilities. 
According to Heidegger, Rickert misses the role that history plays for 
human beings as a source of existential possibilities. Rickert’s account of history 
is too concerned with grounding objective representations of the historical past 
without concern for the ways in which the past informs and determines the 
possibilities for Dasein’s future. The past is not just an object of theoretical 
interest (and hence the object of a science); it is a focus of pragmatic concern. 
An existentially adequate account of history must acknowledge this element of 
history. Hence, scientific history cannot content itself merely with describing “that 
which has happened just once for all” nor “something universal that floats above 
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it,” neither individual objects in the heterogeneous continuum nor values that 
illuminate those objects. Individual objects in the past are not the central concern 
because, as Heidegger attempts to show, history is primarily directed at the 
future. Objects from the past are important insofar as they relate to the 
possibilities of a concrete Dasein’s existence. They signal the possibilities that 
Dasein struggles for and against. Moreover, timelessly valid values are not the 
central concern of history because Dasein is ultimately responsible for the 
authoritative character of those values. The values may motivate Dasein, but 
they have no intrinsic command over Dasein and thus cannot be considered 
timelessly universal.399 By failing to acknowledge the pragmatic dimension of 
scientific history, Rickert gets caught up merely analyzing the publicly available 
interpretation of history. He does not move beyond the publicly acknowledged 
values that underwrite the objectivity of historical representations. Historical 
objectivity, in its aim for universality, remains stuck in the validation of publicly 
available values. The logical analysis of concept formation in present historical 
practice thus cannot rise above the level of inauthentic philosophy of history. 
Heidegger attempts to liberate the philosophy of history by introducing the central 
concern of history as a (or perhaps the) source of Dasein’s possibilities. By 
loosening the hold that inauthentic analysis of the logic of scientific history as 
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historians presently practice it, Heidegger aims to open up the existential 
possibilities of history. 
 In contrast to Rickert’s philosophy of history, Husserl’s discussion of the 
philosophical-historical project in “Rigorous Science” takes seriously some 
forward-looking, pragmatic concerns of historical research. He argues that the 
historicist and worldview philosopher implies a future-oriented, critical-objective 
project. Additionally, that project is aimed at settling long-standing disputes and 
providing the bedrock from which future generations can “take positions.” Husserl 
is at least concerned with the possibilities of human existence, even if only 
tangentially in his discussion of modern distress and the critical project of 
philosophy. 
 Heidegger does not directly criticize Husserl in the chapter of Being and 
Time that focuses on history, and in fact I think he has an ambivalent attitude 
toward Husserl’s brief discussions of history.400 His critiques of Husserl come up 
in the context of other discussions throughout that work, and are focused 
primarily on Husserl’s conceptions of phenomenology and consciousness as they 
are developed his Logical Investigations and Ideas I. I am going to avoid those 
mentions here, however, because his critiques have been explored elsewhere 
and Husserl has little to say about history in those works. This is, of course, not 
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to say that Husserl does not have anything to say about history; it is only to say 
that his thoughts on the subject are largely developed later and elsewhere (in 
Ideas II and III and in Crisis of European Sciences, for instance). Heidegger does 
not even criticize the “Rigorous Science” essay directly in the context of history. 
Instead, he focuses on Husserl account (or lack thereof) of personal Being and 
attack on naturalistic psychology in that essay.401 For my purposes, I want to 
focus on Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity and critique of inauthenticity. 
From that basis, I think a criticism of Husserl’s view of the historical project of 
philosophy can be extrapolated. 
 To briefly recap: Husserl argues that the skepticism that derives from 
historicism and worldview philosophy implies a positive project for philosophy. In 
order to make skeptical claims about the pretensions to universality and 
objectivity of previous philosophical and cultural expressions, the historicist and 
worldview philosophers must have a standard of universality and objectivity. In 
other words, in order to claim that all previous philosophical effort has failed to 
achieve its essential aims (objectivity and universality), one must have a 
standard of those aims. Moreover, the judgment that all previous expressions 
have failed at precisely the same task (objectivity and universality) suggests that 
there is one essential task at which they all aim. Thus, there is a positive project 
of philosophy, one that aims at establishing a scientific philosophy. Such a 
philosophy, while impossible to complete, carries the promise of establishing 
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objective foundations upon which other philosophical, scientific and cultural 
expressions can be built. 
 The project that Husserl outlines takes the history of philosophy seriously, 
even as cursory as it is. The project is developed out of a serious engagement 
with history. Presumably (Husserl is not clear about this), the project will require 
detailed engagement with historical texts insofar as these texts have something 
to contribute to current philosophical work. This claim is lent some credence by 
Husserl’s engagement with historical texts throughout his career.402 In addition 
the project is oriented toward the possibilities of Dasein’s existence. To reinforce 
its engagement with history, Husserl’s project is developed as a consequence of 
a keen historical sense (that of the historicist and worldview philosopher). It is 
presented as a possibility for Dasein’s existence that is built out of historical 
possibilities. 
 As Heidegger emphasizes in his discussions of authenticity, the authority 
of a project requires the participation of Dasein. No project is possible without 
Dasein’s participation (human activities obviously requiring human activity). No 
project, even an erstwhile objective, scientific project, has the power to command 
Dasein’s assent. Dasein must freely choose the project and, presumably to stay 
consistent with such a choice, choose to submit to the norms that guide that 
project. Of course, Dasein need not actively make such a free choice when it 
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participates in a project (and, as discussed in a previous chapter, it almost never 
does make such choices). It is always possible for Dasein to passively and 
unthinkingly accept the norms of Husserl’s project, particularly as those norms 
are structurally regulated by das Man. However, there is nothing in Husserl’s 
discussion to preclude the possibility of inauthentic, irresponsible participation in 
scientific philosophy.403 It is not even clear from his discussion whether the 
project of objective philosophy should be concerned with the possibilities of 
authentic and inauthentic participation.404 However, as Heidegger points out in 
his discussion of inauthenticity, even scientific Dasein must face the possibility 
that her interpretations, and thus her projects, are inauthentic. 
Inauthentic participation poses at least one problem: the untimely closure 
of the project. Husserl’s objective philosophical project is susceptible, as are all 
human activities, to the regulation of das Man. In such regulation, everything is 
taken by Dasein to be publicly understood and interpreted. No further interpretive 
work is required. Heidegger called this the “tranquillizing” effect of inauthenticity. 
This attitude closes off further avenues of exploration. There is always the risk 
that, as the project moves forward, it becomes normalized, closed and 
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unquestioned (so long as it is not undergoing a crisis). In contrast, it was 
characteristic of Dasein’s authenticity that it always remains provisional and open 
to the future. Only in authentic existence can Dasein participate genuinely in 
Husserl’s project, because only then can Dasein choose the norms of the project 
as its own (as opposed to the publicly available norms of das Man) and take on 
an unfinishable, in other words essentially open, project.  
Despite his criticism of Rickert and his potential ambivalence to Husserl’s 
interpretation of our own historical situation, Heidegger does have praise for 
several philosophers when he turns his attention explicitly to history in Being and 
Time. In particular, he lauds Count Paul von Yorck and his correspondence with 
Wilhelm Dilthey and Nietzsche’s exploration of our pragmatic concern with 
history in his Untimely Meditations. I will focus on the latter here.  
Though Heidegger does not go beyond the existential-ontological analysis 
of historiology to discuss concrete historiological practice, he finds in Nietzsche’s 
essay one slightly more concrete, robust vision of the possibilities of authentic 
history and argues that his analysis explains its structure. In Untimely 
Meditations, Nietzsche discusses three kinds of historiology: monumental, 
antiquarian and critical historiology. These kinds can each be healthy and they 
can be unhealthy. Nietzsche argues that they are unhealthy in general when one 
is over-emphasized to the detriment and exclusion of the others. They become 
healthy when they cooperate together, complementing each other. Heidegger 
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argues that Nietzsche’s typology of historiological practice can be clarified by 
having its existential foundations unearthed.  
Authentic Dasein, Dasein that is open to the possibilities of existence as 
they are disclosed in and enabled by history, is “open for the ‘monumental’ 
possibilities of human existence.”405 Monumental historiology thus emphasizes a 
particular dimension of authentic historiology. It can go awry when it is over-
emphasized, though, as it suffocates the present. The possibilities of existence 
enabled by the past are recognized as Dasein’s own possibilities as this opens 
up the possibility of recognizing one’s own indebtedness to the past (this was 
made obvious in Heidegger’s discussion of existential conscience and guilt). This 
indebtedness can be taken up as reverence for the sources of Dasein’s present 
possibilities – that is, it can be enacted as antiquarian historiology. The 
antiquarian emphasizes another dimension of authentic historiology. Like 
monumental history, it can go awry if it is over-emphasized, it prevents the 
antiquarian from judging the relative significance of different features of the past, 
eventually mummifying her culture.  
Finally, authentic Dasein recognizes itself as the ultimate authority over 
any possibility of its existence, and this recognition is augmented by Dasein’s 
authentic interpretation of its historical circumstances. Historical interpretation 
helps Dasein understand its own possibilities, and thereby enable them to be 
living possibilities, and understand their origins in the past to which Dasein is 
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indebted. Such understanding helps shake Dasein out of its submission to the 
pull of the world’s public interpretations. Thus, Heidegger claims that, “as 
authentic, the historiology which is both monumental and antiquarian is 
necessarily a critique of the ‘Present.’”406 Existential authenticity explains the 
possibility of critical history as an emphasis of another dimension of authentic 
historiology. Critical history itself can go awry when over-emphasized as well. 
The critical historian may engage in the critical destruction of the past to such a 
degree that she undermines the sources of existential possibility.  
According to Heidegger, the interrelation of monumental, antiquarian, and 
critical approaches to history can be explained as the three dimensions of the 
temporality of existence discussed in his analysis of care: the future, the past and 
the present. This brief discussion of Nietzsche’s typology of historiology provides 
an indication of the kind of analysis that a Heideggerian philosopher of history 
might provide for more concrete forms of historical study. 
Nietzsche’s emphasis on the pragmatic concerns of history highlights a 
long-ignored but essential element of historical interpretation: historical 
interpretations have consequences, not only for those who participate in the 
science, but for those who live with those interpretations. The irresponsible 
historical environment of Nietzsche’s contemporaries stifled their creative, plastic 
powers. This happened in part through an over-emphasis of one or the other 
forms of historiology. There are pragmatic problems associated with an 
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irresponsible approach to history (though he does not call it such). Such 
problems, in Heidegger’s analysis, can only be ameliorated by taking 
responsibility for one’s historical interpretations. To avoid the pitfalls of unhealthy 
approaches to history, one must recognize the historical past not as a cabinet of 
curiosities, nor as a stifling, musty atmosphere, but as an essential dimension of 
one’s own existence that affords the possibilities from amongst which one must 
choose. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
 To draw this chapter (and the dissertation at large) to a conclusion, let me 
return now to some of the general considerations of the philosophy of history with 
which I began the first chapter. A great deal of the modern philosophy of history 
has focused on epistemological concerns. The need to secure the scientific 
foundations of history was made pressing by the surge of interest in historical 
study beginning in the early 19th Century, an interest that has hardly abated at 
this point, as the shelves of any bookstore – or perhaps book warehouse at this 
point – will attest. Heidegger’s work, in a way similar to Nietzsche’s, casts doubt 
on the claims of the historian to scientific objectivity. The foundations of historical 
interpretation are more complicated than the mere question of whether one has 
secured a solid guiding understanding of one’s subject matter. As he argued, the 
publicly available interpretations of das Man can form a solid foundation for 
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interpretation. As long as one conforms to what They think, one will not go 
wrong. To put this in the language of responsibility and irresponsibility: as long as 
one takes no responsibility for one’s interpretations (and thus one’s activities), 
one cannot go wrong. Irresponsibility covers up all personal faults so long as 
something else takes responsibility for those faults (mistakes made under the 
guidance of das Man are, after all, not my fault). 
Dasein can take just such an irresponsible approach to history, but it can 
also take a more responsible, authentic approach. As seen in this chapter, 
Heidegger argues that human beings are ultimately responsible for the 
interpretations that they accept or deny and that guide their actions. It is a false 
conscience that tells me that I am not responsible for allowing myself to be 
guided by a publicly available historical interpretation. Moreover, though I am 
frequently mired irresponsibly in everyday life amongst public interpretations, it is 
possible for me to cultivate a sense of personal responsibility that not only places 
a burden upon me with respect to my own role in interpretation, but also frees me 
to take cognizance of the genuine possibilities of my life. As Heidegger observes, 
the primary locus of historical study is not the past but the future. I need not only 
do what everyone does; I might do something else. 
If I may continue to employ the terms from the opening chapter, the critical 
philosophy of history has ignored these fundamental possibilities for human 
engagement with history. Modern philosophy of history has suffered from its 
emphasis on the critical branch to the exclusion of its speculative branch. 
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Speculative philosophers of history have certainly been metaphysically 
extravagant at times, but their central insight – that the philosophical study of 
history is not exhausted by purely epistemological investigations – is worth taking 
seriously.407 
Even if we want to abandon the notion that history has a meaning that is 
discernible solely through observation of historical phenomena, this turn leaves 
open the possibility that history may have meaning that is given by the human 
beings who have to live it. Heidegger’s existential analytic, focused as it is on the 
individual’s existence, is particularly fitting here. He articulates a conception of 
meaning and interpretation that is founded ultimately in human existence. The 
meaning of history is connected to the individual as a meaning-giving entity. The 
analysis of anxiety, where the meanings given from the world become 
inaccessible to the individual, is of special importance here. This central theme of 
Being and Time indicates a potentially fruitful way forward for the philosophy of 
history. 
                                                 
407
 There may be some concern here about whether these two branches of the philosophy of 
history can be clearly distinguished from one another. While we may not be able to distinguish 
them when they are heavily mixed (as they are in much of the philosophy of history, particularly 
prior to the mid-20
th
 Century), I think we can distinguish them in their extreme incarnations. The 
critical branch has primarily epistemological concerns and is exemplified by those purists who 
wish to expunge all metaphysics from the philosophy of history. In contrast, metaphysical 
speculation is essential to (and lends its name to) the other branch. I am not aware of any purely 
speculative philosophers of history, possibly because epistemological concerns become so 
pressing when engaging in metaphysical speculation. Though I do not want to go into this at this 
late stage, I would suggest that the classification of the critical philosophy of history (the term 
used with its 20
th
 Century meaning) by self-described critical philosophers was an attempt at 
policing the boundaries of the philosophy of history. By excluding (admittedly dubious) 
metaphysical speculations, the philosophy of history could be put on a sounder footing as a 
purely epistemological enterprise, though it may have lost something valuable in the process. 
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Existential accounts of historical meaning can rescue that meaning from 
its abandonment by the critical philosophy of history. Of course, an existential 
philosophy of history will have a host of problems that require attention. The 
question of authority in interpretation remains significant. Though I have tried to 
clarify that only the individual is ultimately authoritative with respect to her guiding 
interpretations, I have not commented on any criteria by which one might discern 
whether one is being authentic or inauthentic. An existential account would have 
to settle to some degree those criteria. I would also point to the potential for 
relativism as particularly pressing (if meaning is tied to the existence of the 
individual, then can we ever have a universal meaning and are there any non-
individualized constraints on the interpretation of history?). Having mentioned 
only a couple of difficulties (there are surely many more), I will leave them here. 
My aim at this point is to conclude and point a way forward, not to begin further 
investigations. 
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